Jittu Yadav vs State of Chhattisgarh

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2026 Supreme(SC) 727

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
B.V. NAGARATHNA, UJJAL BHUYAN, JJ.
Jittu Yadav – Appellant
Versus
State of Chhattisgarh & Others – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 2911 of 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 4727 of 2026)
Decided On : 27-05-2026

Important Points

Statutory silence regarding the condonation of delay in a special law does not automatically exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Unless a statute contains express restrictive language, the principle of condoning delay for sufficient cause remains applicable to ensure access to justice in appellate proceedings.

Subject

Criminal Law - Externment and Preventive Measures

Act Referred

CHHATTISGARH RAJYA SURAKSHA ADHINIYAM: S.9
COMPANIES ACT: S.421(3)
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: Art.19(1)(d), Art.21, Art.226
LIMITATION ACT: S.29(2), S.5, S.27, S.3, S.4, S.24

Headnote

(A) Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 - Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9 - Externment order - Appeal against order - Limitation period - Applicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 to special or local law - Whether appellate authority can condone delay - No express exclusion of Section 5 of Limitation Act found in the statute - Right to appeal is a substantive right entailing serious civil consequences affecting liberty, movement and livelihood - Silence of statute on condonation of delay does not imply exclusion of Section 5 unless specifically mandated. (Paras 3, 5, 9, 21, 24, 25)

(B) Limitation Act, 1963 - Section 5 and Section 29(2) - Applicability of general law of limitation to special enactments - Principles for determining implied exclusion - Presence of restrictive language like 'but not thereafter' or 'not exceeding' is necessary to qualify as express or necessary implication of exclusion - Absence of such language in the special law confers jurisdiction upon authorities to condone delay for sufficient cause. (Paras 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 24)

Facts of the case:
The appellant challenged an order of externment by filing an appeal before the relevant government authority approximately 50 days after the order was passed. The appeal was dismissed solely on the ground of being barred by the 30-day limitation period prescribed under the special local legislation. The High Court upheld this dismissal. The matter reached this forum on the question of whether the delay could be condoned.

Findings of Court:
The court determined that the special legislation is not a self-contained code regarding limitation and contains no restrictive language suggesting that the expiration of the 30-day period results in a lack of jurisdiction. Emphasizing that the right of appeal is an essential procedural safeguard against the exercise of power affecting fundamental rights, the court concluded that the general provisions of the Limitation Act remain applicable unless specifically excluded.

Issues: Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act is excluded, either expressly or by necessary implication, from proceedings under Section 9 of the local Act.

Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of express statutory language or a scheme indicating that the limitation period is absolute and incapable of enlargement, the general law of limitation applies. Section 5 of the Limitation Act operates to allow for the condonation of delay in the interest of justice where sufficient cause is shown, preventing the deprivation of an appellate remedy on purely technical grounds.

Result: Appeal allowed; impugned judgment set aside; appeal before the appellate authority restored with directions for fresh adjudication.

Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant : Mr. Ashish Kumar Pandey, Adv. Mr. Shivank Mishra, ADv. Mr. Suyash Rawat, Adv. Mr. Trevence Shankar Sahu, ADv. Mr. Yogisha Singh Rajput, Adv. Mr. Mayank Pandey, AOR
For the Respondents: Mr. Rajat Nair, A.A.G. Mr. Ambuj Swaroop, Adv. Mr. Prashant Singh, AOR Mrs. Prerna Dhall, Adv. Mr. Digvijay Singh, Adv.

Table of Content
1. summary of facts regarding the externment order and subsequent dismissal of appeal on limitation grounds. (Para 2 , 3)
2. parties' contentions regarding the applicability of section 5 of the limitation act to the adhiniyam. (Para 5 , 6)
3. overview of statutory provisions regarding externment and appeal timelines under the adhiniyam. (Para 8 , 9)
4. general legal principles regarding the right to appeal and the scope of the limitation act. (Para 10 , 11 , 12 , 13 , 14 , 15 , 16 , 17 , 18)
5. analysis of whether the adhiniyam excludes section 5 of the limitation act by necessary implication. (Para 19 , 20 , 21 , 22 , 23 , 24)
6. final ruling: section 5 applies as it is not excluded; the dismissal on limitation is set aside. (Para 25 , 26 , 27)

JUDGMENT :

B.V. NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. The appellant before us assails the order dated 16.10.2025 passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in WPCR No. 548 of 2025 (for short, “Impugned Judgment”).

3. Briefly put, the facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows:

That the appellant was issued a show-cause notice dated 24.04.2025 by the District Magistrate, Balodabazar-Bhatapara under the provisions of the Chhattisgarh Rajya Suraksha Adhiniyam, 1990 (for short, “Adhiniyam”), calling upon him to explain why an Externment Order should not be passed against him. The appellant submitted his reply; however, the District Magistrate passed the Externment Order dated 18.06.2025, directing the appellant to be externed from District Balodabazar-Bhatapara for a period of one year. Aggrieved, he preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam before the State Government. However, by order dated 03.10.2025, the appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation under Section 9 of the Adhiniyam, per which an appeal against the order of the Collector dated 18.06.2025 ought to have been preferred by the appellant within a period of thirty (30) days, but the same was filed only on 12.09.2025, i.e., after approximately 50 days, by the appellant. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the appellant preferred a writ before the High Court. However, the same also came to be dismissed vide the impugned order dated 16.10.2025. Hence, this appeal.

4. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant Sri Ashish Kumar Pandey and learned A.A.G. Sri Rajat Nair for the State of Chhattisgarh. We have perused the material on record.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted as follows:

(i) The appellate authority being respondent No.1/State found that the appeal had been filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation being thirty (30) days as stipulated under Section 9(1) of Adhiniyam. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed vide Order dated 03.10.2025 as barred by limitation. However, while Section 9 of the Adhiniyam prescribes a period of limitation for filing the appeal, it does not provide any express mechanism for condonation of delay nor does it expressly exclude applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short, “Limitation Act”). The Adhiniyam also does not prescribe any outer period of delay which could be condoned by the appellate forum.

(ii) That in view of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act and the law laid down by this Court in a catena of decisions, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would apply. This is because the said provision is not specifically excluded in the present case. Hence, the delay in filing the appeal ought to have been condoned.

5.1 In the above context, learned counsel for the appellant drew our attention to the relevant provisions of the Adhiniyam and Limitation Act, which we shall refer to later.

5.2 Lastly, it was argued that the Externment Order, by directing the removal of the appellant from his district of residence entailed serious civil consequences for him and adversely affected his fundamental rights of movement and livelihood secured under Articles 19(1)(d) and 21 of the Constitution of India.

6. Per contra, learned Standing Counsel fo