IMPORTANT POINT
Divorce – A dead marriage must be given a decent quietus – Continuing such a marriage would only perpetuate hardship and serve no useful purpose.

JUDGMENT :

(Vikram Nath, J.)

1. The present appeal arises from the judgment dated 28.06.2023 passed by the High Court of Jharkhand in First Appeal No. 242 of 2019, whereby the appellant/husband's appeal was dismissed, affirming the judgment dated 02.07.2019 of the Family Court, Ranchi in Original Suit No. 107 of 2014. By the said judgment, the Family Court dismissed the appellant's petition for dissolution of marriage under Sections 13(1)(ia) and (iii) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955¹[HMA].

2. The marriage between the appellant and the respondent was solemnized on 24.11.2012. Two children were born out of the said wedlock. The first child, a daughter, was born on 17.08.2013. Thereafter, on 06.03.2014, the appellant instituted a petition under Sections 13(1)(ia) and (iii) of the HMA before the Family Court, Ranchi (M.T.S. No. 107 of 2014), seeking a decree of divorce. At the time of filing the suit, the respondent was pregnant with their second child.

2.1. Subsequently, the respondent filed Complaint Case No. 1980/2014, alleging mental and physical cruelty against the appellant and his parents, invoking provisions of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. On 30.11.2014, the respondent gave birth to their second child, who was diagnosed with cerebral palsy. In the divorce proceedings, the appellant alleged that the respondent subjected him and his family to verbal abuse, amounting to cruelty. These allegations were denied by the respondent, who countered with allegations of mental and physical cruelty inflicted upon her by the appellant.

2.2. Upon hearing both parties, the Family Court vide its order dated 02.07.2019, dismissed the appellant’s petition for divorce. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred First Appeal No. 242 of 2019 before the High Court.

2.3. The High Court, by the impugned judgment dated 28.06.2023, dismissed the appeal, holding inter alia that since the parties cohabited until March 2014, the allegations of cruelty made prior thereto could not be sustained, particularly in view of the fact that the second child was born on 30.11.2014.

2.4. Aggrieved by the concurrent findings of both Courts below, the appellant has approached this Court.

3. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for both parties and have carefully perused the record. Both parties were also present appellant through video conferencing and respondent in person. They were also heard.

4. The appellant now seeks dissolution of marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown. It is submitted that the parties have lived separately for over eleven years and that the relationship has been irreparably damaged by prolonged hostility, deep-seated bitterness, and mutual allegations of a grave and serious nature. The marriage, it is contended, has reached a point of no return, with no possibility of reconciliation or revival.

5. It is undisputed that two children were born out of the wedlock. The appellant submits that the elder daughter, presently aged about 12 years, has been in his exclusive care and custody since her infancy. She has been residing with him since the age of six months, and all expenses relating to her education and upbringing are being borne solely by him.

6. On the other hand, the respondent states that the second child, born in November 2014 and diagnosed with cerebral palsy, was under her sole care from birth. Unfortunately, the said child passed away after a few years. The respondent submits that she single-handedly provided care and support for the special needs of the second child during this time.

7. The appellant further submits that, despite the prolonged separation of more than a decade, the respondent has never approached any court seeking custody or visitation rights concerning the elder daughter. He thus asserts that the custody of the child has lawfully and practically remained with him. Nonetheless, he expresses that he has no objection if reasonable visitation rights ar