( 1 ) ALL these Writ Petitions raise same questions. They have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common Judgment. The controversy is very short and revolves around the meaning to lease in the context of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. All the petitioners were conferred right by the appropriate authorities to collect the toll in terms of the Stamp Act. After inviting the bids the petitioners for different premises were the highest bidders and the right to collect the toll tax was leased out to them. The terms and conditions almost in all the transactions are same. We are not referring to the facts of each case but as a sample we are taking writ petition No. 6631 of 1999 as this is the only writ petition within the batch in which the vires of S. 2 (16) of the Stamp Act has also been challenged, in other Writ petitions there is no challenge to S. 2 (16) of the Stamp Act. After the agreement was signed the respondents asked the petitioners to deposit the deficit stamp duty as according to the respondent the agreement entered into between the parties was a lease and was subject to stamp duty as lease in terms of the Stamp Act. These letters were issued on the directives of the Inspector General of Registration and Stamps. The case of the petitioners is that the agreement entered into between the parties was not a lease but a licence, therefore, they could not be asked to pay stamp duty for the agreement treating the agreement to be a lease, This is the only argument which has been advanced in other Writ Petitions but in the present writ petition vires of S. 2 (16) has also been challenged.

( 2 ) ONLY two arguments were advanced by the learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner in this case in connection with challenge to S. 2 (16) of the Stamp Act. He contended that the term lease has to be understood with respect to S. 105 of Transfer of Property Act. The learned counsel has not however submitted as to why it will be necessary to refer to the definition of lease as it appears in Transfer of Property Act when the lease has been defined for the purposes of Stamp Act in S. 2 (16) of the Stamp Act. He however relied on some judgments.

( 3 ) THE judgment in Peddinti Venkata Murall Ranganatha Desika lyengar v. Govt. of A. P. 1996 (3) SCC 75 ; (AIR 1996 SC 966) is pressed into service to contend that S. 2 (16) (c) is on erroneous assumption that an agreement to collect toll would amount to lease. In this connection the learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on a judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Chief Controlling Revenue Authority v. A. B. Project. AIR 1979 All 355 ; (1979 All LJ 990 ). This Judgment is in a different context. In this case the agreement was in respect of taking of 11 cusecs of water by the respondent company. The Court after examining S. 2 (16) of the Stamp Act found that, in order to come to a conclusion that the transaction was a lease one had to find out whether the subject matter was an immovable property and in this case subject matter was water which could not be described to be immovable property. The learned Judges of the Allahabad High Court were right because the language of S. 2 (16) is very plain and unambiguous which defines lease as :"2. (16) "lease":- "lease" means a lease of immovable property, and includes also : (a) a patta; (b) a kabuliyat or other undertaking in writing, not being a counterpart of a lease, to cultivate, occupy or pay or deliver rent for immovable property; (c) any instrument by which tolls of any description are let; (d) any writing on an application for a lease intended to signify that the application is granted". On bare reading of the section it becomes clear that all leases with respect to immovable property would be leases in terms of S. 2 (16) but in addition to leases of immovable property in other three categories there would also be lease under category (c) in which any instrument by which tolls of any descriptio