IMPORTANT POINT
Accused cannot be convicted on the ground of suspicion, no matter how strong it is – There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between ‘may be proved’ and ‘must be or should be proved’.

JUDGMENT

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. The present appeal challenges the judgment dated 6th April 2018 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Criminal Appeal No. 261 of 1995, thereby allowing the appeal of the respondent-State which was filed challenging the judgment dated 26th March 1994 passed in S.T. No. 160 of 1992, vide which the learned 2nd Class Sessions Judge, Damoh (hereinafter referred to as ‘the learned trial Judge’) had acquitted the appellants of the charges under Sections 302, 201 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC’). The High Court, reversing the judgment of the learned trial Judge, had convicted the appellant No. 1 (Ballu Chaurasiya @ Balram @ Balmukund) under Sections 302 and 201/34 of IPC and appellant No. 2 (Halki Bahu @ Jamna Bai @ Jamuna Bai) under Sections 302/34 and 201 of IPC and awarded rigorous imprisonment for life under Sections 302 and 302/34 with fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months. Insofar as Sections 201 and 201/34 of IPC are concerned, the High Court further awarded sentence of rigorous imprisonment for seven years with a fine of Rs. 3000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for 5 months.

2. The prosecution story in brief is as under:

2.1 The deceased-Mahesh Sahu was in a love relation with Anita, who is the daughter of respondent No.2-Jamna Bai (appellant No.2 herein) and sister of Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund (appellant No.1 herein). Anita and deceased Mahesh Sahu resided at Agra for about eight months and then returned to Damoh. Thereafter, the marriage of Anita was solemnized with another person. Even then, they were in contact with each other. Due to this enmity, on 7th June, 1992 at about 11:00 P.M., the appellants caused death of the deceased in furtherance of their common intention. The prosecution relies on the evidence of Govind (PW-7), who saw that appellant No. 1 was dragging a dead body from his house. He had also seen his mother, appellant No. 2, who was washing the blood stains at the door of their house.

2.2 After Beni Prasad @ Beri Prasad (PW-1) and Sumitra Bai (PW-6), who are the father and mother of the deceased, came to know about the incident, they came to the spot of the incident. On the basis of the oral report of PW-1, an FIR (Exh. P-1) came to be registered at Police Station, Damoh.

2.3 Upon completion of the investigation, the chargesheet came to be filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class. Since the case was exclusively triable by the learned trial Judge, it was committed to the learned trial Judge.

2.4 At the conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Judge has acquitted the accused persons since the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent-State preferred an appeal before the High Court.

2.5 The High Court, by the impugned judgment, reversed the finding of the learned trial Judge, as aforesaid.

2.6 Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.

3. We have heard Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Shri Pashupathi Nath Razdan, learned counsel for the respondent-State.

4. Mr. Varun Thakur, learned counsel, submits that the High Court has grossly erred in reversing the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal. He submits that the learned trial Judge by giving elaborate reasonings, found that the prosecution has failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. He submits that the High Court in a cursory manner interfered with the said finding. He submits that the present case is a case of circumstantial evidence and unless the prosecution is able to prove the chain of circumstances beyond reasonable doubt it is not permissible to interfere with the findings of the trial Judge and to record the finding of conviction. He further submits that, in an appeal arising from acquittal, the scope is limited. Unless the finding is shown to be perverse or impos