C. V. N. SASTRI, J.

( 1 ) THESE two L. P. As. , one filed by the defendant and the other filed by the plaintiff respectively arise out of a suit filed for specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 15-12-1984 (Ex. A-1) executed by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff in respect of a total extent of Ac. 0-43 cents of vacant land in Nuzvid town. The execution of the agreement was not disputed by the defendant. The defendant, however, resisted the suit mainly on two grounds. Firstly, time was of the essence of the contract and inasmuch as the plaintiff failed to perform his part of the contract within the time stipulated in the agreement, he was not entitled to enforce the contract. Secondly, the plaintiff came to Court with unclean hands making false allegations and setting up a false claim for Plot No. 21 which was not covered by the suit agreement and as such he was disentitled for the equitable relief of specific performance.

( 2 ) THE trial Court decreed the suit in toto granting the relief of specific performance in respect of the entire extent of Ac. 0-43 cents as claimed by the plaintiff. But on appeal the learned Single Judge, however,modified the decree restricting the relief to Ac. 0-25 cents only and negatived the claim of the plaintiff for the remaining extent of Ac. 0-18 cents holding that the plaintiff failed to establish that the suit agreement includes Plot No. 21. Dissatisfied with the judgment of the learned Single Judge, both sides have filed the present letters Patent Appeals.

( 3 ) SRI M. V. Ramana Reddy, the learned Counsel appearing for the defendant (appellant in L. P. A. No. 105 of 1996) has vehemently contended that the trial court as well as the learned Single Judge erred in holding that time was not of the essence of the contract. According to him, having regard to the admitted fact that the suit agreement dated 15-12-1984 was the result of a mediation by which the prior disputes between the parties were settled and it was specifically stipulated in the agreement that the plaintiff had to pay the sale consideration of Rs. 36,900/-on or before 14-12-1985 (sic. 15-2-1985), time must be regarded as the essence of the contract. We are, however, not impressed with this submission. The normal principle is that in case of contracts relating to the sale of immovable property, time is not treated as the essence of the contract unless the parties have intended it to be so. Time can be made the essence of the contract either by an express stipulation to that effect in the contract or it may also be inferred from the facts and circumstances of the case. Even if time was not originally made the essence of the contract, it can be made so by a subsequent notice fixing a reasonable time for performance. In the instant case there is no express stipulation in the suit agreement making time the essence of the contract. The mere fact that a date was fixed in the agreement for performance does not by itself make the stipulation as to the time the essence of the contract. (See Govinda Prasad vs. Haridutt ).

( 4 ) TIME stipulated in the contract for performance is 15-2-1985. The plaintiff issued notices on 23-3-1985 and 25-3-1985 calling upon the defendant to execute the sale deeds in terms of the original agreements dated 22-9-1982 and 15-8-1983. To the said notices the defendant sent a reply dated 6-4-1985 taking the stand that as per the fresh agreement dated 15-12-1984 (Ex. A-1), the plaintiff had to pay the sale consideration on or before 15-2-1985, that time was the essence of the contract and that since the plaintiff committed breach of the contract the agreement stood cancelled. The suit itself was filed on 29-4-1985 without any delay. On these facts we are clearly of the opinion that the contention of the learned Counsel for the defendant that time is of the essence of the contract has no force.

( 5 ) SRI Ramana Reddy has next contended that the learned Single Judge, having rightly come to the conclusio

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