1. Challenge to High Court order condoning inordinate delay in filing a criminal appeal against acquittal based on a subsequent change in law. (Para 3 )
2024 Supreme(SC) 1277
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Hrishikesh Roy, S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ.
Hyder - Appellant
Versus
State Of Kerala - Respondent
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. ........OF 2024 (ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 14267 OF 2023)
Decided On : 10-12-2024
Important Points
Subject
Criminal Law - Appeals
Headnote
(B) Acquittal - The acquittal was based on multiple reasons, including the failure of the prosecution to establish the chain of evidence regarding the contraband. The court emphasized that the change of law cannot undermine the acquittal judgment rendered in favor of the appellant. (Paras 4, 10)
Facts of the case:
The appellant was acquitted on 10.12.2018, with the trial court relying on the law in Mohanlal. The State filed an appeal after a significant delay, citing a change in law as the basis for condonation.
Findings of Court:
The court found that the delay of 1184 days was not justified and that the acquittal could not be overturned based solely on a change in law.
Issues: The main issues were whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned based on a change in law and the validity of the acquittal.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that a change in law does not provide grounds for condoning delay in cases already decided, emphasizing the importance of timely appeals.
Result: The appeal is allowed.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Advocate Appeared:
For the Appellant : Mr. Ritesh Kumar Chowdhary, AOR, Mr. Niyas Valiyathodi, Adv., Mr. Akash Kumar Singh, Adv.
For the Respondent: Mr. Harshad V. Hameed, AOR, Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, Adv., Mrs. Ashly Harshad, Adv., Mr. Amar Nath Singh, Adv.
Table of Contents
2. Whether a subsequent change in law justifies condoning inordinate delay in filing an appeal against an acquittal based on the previous legal position. (Para 4 , 6 )
3. The acquittal was based on multiple grounds beyond the overruled precedent, and no sufficient explanation was provided for the extensive delay in filing the appeal. (Para 7 , 8 )
4. A subsequent change in law cannot be a ground to reopen or re-decide a case that has already been decided. (Para 9 , 10 )
5. High Court order condoning the delay is set aside and the appeal is allowed. (Para 10 )
6. Does a subsequent change in law justify condoning an inordinate delay in filing an appeal against a decided case?
No. A subsequent change of law is not attracted unless a case is pending before a competent court. If a case has already been decided, it cannot be reopened or re-decided solely based on a new interpretation of the law. (Para 9 , 10 )
7. Can a change in law be the sole basis for condoning delay if the original judgment was based on multiple grounds?
No. If the acquittal was based on multiple reasons, including factual failures such as the prosecution's inability to establish the sample's identity, a change in law on one specific point cannot justify condoning an inordinate delay. (Para 8 , 10 )
ORDER :
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard Mr. Ritesh Kumar Chowdhary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Dileep Poolakkot, learned counsel appearing for the State of Kerala.
3. The challenge here is to the order (dated 23.06.2023) of the High Court whereunder, the State’s application for condonation of delay of 1184 days in presenting the Criminal Appeal was allowed. The impugned order reads as under:
“This application is filed seeking to condone the delay of 1184 days in filing the appeal. The appeal is filed against the judgment by which the trial court acquitted the respondent based on the decision in Mohanlal v. State of Punjab [2018 (3) KLT 852 (SC)]
2. Learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the law laid down as per the decision in Mohanlal (supra) was held per incuriam and overruled by Mukesh Singh. v. State Narcotic Branch, Delhi [2020 (10) SCC 120].
3. Learned counsel for the respondent submitted that a subsequent change in law cannot be a ground for condoning the delay, particularly when the appeal was not pending when the subsequent decision was rendered.
4. As the judgment under appeal is seen rendered solely based on the dictum in Mohanlal (supra) and the legal position having changed, the appeal has to be heard on merits. Being so, the delay is liable to be condoned.
Hence, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned.”
4. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant was acquitted on 10.12.2018 by the learned Special Court and that the acquittal was based on multiple reasons including the fact that there is no reliable or cogent material before the Court to show that the sample which reached the laboratory, was indeed the sample drawn from the contraband seized from the possession of the accused. On the aspect of the acquittal being based on the law declared by this Court in Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab reported in (2018) 17 SCC 627, the counsel submits that under the ratio in the said judgment, it was held that a fair investigation would postulate that the informant and the investigator must not be the same person. It is therefore contended that merely because there is change of law on this aspect in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) reported in (2020) 10 SCC 120, the High Court could not have condoned the inordinate delay in presenting the special appeal.
5. In Mukesh Singh (supra), the Court said that in a case where the informant himself is the investigator, that by itself cannot be sufficient to hold that the investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or like factor. The question of bias or prejudice would depend upon facts and circumstances of each case.
6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the State would argue that when there is a change of law and the Court subsequently clarified that the informant can also be the investigator in Mukesh Singh (supra), the condonation of delay by the High Court on account of the change of law, cannot be faulted.
7. We have perused the application for condonation of delay filed by the State before the High Court and notice that there is hardly any acceptable explanation to condone the huge delay of 1184 days, in presenting the appeal. Nothing is mentioned as to why, following the acquittal of the appellant on 10.12.2018, the State waited for over 3 years, to file the appeal on 16.09.2022.
8. As earlier noted, the acquittal of the appellant was not only because of the judgment in Mohan Lal (supra) but it also was based on the failure of the prosecution to establish that the sample which was sent to the laboratory, was drawn from the contraband, seized from the possession of the accused.
9. On the arguments, we may benefit by adverting to the decision in Delhi Development Authority v. Tejpal & Ors. reported in (2024) 7 SCC 433 where the Court held as under:
“47. To sum up, we hold that subsequent change of law will not be attracted unless a case is pending before the competent court awaiting its final adjudication. To say it