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2026 Supreme(SC) 739
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
SANJAY KAROL, NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH, JJ.
Parveen Kumar@ Parveen Chauhan – Appellant
Versus
State of Haryana & Ors. – Respondents
Criminal Appeal No. 3093 of 2026 (@Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.9920 of 2026)
Decided On : 01-07-2026
For the Petitioner(s): Mr. Sunil Kumar Verma, AOR Mr. Himank Nargotra, Adv. Mr. Desam Sudhakara Reddy, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Akshay Amritanshu, AOR Ms. Aashna Gill, Adv. Ms. Harsh Rekha, Adv. Mr. Sarthak Srivastava, Adv.
IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Remission in sentence – Power under Article 161 of Constitution is untrammelled and unaffected by provisions of Cr.P.C.
(2) Per Incuriam – It is not the numerical strength of Judges taking a particular view that is relevant but it is instead strength of Bench, which is determinative factor of binding nature of a particular view.
Headnote:
(A) Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Sections 432, 433 and 435 [Sections 473, 474 and 477 of BNSS, 2023] – Constitution of India – Article 161 – Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302 – Remission in sentence – A statutory policy, even if it may be so, cannot override a exercise of power under Article 161, for that power is distinct and independent, uninfluenced by any other power, more so statutory in nature – Power under Article 161 of Constitution is untrammelled and unaffected by provisions of Cr.P.C. – Since 2002 Policy stood framed under Constitution and such power is to be exercised by Governor himself, subsequent Policy of 2008, cannot deter effect of former – Findings in this case shall apply prospectively and shall not operate to reopen any applications for remissions that already stood decided. (Paras 9, 12, 16 and 17)
(B) Judicial Discipline – Per Incuriam – It is not the numerical strength of Judges taking a particular view that is relevant but it is instead strength of Bench, which is determinative factor of binding nature of a particular view – A Judgment cannot be said to be per incuriam: (a) if it makes reference to an earlier decision and then concludes correctly or incorrectly; or (b) if ordinary reading of judgment does not on face of it show it to be in conflict with earlier decisions, court should refrain adopting such an interpretation. (Para 14)
Facts of the case:
The question to be considered in this appeal is whether the appellant’s application for grant of remission to the State of Haryana will be governed by the ‘Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002’ dated 12th April 2002 or the subsequent Policy dated 13th August 2008 termed as ‘Premature Release of Life Convicts 2008’ as notified by the Jails and Judicial Department, Government of Haryana.
Findings of Court:
State shall take a decision regarding the remission application of the appellant consistent with this judgment within four weeks from the date of this judgment.
Result : Appeal allowed.
Key Points: - The power under Article 161 of the Constitution is untrammelled and unaffected by provisions of CrPC (!) (!) . - It is not numerical strength but the strength of the Bench that determines the binding nature of a view (!) (!) . - The 2002 Policy is traceable to Article 161 of the Constitution, whereas the 2008 Policy is statutory under CrPC (!) (!) . - A statutory policy cannot override an exercise of power under Article 161 (!) (!) . - The 2002 Policy and the 2008 Policy are substantially identical in their source of constitutional power (!) (!) . - The judgment in Rajkumar supra held the 2002 Policy to be of statutory origin, which may be per incuriam (!) (!) . - The appellant is entitled to the benefit of the 2002 Policy as it was in force at the time of his conviction (!) (!) . - Findings in this case apply prospectively and do not reopen already decided remission applications (!) (!) . - The State must decide the appellant’s remission application consistent with this judgment within four weeks (!) (!) .
What is the applicable remission policy for a life convict sentenced before 2008 — the 2002 Policy or the 2008 Policy?
Does the power to grant remission under Article 161 of the Constitution override statutory policies under CrPC?
Are the 2002 Policy and the 2008 Policy both statutory in nature, and if so, which one prevails when both are applicable?
Legal Category Hierarchy
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constitutional law
-
article 161
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powers of governor
- remission of sentences
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powers of governor
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article 161
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criminal law
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sentencing
- life imprisonment
-
remission policies
- 2002 policy
- 2008 policy
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sentencing
-
administrative law
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jail administration
- policy hierarchy
- supervision and review
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jail administration
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civil procedure
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writ petitions
- CRWP
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writ petitions
JUDGMENT :
SANJAY KAROL, J.
1. Leave Granted.
2. The question to be considered in this appeal is whether the appellant’s application for 2. The question to be considered in this appeal is whether the appellant’s application for grant of remission to the State of Haryana will be governed by the ‘Policy Regarding Release of Life Convicts 2002 1 [2002 Policy]’ dated 12th April 2002 or the subsequent Policy dated 13th August 2008 termed as ‘Premature Release of Life Convicts 2008 2 [2008 Policy]’ as notified by the Jails and Judicial Department, Government of Haryana.
3. Since we are only concerned with the question of applicability of a policy, the facts in which the question arose has limited relevance, save and except to note that the appellant stood convicted for murder of a 12 year old child, on 3rd January 2009 in connection with FIR No.670 of 2007 dated 25th September 2007 lodged at PS City, Gurgaon. He was sentenced to undergo life imprisonment under Section 302 Indian Penal Code, 1860 3 [IPC], five years of imprisonment under Section 365 IPC and two years under Section 201 IPC. The High Court by judgment 4 [CRA No.198 of 2009] dated 16th July 2013 partly allowed the appeal setting aside the conviction under Section 365 IPC. Appeal against the said judgment to this Court was dismissed 5 [SLP (Crl.) No.2128 of 2014] by an order dated 15th September 2015 which has attained finality.
4. On 26th May 2022, the appellant filed a representation seeking release on the basis of 2002 Policy, having served 14 years of actual imprisonment; however, no response was received. Thereafter, he filed a writ petition 6 [CRWP No.7465 of 2022] against his pending representation, which was disposed on 16th August 2022, directing the prison authorities to decide the same within a period of three months. The said representation eventually came to be decided on 20th October 2022 and concluded in a rejection on two grounds – (i) that the appellant would be governed by the 2008 Policy and not the 2002 Policy; (ii) that as per the former he had completed only 13 years 7 months and 16 days of actual imprisonment and 16 years five months and 16 days of total imprisonment as on 21st September 2022 and as such was not eligible for not having completed the requisite period of twenty years of actual sentence and twenty five years of total sentence. He then filed another writ petition 7 [CRWP no.12409 of 2024] challenging the aforesaid decision by placing reliance on State of Haryana v. Jagdish, (2010) 4 SCC 216. By an order dated 27th January 2025, this writ petition came to be dismissed. Hence this appeal.
5. The substance of the appellant’s case as it appears, is that since the 2002 Policy had been brought in exercise of Article 161 of the Constitution of India, the coming into force of the subsequent 2008 Policy which was explicitly under the exercise of power bestowed by Section 432 and 433 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 9 [ CrPC], would not denude him of the benefits thereunder. Further, the beneficial remission policy would apply instead of policy relevant on the date of conviction. One more aspect of his submission is that the judgment in State of Haryana v. Raj Kumar, (2021) 9 SCC 292 would not have precedential value on account of the fact that Jagdish supra is rendered by a larger Bench.
6. The State, on the other hand, submits that a policy which is referable to Article 161/72 of the Constitution would override that enacted under the CrPC. But in view of the holding in Raj Kumar supra which observed that both the 2002 Policy and the 2008 Policy were, in fact, in exercise of power traceable to the provisions of the CrPC. Further, that since the 2008 Policy superseded the earlier one and as on the date of conviction only the 2008 Policy was in force, no question would arise of the applicability of the 2002policy to the appellant.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Hereinbelow is a chart referencing different remission policies issued by H
