S. B. SINHA, C. J.

( 1 ) A short but interesting question which arises for consideration in this writ appeal is as to whether an application purported to have been made under Sections 30 and 33 of the indian Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as "1940 Act") can be treated to be an application under Section 34 of the arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "1996 Act ). The parties entered into an agreement for construction of polytechnic hostel and staff quarters etc. Disputes and differences having arisen between the parties as regards the performance of the aforementioned contract, inter alia invocation of bank guarantee. A writ petition was filed by the respondent herein which was marked as writ Petition No. 11619 of 1996. The said writ petition was dismissed where against an appeal was filed by the respondent herein before a Division Bench of this Court which was marked as Writ Appeal No. 836 of 1996. At the suggestion of the Division bench, the parties agreed to refer the disputes for arbitration by Justice K. Punnaiah. On 4-9-1996, the arbitrator entered into reference. The award for a sum of rs. 49,44,497-50 together with past and future interest at 21% per annum as against the claim of Rs. 48,29,065/- was ordered by the arbitrator on 27-10-1997. On 23-1 -1998, an application was filed in the Court of additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, hyderabad under Sections 30 and 33 of 1940 Act. The respondent herein filed interlocutory application marked as IA no. 513 of 1998 questioning the maintainability of the said application under the 1940 Act and the jurisdiction of the court.

( 2 ) THE writ petition was filed by the respondent herein on 3-8-1998 which was marked as WP No. 12006 of 1998 inter alia questioning the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the said application on the ground that 1940 Arbitration Act, was not applicable. The said writ petition has been allowed by the impugned order.

( 3 ) MR. Ramesh Ranganathan, learned additional Advocate-General appearing on behalf of the appellants inter alia submitted that having regard to the provisions of sections 21 and 85 of the 1996 Act, it should be held that although the application under Sections 30 and 33 of the 1940 Act, was not maintainable, the application could have been treated to be one under section 34 of the 1996 Act. The learned counsel would urge that the objection filed in any format may be treated to be one under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. Reliance in this connection has been placed on the decisions in Madan Lal v. Sunder Lal, air 1967 SC 1233 and Habeebur Rahman v. A. Varamma, AIR 1974 AP 113.

( 4 ) ON behalf of the respondent Sri m. Srinivas Rao on the other hand submitted that an objection must be filed in terms of 34 of the 1996 Act, and it must be filed within the time specified therein. According to the learned Counsel having regard to the charge in law, an application filed under Sections 30 and 33 of 1940 Act, cannot be equated with an application filed under Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The learned Counsel would urge that in that situation, the impugned order must be held to be good in law. Reliance has been placed by the learned Counsel on prudential Capital Markets Limited v. State of AP. , 2000. (5)ALD 418 = 2000 (5)ALT 468.

( 5 ) THE learned single Judge referred to a large number of decisions to arrive at a finding that as an Ordinance preceded the 1996 Act, on 27-6-1996 when the parties agreed to refer their disputes to arbitration, 1996 Act, will hold the field. On the aforementioned finding, it was held that the learned Court had no jurisdiction under the provisions of the Act. However, it was observed:"at the time of hearing the learned counsel for the respondents stated that the interest of the respondents may be safeguarded in the Court comes to the conclusion that the proceedings are without jurisdiction. This Court need not give any specific direction with reference to the said prayer. How

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