SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Abhay S. Oka, Pankaj Mithal, JJ.
Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited – Appellant
Versus
Samir Narain Bhojwani – Respondent
Civil Appeal No.7247 of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.16451 of 2023) with Civil Appeal No.7248 OF 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.20359 of 2023) and CIVIL APPEAL NO.7249 OF 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 14238 of 2024) (Diary No.40494 of 2023)
Decided On : 08-07-2024
Arbitration - Remand to Section 34 Court - [MHADA] - [Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 34] - The court allowed the application for permission to file special leave petition and granted leave. The appeals took exception to the judgment and order dated 7th July 2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The factual aspects necessary for deciding the appeals were set out. The dispute began on 22nd March 2012 when the respondent alleged default against the appellant. The arbitral proceedings concluded in the form of an award made by the Arbitral Tribunal on 7th September 2018 in favor of the respondent. The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court to challenge the award. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court passed an order of remand to the learned Single Judge on the ground that the learned Single Judge did not consider several issues. The Division Bench referred to an application made by the third parties. Both the parties to the appeal under Section 37 have preferred these cross-appeals.
Fact of the Case:
The appeals took exception to the judgment and order dated 7th July 2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The dispute began on 22nd March 2012 when the respondent alleged default against the appellant. The arbitral proceedings concluded in the form of an award made by the Arbitral Tribunal on 7th September 2018 in favor of the respondent. The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court to challenge the award. By the impugned judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court passed an order of remand to the learned Single Judge on the ground that the learned Single Judge did not consider several issues. The Division Bench referred to an application made by the third parties. Both the parties to the appeal under Section 37 have preferred these cross-appeals.
Finding of the Court:
The learned Single Judge made an in-depth discussion on the factual aspects and the submissions of the learned counsel representing the parties. The Division Bench held that the impugned order is required to be set aside and the matter needs to be remanded to the learned Single Judge for de novo consideration. The Division Bench held that the impugned order does not address several issues raised by both parties before setting aside the Award. The Division Bench was of the opinion that the petition filed by the Respondent needs to be reconsidered.
Issues: The issue revolves around the power of the Appellate Court dealing with the appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act to pass an order of remand to Section 34 Court. The Division Bench held that the impugned order is required to be set aside and the matter needs to be remanded to the learned Single Judge for de novo consideration. The Division Bench held that the impugned order does not address several issues raised by both parties before setting aside the Award.
Ratio Decidendi: The jurisdiction of the Appellate Court dealing with an appeal under Section 37 against the judgment in a petition under Section 34 is more constrained than the jurisdiction of the Court dealing with a petition under Section 34. The Appellate Court can exercise the power of remand only when exceptional circumstances make an order of remand unavoidable. The object of the Arbitration Act is to provide an arbitral procedure that is fair, efficient, and capable of meeting the needs of specific arbitration. The object is to ensure that the arbitral proceedings and proceedings filed for challenging the award are concluded expeditiously. The proceedings have to be cost-effective. The supervisory role of the Courts is very restricted.
Final Decision: The impugned judgment dated 7th July 2023 in Commercial Appeal no.31 of 2023 is set aside, and Commercial Appeal no.30 of 2023 is restored to the file of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. The restored appeal shall be placed before the roster Bench on 29th July 2024 at 10:30 a.m. The parties to the appeal before this Court shall be under an obligation to appear before the concerned Bench on that day, and no fresh notice shall be served to the parties. The High Court will permit the appellants to file an amended memorandum of appeal containing only the relevant and permissible grounds. The concerned Division Bench shall fix a schedule for hearing of the appeal. The interim relief, granted by this Court on 11th August 2023, shall continue to operate till the disposal of the remanded appeal. The appeals are, accordingly, partly allowed with no orders as to costs.
JUDGMENT :
Abhay S. Oka, J.
1. The application for permission to file special leave petition is allowed. Leave granted.
FACTUAL ASPECTS
2. These appeals take exception to the same judgment and order dated 7th July 2023 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay. Therefore, the same are being decided together. We are setting out a few factual aspects necessary for deciding the appeals.
3. On 31st March 1993, the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) executed a lease agreement in respect of the subject property in favour of Andheri Kamgar Nagar Cooperative Housing Society Limited (for short, ‘the Society’). It is stated to be a society of slum dwellers. The Society, by the agreement dated 6th October 1996, appointed M/s. Aurora Properties and Investments (for short, ‘M/s. Aurora’) as the property developer to implement a slum rehabilitation scheme. M/s. Aurora was to construct 237 rehabilitation tenements for slum dwellers and 40 tenements for project-affected persons (PAPs) free of cost and develop the property using the available Floor Space Index (FSI) and dispose of the same. It appears that M/s. Aurora could not discharge its obligations. Therefore, by the agreement dated 22nd September 1999 (described as an agreement for the grant of sub-development rights), the society appointed Bombay Slum Redevelopment Corporation Private Limited (the appellant) as the developer. Apart from taking over the obligations of M/s. Aurora under the development agreement dated 6th October 1996, the appellant corporation agreed to hand over 15,000 square feet of builtup area in the redeveloped property to M/s.Aurora against M/s. Aurora paying the cost of construction at Rs.600 per square foot. After that, the appellant started the development of the property. On 10th March 2003, an agreement was executed by and between the appellant and one Samir Narain Bhojwani (the respondent), under which the appellant retained 45% of the total available FSI and permitted the respondent to construct the free sale area by allotting him FSI to the extent of the remaining 55%. According to the appellant's case, the respondent was appointed as a contractor to carry out the construction activities of the said building on the site. On 3rd July 2004, a deed of confirmation was executed to register the agreement dated 10th March 2003. Thereafter, on 11th September 2009, there was a letter/tripartite agreement executed, to which M/s. Aurora, the appellant and the respondent were parties under which it was agreed that the appellant would provide 22,500 square feet of constructed area to M/s. Aurora instead of 15,000 square feet, which was agreed to be allotted under the agreement dated 22nd September 1999.
4. The dispute began on 22nd March 2012 when the respondent, by his letter, alleged default against the appellant as set out in the said letter. After the letter was sent, there was a prolonged correspondence, exchange of drafts of the sale agreements, etc. Ultimately, the respondent filed a petition before the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Arbitration Act’). An Arbitrator was appointed. The arbitral proceedings concluded in the form of an award made by the Arbitral Tribunal on 7th September 2018 in favour of the respondent (the claimant before the Arbitral Tribunal). Most of the claims made by the respondent were granted. The counterclaim made by the appellant was rejected. The appellant filed a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act before the High Court to challenge the award. By the judgment dated 13th September 2019, the learned Single Judge of the High Court allowed the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act and proceeded to set aside the award on various grounds, such as perversity, patent illegality, etc. The respondent filed an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) of the Arbitration Act to challenge the judgment of the learned Single Judge. By the impugned judgmen
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