( 1 ) BODIREDDYGARI Ramakrishna Reddy, respondent in this C. R. P. moved an application in C. M. P. No. 27893 of 2003 to vacate the stay granted in C. M. P. No. 20989 of 2003 in C. R. P. No. 4625 of 2003, dated 14-11-2003. At the stage of hearing of the vacate application, Sri C. M. R. Velu, learned counsel representing the vacate petitioner-respondent in the C. R. P. and Sri Krishnan, learned counsel representing sri K. S. Gopalakrishnan, learned counsel for the revision petitioner had made a request to dispose of the main C. R. P. itself, and that is how, with the consent of the parties the main c. R. P. is being disposed of.

( 2 ) K. C. Balasubramanyam Pillai, the revision petitioner, is the petitioner in E. A. No. 67 of 2003 and judgment-debtor in o. E. P. No. 20 of 2002 and defendant in o. S. No. 46 of 1992, on the file of Senior civil Judge, Puttur. The said k. C. Balasubramanyam Pillai, moved the aforesaid application in E. A. No. 67 of 2003 under Section 28 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 (for short the Act ), for rescission of contract of sale, dated 22-02-1991, and the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puttur, after recording reasons had arrived at a conclusion that the application is not maintainable and had dismissed the same. Aggrieved by the said order, the present c. R. P. is filed.

( 3 ) SRI Krishnan, learned counsel representing the revision petitioner had explained the inordinate delay and submitted that after a lapse of more than nine years the respondent-decree-holder cannot put the decree into execution, since, definitely, it would not be putting the decree, into execution within reasonable time. The learned counsel also while elaborating the submissions had pointed out that, in fact, there is steep rise of prices and at this point of time if the respondent-decree-holder is permitted to proceed with the execution of the decree for specific performance, the revision petitioner-judgment-debtor would be put to serious loss. The learned counsel also contended that when a decree for specific performance is put into execution, such objection can be taken even before the executing Court and necessarily an application need not be moved on the original side only. The learned counsel also submitted that even on the applicability of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, the learned Senior Civil Judge, Puttur, had not properly appreciated the different provisions of the said Act and had arrived at a wrong conclusion. The learned counsel also would maintain that under the agreement of sale, an amount of Rs. 5,000. 00 alone had been paid and the rest of the amount was not paid. Though respondent-decree-holder obtained the decree on 30-11 -1992, and after a long lapse of time, now the said decree-holder wants to further proceed with the execution of the decree, which would be definitely unjustified even on the ground of equity. The learned counsel had placed strong reliance on a decision of the Apex Court reported in h. I. Trust Limited v. Haridas Mundhra.

( 4 ) PER contra, Sri C. M. R. Velu, learned counsel representing the respondent- decree-holder, had taken this Court through the reasons recorded by the learned Senior civil Judge, Puttur, and had submitted that the learned Judge had arrived at the correct conclusion relating to the maintainability of the application on execution side. The learned counsel also had placed strong reliance on the judgment-reported in ramankutty Guptan v. Avara in this regard. The learned counsel also would maintain that a decree whether it is an ex parte decree or a decree on merits, cannot be challenged at this distant point of time especially, in the light of the fact that an abortive attempt was made by the judgmentdebtor to get the decree set aside and had left the matter there, and further the judgment-debtor had slept over the matter having not invoked the remedy available to him in law within the period of limitation and hence, such party cannot be permitted to