( 1 ) THIS petition has been filed by A-1 to A-4 and A-6 to A-8, who were facing the trial in C. C. No. 101 of 1997 before the II Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad for quashing the proceedings. The original complaint is filed by one Syed Mazher Hussain i. e. , the 2nd respondent herein, with the following averments.

( 2 ) IT is stated that A-1 and A-2 are the parents of A-3, A-4 Smt. Wajidunnisa Begum is the younger sister of A-2, A-5 Afsari Begum is the real mother of the girl viz. , Mahjabeen Fatima, whose marriage was performed illegally with A-3 Mr. Muzamil Ahmed Sajid on 24-2-1997 at 7-00 p. m. in Sameera Function Hall, Lad Bazaar, Hyderabed. It is further stated that A-6 is the Murshad of A-1 to A-3, who delivered the sermon of marriage and A-7 participated and acted as the guardian of the girl Mahjabeen Fatima. As a matter of fact, A-7 is not the guardian of the girl Mahjabeen Fatima. A-8 and A-9 are the witnesses too the said marriage. A-5, Afsari Begum is the real mother of the girl Mahjabeen Fatima. A-4 Wajidunnisa Begum is not the real mother of the girl Mahjabeen Fatima. A-4 is issueless and she did not give birth to any female child. It is contended that the girl Mahjabeen Fatima was born on 4-1-1980. Thus the accused performed the marriage of the girl below the age of 18 years, which is an offence punishable under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929. With these averments, the complaint was filed. Then the accused appeared before the trial Court. Before commencing the trial, the present petition has been filed by the petitioners herein for quashing the proceedings in C. C. No. 101 of 1997.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel Mr. K. Raja Reddy appearing on behalf of the accused-petitioners herein submitted at the Bar that the Muslim girl can marry after attaining the age of puberty. The Child Marriage Restraint Act is not applicable to the Muslims.

( 4 ) IN support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioners herein relied upon many rulings. It was mainly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners herein that the Shariat Act is applicable to the Muslims. Therefore, the Muslims are guided by their Personal Law. The Child Marriage Restraint Act is not applicable to them and therefore the proceedings instituted against the accused-petitioners herein be quashed. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon a ruling reported in C. Mohammad Yunus v. Syed Unnissa, AIR 1961 SC 808, in which their Lordships were pleased to hold at paras (9) and (10) as under : 9. Under the Shariat Act, 1937, as framed in questions relating to charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments, the custom or usage would prevail. But the Act enacted by the Central Legislature was amended by Madras Act 18 of 1949 and S. 2 as amended provides : notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions, regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of Personal law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including tallaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and Mubarrat, Maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties and wakfs the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat)". 10. Manifestly by this act, the rule of decision in all questions relating to intestate succession and other specified matters including wakfs where the parties to the dispute are Muslims is the Muslim Personal Law. The terms of the Act as amended are explicit. Normally a statute which takes away or impairs vested rights under existing laws is presumed not to have retrospective operation. Where vested rights are affected and the question is not one of procedure there is a presumption that it was not the intention of the Legislature to alter vested rights. But the question is always