1. Appeal against conviction under Section 363 IPC and Section 6 POCSO Act for alleged sexual assault of a minor child. (Para 2 )
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2026 Supreme(SC) 1135
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, N.V. ANJARIA, JJ.
Deepak In JC – Appellant
Versus
State Govt. of NCT Delhi – Respondent
Criminal Appeal Nos. 4414-4415 of 2026 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos. 21271-72 of 2025)
Decided On : 17-09-2026
Important Points
Statutory presumptions of guilt under the POCSO Act are rebuttable. While the burden shifts to the accused, the prosecution must still prove foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused can prove innocence based on a preponderance of probability.
Subject
Criminal Law - POCSO Act
Act Referred
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: Art.21
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE: S.161, S.164
CUSTOMS ACT: S.123, S.138(a), S.139
ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT: S.10(c)
EVIDENCE ACT: S.114
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT ACT: S.39
INDIAN PENAL CODE: S.363, S.506, S.376, S.361
NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES ACT: S.35, S.54
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT: S.138, S.139
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT: S.20, S.4(1)
PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT: S.10(7)(b)
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT: S.6, S.4, S.5, S.29, S.30
WILD LIFE PROTECTION ACT: S.57
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE: S.161, S.164
CUSTOMS ACT: S.123, S.138(a), S.139
ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES ACT: S.10(c)
EVIDENCE ACT: S.114
FOREIGN EXCHANGE MANAGEMENT ACT: S.39
INDIAN PENAL CODE: S.363, S.506, S.376, S.361
NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES ACT: S.35, S.54
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT: S.138, S.139
PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT: S.20, S.4(1)
PREVENTION OF FOOD ADULTERATION ACT: S.10(7)(b)
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN FROM SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT: S.6, S.4, S.5, S.29, S.30
WILD LIFE PROTECTION ACT: S.57
Headnote
(A) Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 - Sections 6, 29 and 30 - Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Section 363 - Presumption as to certain offences and culpable mental state - Statutory presumptions under Sections 29 and 30 are not absolute; they operate as a rule of reverse burden that is rebuttable. These provisions do not dispense with the prosecution's obligation to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. (Paras 7.1, 7.3, 7.7)
(B) Sterling Witness - To be a "sterling witness," the testimony must be of very high quality and calibre, unassailable, and consistent from the initial statement to the deposition in court. Such a version must correlate with supporting materials, including scientific evidence and expert opinions. (Paras 5.6, 5.7)
(C) Rebuttal of Presumption - The accused can rebut the statutory presumption of guilt by discrediting prosecution witnesses, highlighting inherent inconsistencies, pointing out absurdities in the prosecution story, and presenting evidence that matches a defense of innocence on a preponderance of probability. (Paras 7.5, 7.8)
(D) Principles of Fair Trial - Statutory presumptions cannot discount the fundamental norms of a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. If two views are possible based on the evidence, the view favoring the accused must be adopted. (Paras 7.6, 8)
Facts of the case:
An appellant was convicted of kidnapping and committing a sexual act upon a child aged approximately 2.5 years. The prosecution alleged that the appellant took the child to a park and that the child later indicated sexual assault, with blood noticed on the child's clothing. The defense contended that the allegations were motivated by prior enmity between the families due to disputes over a common water connection.
Findings of Court:
The court observed manifest contradictions between the testimony of the mother and the first attending doctor regarding the timing of the visit. Medical evidence, including an FSL report, contradicted the ocular version, as no semen or blood was detected on the clothing, and the child's hymen remained intact. The court found that the mother's testimony failed to meet the standard of a "sterling witness" and that the defense's version of enmity was probable.
Issues: Whether the statutory presumption of guilt under the POCSO Act overrides the requirement of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt and whether material contradictions in witness testimony and negative medical evidence are sufficient to rebut such presumption.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the reverse burden of proof under the POCSO Act is an evidential shift and not an absolute presumption. Once the accused shows that the prosecution's version is improbable or inconsistent through a preponderance of probability, the presumption of guilt disappears. The prosecution must still establish the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction.
Result: Impugned judgment and order set aside; appellant held not guilty and acquitted.
(B) Sterling Witness - To be a "sterling witness," the testimony must be of very high quality and calibre, unassailable, and consistent from the initial statement to the deposition in court. Such a version must correlate with supporting materials, including scientific evidence and expert opinions. (Paras 5.6, 5.7)
(C) Rebuttal of Presumption - The accused can rebut the statutory presumption of guilt by discrediting prosecution witnesses, highlighting inherent inconsistencies, pointing out absurdities in the prosecution story, and presenting evidence that matches a defense of innocence on a preponderance of probability. (Paras 7.5, 7.8)
(D) Principles of Fair Trial - Statutory presumptions cannot discount the fundamental norms of a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. If two views are possible based on the evidence, the view favoring the accused must be adopted. (Paras 7.6, 8)
Facts of the case:
An appellant was convicted of kidnapping and committing a sexual act upon a child aged approximately 2.5 years. The prosecution alleged that the appellant took the child to a park and that the child later indicated sexual assault, with blood noticed on the child's clothing. The defense contended that the allegations were motivated by prior enmity between the families due to disputes over a common water connection.
Findings of Court:
The court observed manifest contradictions between the testimony of the mother and the first attending doctor regarding the timing of the visit. Medical evidence, including an FSL report, contradicted the ocular version, as no semen or blood was detected on the clothing, and the child's hymen remained intact. The court found that the mother's testimony failed to meet the standard of a "sterling witness" and that the defense's version of enmity was probable.
Issues: Whether the statutory presumption of guilt under the POCSO Act overrides the requirement of proving the case beyond reasonable doubt and whether material contradictions in witness testimony and negative medical evidence are sufficient to rebut such presumption.
Ratio Decidendi: The court ruled that the reverse burden of proof under the POCSO Act is an evidential shift and not an absolute presumption. Once the accused shows that the prosecution's version is improbable or inconsistent through a preponderance of probability, the presumption of guilt disappears. The prosecution must still establish the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a conviction.
Result: Impugned judgment and order set aside; appellant held not guilty and acquitted.
Legal Category Hierarchy
- crime and sentencing
- practice and procedure
Advocates appeared:
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Pulkit Prakash, AOR Mr. S.S. Sastry, Adv. Mr. Ankur Gosain, Adv. Ms. Arushi Sharma, Adv. Mr. Harsh Raj, Adv. Mr. Gaurav Khanna, Adv. Ms. Nabira Farman, Adv. Ms. Ankita Sinha, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Davinder Pal Singh, A.S.G. Dr. N. Visakamurthy, AOR Ms. Seema Bengani, Adv. Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Adv. Mr. Udit Dedhiya, Adv. Mr. Bhuvan Kapoor, Adv. Mr. Mukul Singh, Adv.
For Petitioner(s) Mr. Pulkit Prakash, AOR Mr. S.S. Sastry, Adv. Mr. Ankur Gosain, Adv. Ms. Arushi Sharma, Adv. Mr. Harsh Raj, Adv. Mr. Gaurav Khanna, Adv. Ms. Nabira Farman, Adv. Ms. Ankita Sinha, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Davinder Pal Singh, A.S.G. Dr. N. Visakamurthy, AOR Ms. Seema Bengani, Adv. Mr. Rajan Kumar Chourasia, Adv. Mr. Udit Dedhiya, Adv. Mr. Bhuvan Kapoor, Adv. Mr. Mukul Singh, Adv.
Table of Contents
2. Appellant argued contradictions and lack of medical support; respondent argued guilt proven beyond doubt. (Para 4 )
3. Prosecution evidence found inconsistent; medical evidence negated penetrative assault; statutory presumption rebutted by defence. (Para 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 )
4. Statutory presumption under Section 29 POCSO is rebuttable; prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; accused can rebut by preponderance of probability. (Para 7 )
5. Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted and directed to be released. (Para 10 , 11 )
6. What is the nature and effect of the statutory presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act?
It is a rebuttable presumption shifting evidential burden to accused; prosecution must still prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; accused may rebut by preponderance of probability. (Para 7 )
7. What is the role of the court when two views are possible on evidence?
If two views are possible, one pointing to guilt and the other to innocence, the view favouring the accused must be adopted; guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 8 )
JUDGMENT :
N.V. ANJARIA, J.
Leave granted.
2. These two appeals preferred by the appellant-convict raise challenge to judgment and order dated 03.07.2025 passed by the High Court of Delhi1[Hereinafter, “High Court”], which was a common judgment delivered in Criminal Appeal No.1029 of 2023 and Criminal Miscellaneous (Bail) No.1732 of 2023. Thereby, the High Court dismissed the appeals, in turn, confirmed judgment and order dated 21.08.2023 of the Court of Additional Sessions Judge-01, (Designated Special Court under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012), South-East, Saket Courts, New Delhi2[Hereinafter, “trial court”] in Sessions Case No.26 of 2016.
2.1 The trial court held the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under Section 363, Indian Penal Code, 18603[Hereinafter, “IPC”] and under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 20124[Hereinafter, “POCSO”]. It, however, acquitted the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 506, IPC.
2.2 For the conviction recorded under Section 6 of POCSO Act, the appellant came to be sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- with default clause to suffer simple imprisonment for 6 months. In respect of the offence punishable under Section 363, IPC, the sentence awarded to the appellant was requiring him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 1 year and to pay a fine of Rs.3,000/- with default clause to suffer simple imprisonment for 2 months. The trial court directed that out of the total fine of Rs.8,000/- as above, an amount of Rs.7,000/- shall be paid to the victim by way of compensation.
3. The prosecution story is revealed from the complaint dated 11.12.2015 lodged at Kalkaji Police Station by the mother of the victim. It was stated therein inter-alia that the complainant’s daughter aged about 2.5 years, while playing in the evening at around 05.30 pm on 09.12.2015, went to the jhuggi of the appellant which was located next to the complainant’s jhuggi. As her daughter did not return home for long, the complainant (PW-5) went to Sarvodaya Camp Park in search of her daughter where she came to know from her brother-in-law that the appellant had taken her to Hans Raj City Park for outing.
3.1 It was stated in the complaint that despite the brother-in-law of the complainant called the appellant asking him to bring back the victim, the victim did not return even after passage of more than 15 minutes. The complainant reached Hans Raj City Park in a taxi at about 06.30 pm. At that time, she saw the appellant along with her daughter. She took her daughter to home, where her daughter went asleep. It was stated that upon waking up at around 07.00 pm, she started crying, pulling her pyjami (Exh.6).
3.1.1 According to the complainant, when she removed the pyjami of her daughter, blood was noticed and further that the victim-daughter told the complainant that the appellant had put his private part inside her private part. The complainant called her husband, who came at about 09.30 pm. Dr. Rajesh Parthasarthy (PW-1), who was a private doctor, was consulted who advised them to visit the police station, it was stated. It was alleged that the appellant and his family had been threatening them to settle the matter.
3.2 First Information Report5[Hereinafter, “FIR”] No.1085 of 2015 was registered on 11.12.2015 for the offences punishable under IPC and POCSO. Statement under Section 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, 19736[Hereinafter, “Cr.PC”] of the victim, though was sought to be recorded, the victim could not say anything because of her tender age of 2.5 years. Statements of the father and uncle (chacha) of the victim were thereafter recorded under Section 161, Cr.PC. Statement of the complainant (PW-5) under Section 164, Cr.PC was recorded.
3.2.1 A chargesheet came to be filed on 24.03.2016 for the offences punishable under Sections 363, 376 and 506, IPC and Sections 4 and 5 of the POCSO Act. The trial court frame
