( 1 ) AT times it becomes necessary for the Court to remind itself about the self-imposed restraints and limitations in exercise of the power granted to the Court by the Constitution under Article 226. The Court can take judicial notice of the fact that large number of writ petitions are filed in this Court by persons without exhausting statutory alternative remedies or other remedies available to them. Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue directions, orders or writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari or any of them. Such directions, orders or writs may be issued for the enforcement of fundamental rights or for any other purpose. It is well established that the remedy provided for in Article 226 of the Constitution is a discretionary remedy and the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant such a relief in certain circumstances even though a legal right might have been infringed. Availability of an alternative remedy is one of such considerations which the High Court may take into account to refuse to exercise its jurisdiction, but this principle does not apply to the enforcement of Fundamental Rights either under Article 32 or under 226 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court in Mohd. Yasin vs. Town Area Committee and the cases to follow that case held that an alternative remedy is not a bar to move a writ petition in the High Court to enforce a fundamental right. This is the only exception. In all other cases where no fundamental right is involved, it has been ruled that the High Court would not exercise its jurisdiction under article 226 when an alternative, adequate and efficacious legal remedy is available and the petitioner has not availed of the same before coming to the high Court. Of course, Article 226 is silent on this point; it does not say in so many words anything about this matter, but the Courts have themselves evolved this rule as a kind of self-imposed restriction on their jurisdiction under Article 226. The rule of exhaustion of a remedy before invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 has been characterized as a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law, per decision of the supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Md. Nooh and Babu Ram vs. Zilla parishad. The rule has been justified on the ground that persons should not be encouraged to circumvent the provisions made by a statute providing for a mechanism and procedure to challenge administrative or quasi-judicial actions taken thereunder.

( 2 ) IN Union of India vs. T. R. Varma the Supreme Court observed:"it is well settled that when an alternative and equally efficacious remedy is open to a litigant, he should be required to pursue that remedy and not invoke the special jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a prerogative writ. It is true that the existence of another remedy does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court to issue a writ, but. . . . . "the existence of an adequate legal remedy is a thing to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting writs. . . . "and when such remedy exists, it will be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under article 226, unless there are good grounds therefor. "

( 3 ) IN Thansingh vs. Supdt. of Taxes the Supreme Court was pleased to observe:"the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not subject to any restrictions except the territorial restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles. But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary; it is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so. The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain self-imposed limitations. Resort to that jurisdiction is not intended as an alternative remedy for relief which may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by statute. Ordinarily the court will n

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