S. B. SINHA, C. J.

( 1 ) WHETHER the High Court would be the appropriate Court for entertaining an application under Section 34 of the arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter referred to as the said Act ) where an arbitrator has been appointed by the Chief Justice of this Court in terms of sub-section (6) of Section 11 of the said Act, is the question which falls for consideration in this petition.

( 2 ) THE first respondent herein, as regards the several disputes and differences by and between it and the petitioners, invoked the arbitration clause culminating in filing an application before this Court under section 11 of the said Act. The said application was marked as Arbitration application No. 32 of 1998. The learned chief Justice appointed the 2nd and 3rd respondents herein as joint arbitrators by an order dated 21-8-1998 observing that they would be at liberty to appoint an umpire in the event they deem fit having due regard to the views of the parties as may be obtained at the first sitting of the arbitrator. The learned arbitrators submitted an award dated 30-6-1999. The petitioners herein have filed this petition under Section 34 of the said Act. An objection has been raised by the 1st respondent herein as regards maintainability of the said petition before this Court.

( 3 ) MR. Gouri Shankar Sanghi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, inter alia submitted that having regard to the scheme framed by this Court the jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator having been sub-divided, this Court alone had the jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator. In other words, contends the learned counsel, pecuniary jurisdiction of the courts would be the determining factor for filing an application under Section 34 of the act.

( 4 ) THE learned Counsel in support of his aforementioned contention has strongly relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in m/s. Guru Nanak Foundation v. M/s. Rattan singh and Sons.

( 5 ) MR. M. R. K. Choudhary, the learned senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents on the other hand would submit that having regard to the definition of court as contained in Section 2 (e) of the act, no application in terms of Section 34 of the said Act can be filed before this Court. It was submitted that Section 42 of the Act will have no application in the instant case inasmuch as the applicability of the said provision must be kept confined to the arbitral proceedings and as an award is not a part of the arbitral proceedings, and award being not a petition, the learned counsel would urge that an award is not a part of the arbitral proceedings. The learned counsel would contend that the scheme of the new Act being completely different from that of the 1940 Act, the decisions rendered thereunder will have no application in the facts of the case. Having regard to the history of legislation of the said Act, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the scheme of the new Act is much more comprehensive than the 1940 act. By reason of the provisions of the said act, the right of the Courts to intervene had been reduced. Whereas Sections 8,9,10,12, 20 read with Section 4 of the 1940 Act provided for the circumstances in which the court could intervene between the arbitral proceedings, and during the arbitral proceedings. Furthermore, the Court could revoke the authority of an arbitrator or umpire under Section 5, give opinions on questions of law if special case is stated under Section 13 (b), enlarge the time for making award under Section 28, stay a legal proceedings that pertain to an arbitration agreement under Section 34, pass an interim order under Sections 18 and 41 and issue process for appearing before arbitrator. Even after passing of an award it could exercise its jurisdiction under Sections 14, 15,16,17,19,33 read with 30 thereof. Apart from Section 5 of the 1940 Act the Court s power to intervene was contained in section 9 for making interim orders, S

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