IMPORTANT POINT
Quashing of Sanction Order – Whether Sanction has been granted by competent authority or not, would be a matter of evidence – High Court should not have quashed Sanction Order and consequent proceedings, unless it was satisfied that failure of justice had occurred by such error or irregularity or invalidity.

JUDGMENT

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal, filed by the appellant-State of Punjab, is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated 20.05.2019, passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CRM-M No. 11994 of 2019 (O&M), whereby the said petition, filed by the respondent-accused seeking quashing of Sanction Order dated 19.11.2018, in the case arising out of F.I.R. No. 02 dated 10.01.2024, registered at Police StationVigilance Bureau, Patiala Range, Patiala for the offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short “the Act”), has been allowed and the consequent proceedings arising therefrom have been set aside.

3. Heard learned counsels for the parties.

4. It is sought to be submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant-State of Punjab that the High Court had passed the impugned order when the trial had already commenced and the prosecution had already examined seven witnesses. Learned counsel places heavy reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of State of Karnataka, Lokayukta Police Versus S. Subbegowda (2023 SCC Online SC 911), to submit that the High Court has committed an error in quashing the Sanction Order and setting aside the proceedings arising therefrom when the trial has already commenced.

5. However, the learned counsel for the respondent-accused submits that the High Court has rightly quashed the proceedings considering the fact that earlier, Sanction sought was not granted by the competent authority and now, the impugned Sanction Order has been passed by an officer who was not competent to grant the Sanction to prosecute the respondent-accused.

6. The short question that arises for determination of this Court is whether the High Court could have set aside the impugned Sanction Order and the proceedings arising therefrom, more particularly, when the trial had already commenced and the prosecution had examined seven witnesses.

7. In our opinion, the judgment in the case of S. Subbegowda (supra) clinches the issue, in which, this Court in the similar facts and circumstances, after considering the provisions contained in Section 19 of the Act, has held as under: -

“11. The combined reading of sub-section (3) and (4) of Section 19 makes it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no finding, sentence or order passed by the Special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a Court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of, the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of the Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. sub-section

(4) further postulates that in determining under subsection (3) whether the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction has occasioned, or resulted in failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. The explanation to sub-section (4) further provides that for the purpose of Section 19, error includes “competency of the authority to grant sanction”. Thus, it is clear from the language employed in sub-section (3) of Section 19 that the said sub-section has application to the proceedings before the Court in appeal, confirmation or revision, and not to the proceedings before the Special Judge. The said sub-section (3) clearly forbids the court in appeal, confirmation or revision, the interference with the order passed by the Special Judge on the ground that the sanction was bad, save and except in cases where the appellate or revisional court finds that the failure of justice had occurred by such invalidity.”

12. & 13……………………………

14. In the instant case, the Special Judge proceeded with the trial, on the second application for discharge filed by the respondent having not been pressed for by him. The Special Judge, while dismissing the third application filed by