( 1 ) THE petitioner herein has inter alia questioned the validity of Section 3 (1) (d) of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to the 1986 Act ) as also prayed for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus declaring the proceedings in M. C. No. 38 of 1995, c. C. No. 916 of 1995 and C. C. No. 62 of 1997 on the file of XXII Metropolitan Magistrate- cum-Mahila Court, Hyderabad as violative of Chapter XVII-B of Criminal Procedure code under Sections 218 to 224 and also section 26 of General Clauses Act.

( 2 ) THE petitioner married respondent no. 4 on 16-4-1994. She was divorced by the petitioner on 28-8-1995. She also allegedly received Mehr and Iddat period amount of rs. 19,985/- from Qazi Office and gave receipt therefor.

( 3 ) SHE filed an application in September, 1995 purported to be under Section 3 of the 1986 Act before the second respondent which was marked as M. C. No. 38 of 1995. Subsequently, cognizance of the offence was taken in the said case. A miscellaneous petition was filed in the said proceedings. A complaint under Sections 498-A, 500 and 501 of Indian Penal Code read with sections 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition act, 1976 was also filed which was marked as C. C. No. 916 of 1995 before the xxii Metropolitan Magistrate-cum-Mahila court, Hyderabad. A judgment of conviction and sentence was passed on 17-2-2000 whereby and whereunder the petitioner was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for two years and fine of rs. 2,000/- for offence under Section 4 of dowry Prohibition Act and also a fine of rs. 1,000/- under Section 6 of the Dowry prohibition Act. Yet again, another complaint in C. C. No. 62 of 1997 was filed for offence under Section 406 of Indian Penal code which is still pending.

( 4 ) SRI T. Mohan Rao, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner raised number of contentions in support of the application.

( 5 ) ACCORDING to the learned Counsel, item 1 of List III of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution vis-a-vis Entry 5 thereof being overlapping, the Parliament has no legislative competence to enact the said law.

( 6 ) THE learned Counsel would submit that having regard to the provisions contained in Section 220 of the Criminal procedure Code, the three cases were not maintainable. Our attention in this connection has been drawn to Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 26 of the general Clauses Act. Mr. Rao urged that the gifts given at the time of marriage cannot be said to be dowry. A distinction according to the learned Counsel, exists between gift to the bride and dowry.

( 7 ) THE learned Counsel would further contend that the cause of action for all these three cases being same viz. , divorce of the respondent by the petitioner, different cases were not maintainable. We are unable to accept this submission of the learned counsel.

( 8 ) IT is not a case where in relation to same cause of action, more than one case has been filed under the Special Law as also general Law.

( 9 ) THE fourth respondent has filed three different cases which involve three different causes of action. None of the criminal cases is inter-related with the other. Section 26 of the General Clauses Act or for that matter article 20 of the Constitution of India will thus, have no role to play.

( 10 ) SECTION 71 of the Indian Penal Code provides for limit of punishment of offence made up of several offences. Said provision reads thus:where anything which is an offence is made up of parts, any of which parts is itself an offence, the offender, shall not be punished with the punishment of more than one of such offences, unless it to be so expressly provided: where anything is an offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, or where several acts, of which one or more than one would by itself or themselves constitute an offence, when combined, a different offence, the offende