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2025 Supreme(SC) 805
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SURYA KANT, NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, JJ.
Tushar Himatlal Jani – Appellant
Versus
Jasbir Singh Vijan & Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal No. 6636 of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 2657 of 2025)
Decided On : 13-05-2025
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Amit Dhingra, Adv. Mr. Anirudh Arunkumar, Adv. For M/S. Dua Associates, AOR
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Arunabh Chowdhury, Sr. Adv. Mr. Anuroop Chakravarti, Adv. Mr. Ramit Singh, Adv. Mr. M S Vishnu Sankar, Adv. Mr. Mitesh Parekh, Adv. Ms. Athira G Nair, Adv. For M/S. Lawfic, AOR Mr. C. George Thomas, AOR
IMPORTANT POINT
Interim injunction cannot be granted without satisfying all three essential prerequisites.
Headnote:
Civil Procedure Code, 1908 - Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 - Interim injunction - Grant of - Parameters - Before granting interim injunction, Court must satisfy itself of three essential prerequisites: firstly, existence of a prima facie case in favour of applicant evincing reasonable probability of success at trial; secondly, that balance of convenience lies in favour of granting injunctive relief; and thirdly, that applicant would suffer irreparable injury or harm not adequately compensable in damages if injunction is refused - It is only when these three conditions are cumulatively fulfilled that interim injunction ought to be granted - Appellant is absolute owner of property, with disputed area constituting merely a fraction of entire premises - Appellant has already entered into agreement to redevelop property - Restraint imposed by impugned injunction significantly circumscribes Appellant's legal right to derive commercial benefit from his property - Injunction has inordinately impeded entire redevelopment project for a relatively small disputed portion - Appellant would suffer irreparable injury if injunction is allowed to operate, given that protracted delay is not only causing substantial financial losses but also affecting Appellant's contractual obligations, which cannot be adequately compensated at a belated stage - Impugned order of High Court set aside. (Paras 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19)
Facts of the case:
Instant appeal is directed against the order dated 30.07.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay (High Court) restraining the Appellant from dispossessing Respondent No. 1 or creating any third-party interest in the disputed premises.
Findings of Court:
With a view to balance equities, Appellant directed to keep one unit measuring about 550 square feet reserved in developed property as a security to protect alleged rights of Respondent No. 1, in the event that suit pending before Small Causes Court is decided in his favour.
Result : Appeal allowed.
JUDGMENT :
(Surya Kant, J.)
Leave granted.
2. The instant appeal is directed against the order dated 30.07.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay (High Court) restraining the Appellant from dispossessing Respondent No. 1 or creating any third-party interest in the disputed premises.
3. The facts leading to the instant appeal are that the Appellant’s father was the owner of a plot admeasuring 22,000 square feet bearing C.T.S. Nos.443(part), 451(part), 452A(part) at Vittalwadi, Ghatala Village, Chembur, Mumbai. Out of the said area, the Appellant’s father leased out 11,250 square feet i.e. the subject land, to a partnership firm, namely M/s Silver Chem (India)/Respondent No.2, which was owned by the Vijan family members in 1972. It seems that upon the death of his father, the entire property devolved upon the Appellant. The Appellant terminated the above-mentioned lease agreement vide notice dated 11.02.2008 and, in furtherance thereof, filed Eviction Suit No. 119/148 of 2008 before the Small Causes Court at Bombay (Small Causes Court).
4. Notably, Respondent No.1, who claims to be the legal heir of one of the partners of Respondent No. 2, allegedly runs a business from the suit structure in the name and style of M/s Asset Motors. He, thus, filed an Impleadment Application in the Eviction Suit, contending that he is a necessary and proper party whose rights would be directly affected by the outcome of the proceedings. Respondent No.1 postulated his undivided share in the business of Respondent No. 2 by virtue of a Memorandum of Understanding executed amongst the Vijan family members and further relied on his institution of a separate suit (bearing No.441/2014) before the High Court seeking partition of his 1/6th undivided share in all the properties owned and held by the Vijan family. The Small Causes Court allowed the impleadment application vide order dated 06.10.2016. The Appellant, being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, preferred a revision petition before the Appellate Small Causes Court, which was allowed vide order dated 03.05.2019, setting aside the order of impleadment.
5. Members of the Vijan family, i.e. the partners of Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 1, purportedly entered into a Family Settlement Agreement on 09.06.2021 to resolve their inter se differences, which referred to Respondent No. 1’s entitlement to 550 square feet area within the subject land. This Family Settlement was the outcome of mediation efforts facilitated by a learned Mediator appointed by this Court in several petitions between members of the Vijan family. According to Respondent No.1, the Agreement ostensibly provided him with an undivided share in the premises, wherein he claims to have been allocated 550 square feet out of the total area of 22,000 square feet with entitlement to ‘receive right, title, interest, free of any encumbrances’ therein.
6. In the aftermath of this settlement, several consequential events unfolded. Evidently, the partners of Respondent No. 2, along with Respondent No.1, entered into a Lease and License Agreement dated 15.10.2021, with M/s KMG Global as the licensee, for a period of 12 months in respect of the subject land. The Appellant has categorically asserted that this Agreement was executed without his consent and knowledge. Subsequently, Respondent No. 2 firm and its partners claimed to have surrendered their tenancy rights on 19.10.2022 qua the subject land. Pursuant to these developments, Respondent No. 1 once again filed an impleadment application in the Eviction suit relying on the Family Settlement Agreement. He simultaneously lodged an application before the Registrar of Firms seeking recognition as a partner in Respondent No. 2 firm. Whilst these applications remained pending, Respondent No. 1 instituted a separate suit, which, according to the Appellant, was merely an attempt to create a paper trail of Respondent No. 1’s alleged physical possession of the disputed area in the subject land.
7. It appears t
