( 1 ) THESE writ petitions questioning the assessment under Section 3, the demand raised under Section 4 and the amendment to the Schedule to the Andhra Pradesh Non-Agricultural Lands Assessment Act, 1963 (for short the NALA Act ) at the first instance came up before a Division Bench of this Court consisting of Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J. and G. Bikshapathi, J. The main contentions raised before, the said Division Bench by the petitioners are that amendments to Section 2 (d), Section 8 and to the Schedule to the NALA Act are unconstitutional, that the enhanced rate of assessment is arbitrary, excessive and confiscatory in nature and that since vacant non-agricultural lands are being assessed, the decision of the Full Bench of this Court in S. V. Cement Ltd. v. R. D. O. Nandyal, (1993) 2 ALT 32 (FB) requires reconsideration. The Division Bench holding that the decision of the Full Bench in S. V. Cement s case (supra) requires reconsideration in view of the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Mahanandi Coalfields Ltd. , (1995) 3 JT (SC) 662 ; (AIR 1995 SC 1868) and India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1990 SC 85, referred this batch of writ petitions to a Full Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on the above aspects. Therefore, these cases were posted before a Full Bench. The Full Bench referred the matters to a Larger Bench observing that the Full Bench consisting of even number of members cannot reconsider the decision of another Full Bench in S. V. Cement s case (supra ). That is how the matters came up before this larger Bench.

( 2 ) ALL these writ petitions give rise to similar points and, therefore, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners contended that Section 3 of the NALA Act is ultra vires of the Act and violative of Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution of India, that the classification is per se irrational and not intelligible as it results in uneven assessments. Assessment is not tevied on land but on the user of the land and that the rate of assessment is confiscatory and extortional and thus violative of Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India, that the term assessment , does not mean tax as commonly understood. The NALA Act can, impose tax only on vacant non-agricultural land , but not on the land occupied by buildings, factories or mines including the land appurtenant thereto. Further, according to the leanred counsel, Section 8 is ultra vires the Constitution, and the term used occurring in Section 3 and in the Schedule to the Act should mean actually used and that the NALA Act being a fiscal legislation the provisions should be given strict interpretation. It is also contended that where two interpretations are possible, the one in favour of the assessee must be preferred.

( 4 ) THE learned Advocate-General contended that the provisions of the NALA Act are not violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution, that the amount of assessment determined is neither confiscatory nor extortional, that the interpretation of the term used as was done by the Full Bench in S. V, Cement s case, (1993 (2) ALT 32) (supra) is proper, that the assessment under the NALA Act is not covered by any Central Legislation, that the delegation of power to amend the Schedule as provided under Section 8 is quite proper and legal and that there are no grounds to review the decision of the Full Bench in S. V. Cement s case (supra ). The provisions of the NALA Act are neither arbitrary nor irrational and, therefore, the Act is not violative of Art. 14 or 19 of the Constitution of India and that there are no merits in the writ petitions.

( 5 ) IN S. V. Cement s case, (1993 (2) ALT 32) (supra) it was held that the word used occurring in the NALA Act means not only actually used , but meant to be used or set apart for being used . It is this interpretation that is primarily assailed in this batch of writ petitions. To ap