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2026 Supreme(SC) 1382

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
DIPANKAR DATTA, SHEEL NAGU, JJ.
Prithviraj S. Singh (Deceased) Through Lrs. Etc. – Appellants
Versus
The Secretary, School Education Department, State of Maharashtra & Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal Nos. 10193-10194 of 2016
Decided On : 18-11-2026

Important Points

A party must specifically plead averments to seek relief under Article 226; however, an action wholly contrary to a judicial order is a nullity, allowing the Supreme Court to exercise Article 142 powers to grant compensation for wrongful termination in the interest of justice.

Subject

Service Law - Disciplinary Proceedings

Act Referred

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA: Art.226
MAHARASHTRA EMPLOYEES OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS CONDITIONS OF SERVICE REGULATION ACT: S.9
MAHARASHTRA EMPLOYEES OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS CONDITIONS OF SERVICE RULES: R.37(2)(a)(iii)

Headnote

(A) Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 and Rules, 1981; Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 142 - Termination of service - Disciplinary proceedings - Non-compliance with court's consent order - Pleading requirement: a party is under obligation to plead its case by making the requisite averments/assertions in support of the relief that it claims, and a court is under no obligation to entertain a plea if the same is not supported by the necessary averments/assertions in the petition (Para 9) - An action or order which is wholly contrary to an express judicial order passed in exercise of competent jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be accepted (Para 11).

(B) Writ Jurisdiction - Scope of relief - While relief under Article 226 is generally not granted to a litigant who has approached the court without pleading an appropriate case for relief, the court may exercise its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to grant compensation where the termination of service is found to be wrongful and contrary to judicial orders (Para 11, 12).

Facts of the case:
Two employees of a private school were terminated following an ex parte departmental inquiry for misappropriation of public money. The termination was challenged before a tribunal. The High Court had previously passed a consent order allowing the school to lead evidence before the tribunal to substantiate the charges of misconduct. Despite this liberty, the school did not lead evidence, and the tribunal dismissed the appeals based on documentary evidence. The employees subsequently filed writ petitions in the High Court but failed to plead the school's non-compliance with the consent order, instead seeking parity with another employee who received a lighter penalty. The High Court dismissed the petitions, noting the employees did not stand on the same footing as the other employee.

Findings of Court:
The court observed that the writ petitions were ineptly drafted as they failed to challenge the tribunal's omission to consider the lack of evidence. However, the court noted that the school's failure to adhere to the High Court's consent order to lead evidence meant the charges were not effectively established. Furthermore, the non-supply of the final inquiry reports constituted a serious flaw in the disciplinary process. Consequently, the termination was deemed wrongful.

Issues: Whether the appellants were entitled to relief under Article 226 despite the lack of specific pleadings regarding the non-compliance with the consent order, and whether the failure to lead evidence as per a judicial order rendered the termination null.

Ratio Decidendi: While a party must plead its case to seek relief under Article 226, an action that is wholly contrary to an express judicial order is a nullity. In the interest of justice, the court can exercise its extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to grant lump sum compensation for wrongful termination when the disciplinary process is fundamentally flawed and contrary to judicial directions.

Result: Appeals disposed of with a direction to the school to pay Rs. 10,00,000/- as lump sum compensation to each appellant as a full and final settlement.

Legal Category Hierarchy

  • administrative law
    • disciplinary proceedings
      • natural justice (Para 2, 5, 11)
      • service termination (Para 2, 3, 12)
    • judicial review
      • writ jurisdiction (Para 4, 6, 11)
  • practice and procedure
    • evidence (Para 5, 9, 11)
    • consent orders (Para 4, 10, 11)
  • constitutional law
    • extraordinary powers (Para 12)

Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. B H Marlapalle, Sr. Adv. Mr. Ajit Pravin Wagh- 2799, AOR Mr. Avinish Kumar Saurabh, Adv. Ms. Nivedita Kushwaha, Adv. Mr. Ritik Ranjan, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande- 3259, AOR Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv. Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv. Mr. Sourav Singh, Adv. Ms. Chitransha Singh Sikarwar, Adv. Mr. Sudhanshu S Choudhari, Sr. Adv. Mr. Vatsalya Vigya- 3007, AOR Ms. Aanchal Rathore, Adv. Ms. Gautami Yadav, Adv. Ms. Pranjal Chapalgaonkar, Adv. Mr. Yash Singhania, Adv. Mr. Pradeep Kumar Tripathi, Adv.

Table of Contents

1. Employees challenged their termination for alleged misconduct following inquiry proceedings; subsequent appeals and writ petitions contested the fairness of the disciplinary process and the absence of evidence. (Para 2 , 3 , 5 )

2. The school argued the inquiry was regular, while the employees contended the proceedings were vitiated by procedural unfairness, non-supply of documents, and failure to lead fresh evidence. (Para 7 , 9 )

3. The court observed that the school failed to lead evidence despite judicial consent, and the tribunal ignored the absence of material to sustain the charges and termination orders. (Para 10 , 11 )

4. An administrative action or termination order that is wholly contrary to an express judicial consent order is a nullity, even if not explicitly pleaded in the writ petition. (Para 11 )

5. The court invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to award lump sum compensation to the claimants for wrongful termination in full and final settlement of all claims. (Para 12 , 13 )

6. Can a writ court grant relief based on a ground not specifically emphasized in the pleadings?

While courts generally avoid granting relief on unpleaded grounds, they may intervene under Article 142 when an administrative act or order is fundamentally inconsistent with an existing express judicial consent order, rendering that act a nullity. (Para 9 , 11 )

7. What is the consequence of a school's failure to lead evidence when authorized by a consent order during appellate proceedings?

The failure to lead evidence as permitted renders the inquiry findings unsubstantiated. Consequently, the tribunal's reliance on records without such evidence creates an infirmity in the disciplinary process, justifying potential judicial intervention. (Para 10 , 11 )

JUDGMENT :

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. The present case illustrates how a meritorious cause was allowed to fail by reason of inept drafting of a writ petition, the substance having been eclipsed by form.

2. Appellant—Prithviraj S. Singh,1[in C.A. No. 10193 of 2016] was a senior clerk, and appellant—Shivadatta R. Singh,2[in the connected C.A. No. 10194 of 2016] was a head clerk in the respondent no. 7,3[school (run by the respondent no. 4—trust)]. Both, along with the in-charge headmaster—Kamalkant S. Mishra of the school, were proceeded against departmentally for misappropriation of public money and allied charges. The school constituted an inquiry committee,4[committee] in terms of the provisions contained in the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981,5[the Rules] [framed under the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977,6[the Act]]. An objection was raised by the appellants to the inclusion of a member of the committee, namely Umesh Pratap Singh. Accepting such an objection, a new member, namely Chandra Kumar Singh, was inducted into the committee. Still, not satisfied, an exception was again taken to the inclusion of the new member. On this occasion, the objection bore no fruit and was rejected. As a mark of protest, the appellants abstained from attending the inquiry, resulting in the inquiry proceeding ex parte. Reports of inquiry dated 13th November 2004 (in respect of Prithviraj S. Singh) and 11th November 2004 (in respect of Shivadatta R. Singh) were prepared by the committee holding that the charges against the appellants stood established. Neither the minutes of proceedings of inquiry nor the final inquiry reports were furnished to the appellants. In due course, the appellants were removed (terminated) from service.

3. Termination of the appellants’ services triggered litigation at their end. The orders of termination were carried in appeals,7[Appeal Nos. MUM/1/2005 and MUM/2/2005 by Prithviraj S. Singh and Shivadatta R. Singh, respectively] before the School Tribunal, Mumbai,8[tribunal], under Section 9 of the Act. Reinstatement in service upon quashing of the disciplinary proceedings, including the inquiry reports and the final orders of penalty, was sought by the appellants. Vide interim orders dated 10th March, 2005, the tribunal stayed the operation of the termination orders till disposal of the appeals and directed the school to allow the appellants to resume their service and pay 50% of their salary.

4. Aggrieved by the interim orders, the school invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,9[High Court] by presenting petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution,10[Writ Petition (Lodg.) Nos. 774 of 2005 and No. 776 of 2005 against Prithviraj S. Singh and Shivadatta R. Singh, respectively]. With the consent of the parties, the petitions were disposed of by a Single Judge on 17th March, 2005. The brief consent order reads as follows:

    At the stage of mentioning, the matter has been taken up on Board for admission by consent.

    Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners and for the First Respondent-employee are agreed that the following order may be passed by consent in substitution of the impugned order dated 10th March, 2005 of the Presiding Officer of the School Tribunal without any further reason being recorded:

    (1) The First Respondent shall, without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties be paid an amount equivalent to the subsistence allowance in accordance with law, during the pendency of the appeal before the School Tribunal.

    (2) In view of the judgment of a Learned Single Judge of this Court in Adarsh Vidya Mandir Trust vs. Awadesh Narayan Komal Singh , 2005(1) Bom. C.R. 786, it would be open to the Petitioners to apply before the School Tribunal for leading evidence to substantiate the charge of misconduct against the First Respondent. In the event that such an application is made, the

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