( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 8-12-2000 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in Writ Petition No. 3357 of 1999 whereby and whereunder the writ petition filed by the appellant herein was dismissed.

( 2 ) THE long and short of the story made out in the writ application is that despite existence of a renewal clause contained in an agreement dated 10-3-1993 providing for extension thereof for three terms, the notice impugned in the writ application was issued, which is in the following terms :

( 3 ) CLAUSE (1) of the agreement dated 10-3-1993, whereupon the entire case of the appellant rests, reads thus :"1. The period of licence is from 1-3-1993 to 28-2-1996. Licence is given for a period of three years in the initial period. The same will be extended for three terms of three years each on compound enhancement of the existing monthly fee @ 20%, 30% and 30% on 4th, 7th and 10th years of the licence respectively subject to the performance. "

( 4 ) MR. C. Ramachandra Raju, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that the action of the respondents is arbitrary and in support thereof took us through the entire judgment of the Apex Court in Ramana v. I. A. Authority of India AIR 1979 SC 1628. The learned counsel would urge that the action on the part of the respondents herein is contrary to the said agreement, as a result whereof the appellant s legal right has been infringed. The learned counsel would remind us the dicta of Frankfuter, J. in Vitarelli v. Seaton (1959) 359 US 535, wherein it was observed :"he that takes the procedure sword shall perish with the sword".

( 5 ) OUR attention has also been drawn to several other paragraphs of the said judgment, which, as indicated hereinbefore, was read in extenso by the learned counsel.

( 6 ) THE learned counsel does not dispute that the right of the appellant, if any, flows only out of the aforementioned agreement dated 10-3-1993. It is also not in dispute that although the said agreement was initally for aperiod of three years, another extension had been granted and as would appear from the notice impugned in the writ petition that the respondents herein refused to extend the said licence. Unfortunate, as though it may seem to be, that the learned counsel forgot to notice a distinction that the standard set out by the Supreme Court in International Airport Authority (AIR 1979 SC 1628) (supra) was to be maintained at the thereshold of the contract and not for the purpose of enforcing the contract. It is now a well settled principle of law, having regard to several decisions of the Apex Court beginning from M/s Radhakrishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, AIR 1977 SC 1469, that the Court can exercise its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only in the event the contract is statutory one or the termination thereof is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. By a reason of subsequent decision of the Apex Court, the aforementioned three principles laid down in Radhakrishna Agarwal s case (supra) have been extended only to the extent that the writ petition would also be maintainable if a contract has been terminated on a ground de hors any terms of the contract and which is per se violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. No foundational fact has been stated by the appellant in the writ affidavit so as to show that the action on the part of the respondents herein was either de hors the contract or the same was per se violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Only because there exists a clause of renewal, the same by itself would not clothe any legal right upon the appellant to obtain renewal automatically having regard to several other clauses of the said licence, which need not be referred to in detail. It is also a well-settled principle of law that the writ Court shall not convert itself into a civil Court so as to enable it to pass a decree for specific performance of c

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