( 1 ) IS matter comes before us as a result of the reference made by one of the learned single Judge.

( 2 ) HEARD Sri B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. Y. Ratnakar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent.

( 3 ) IT appears that the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal was challenged before the Civil Court in terms of Section 34 of arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short 1996 Act ).

( 4 ) THE petitioner who challenged the award did not present himself before the lower Court on the date fixed. Therefore the application was dismissed by the Civil Court. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application in I. A. No. 2017/2002 seeking restoration of the earlier application being O. P. No. 1524/99. When this application was listed, again the petitioner absented himself and this application was also dismissed. The order passed in I. A. No. 2017/2002 dismissing the application in default and the order passed in O. P. No. 1524/99 dismissing the O. P. in default have been challenged by way of C. R. P. No. 332/2003. When this matter came before the learned Single Judge, he felt that the matter was of wider magnitude and much public importance. Therefore, he referred the following question to be decided by the Division Bench:"whether the learned Chief Judge, City civil Court, Hyderabad who had dismissed I. A. No. 2017/2002 has power or jurisdiction to make an order of default in O. P. No. 1524/99 in the light of the provisions of the Arbitration and Reconciliation Act 1996?"

( 5 ) MR. B. Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner mainly contended that the CPC was not applicable to the proceedings pending in Civil Court under the Arbitration and Conciliation act 1996. He contended that under misapprehension an application was filed by his client under Order 9 Rule 9 before the civil Court. As a matter of fact, the Civil court has no jurisdiction to dismiss the application in default entertained by him under Section 34 of 1996 Act. According to him, once an application was filed under section 34 of 1996 Act the only course open to the Civil Court is either to allow or dismiss the application by setting aside the award on the grounds which are mentioned in Sec. 34 of 1996 Act. Since the provisions of CPC have not been made applicable, the Civil court cannot even dismiss the application under Section 34 in default. He has taken us to various provisions of 1996 Act.

( 6 ) SECTION 2 (e) defines Civil Court as follows:"court" means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court or a grade inferior to such principal Civil Court or any Court of Small Causes. "

( 7 ) SECTION 5 lays down the extent of judicial intervention as follows:"notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this part. "

( 8 ) ACCORDING to Sri Adinarayana Rao, the civil Courts cannot interfere or intervene in the matter, which is the subject matter of arbitration except where it is specifically provided for in the first part of 1996 Act. Since in the first part ot the 1996 Act it is no where provided that CPC would apply, dismissal of OP in default was without jurisdiction. He also took us to Section 19 of 1996 Act which lays down that Arbitrary tribunal shall not be bound by the CPC or the Evidence Act and shall be free to lay down its own procedure. He referred to section 36 of 1996 Act and submits that when the award has become final after expiry of statutory period, the award can be enforced by a Civil Court as a decree of the court. He submits that if the intention of the legisla