SARDAR ALI KHAN, J.

( 1 ) A Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the question of the right of a divorced woman to claim maintenance under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act ) has referred the matter for the Full Bench on certain questions arising about the right of such Muslim divorced women to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred as `the Code ) from her former husband even after the enforcement of the aforesaid Act. The Division Bench felt that the matter involves substantial questions of law of general importance having a far-reaching effect and therefore it should be placed before a Full Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on the matter. The questions to be considered by the Full Bench are as follows : (1) Whether a divorced Muslim woman can claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code from her former husband even after passing of the Act of 1986? (2) Whether the maintenance contemplated under Section 3 (1) (a) of the Act of 1986 is restricted only for the period of `iddat or whether a fair and reasonable provision has to be made for future also within the period of Iddat? (3) How far Sections 125 to 128 of the Code can be held to be applicable after coming into force of the Act of 1986 and what should be the mode of disposal of the cases pending before the Courts under these Sections?

( 2 ) THE above three questions will therefore have to be considered by this Full Bench in the light of the provisions of the Act of 1986, the principles of Mohammadan Law and the provisions of Sections 125 to 128 of the Code.

( 3 ) THE main question with regard to the right of a divorced Muslim woman for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code from her former husband after passing of the Act of 1986 and deserves to be taken up first for consideration (sic) hinges around Section 3 of the Act. Before going to the intricacies of Section 3 of the Act of 1986, it would be necessary to consider the aims and objects for which the Act of 1986 has been passed.

( 4 ) THE decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum, AIR 1985 SC 945 (for short, Shah Bano case) created a furore among the Muslim community of India who agitated strongly against the decision on the ground that it sought to abrogate the principles of Muslim law with regard to maintenance payable to a divorced Muslim wife. In the wake of the protests made against the said decision, the Parliament passed the Act of 1986. It would be in the fitness of things to make a reference to the objects and reasons of the said Act which clearly brings out the circumstances under which the Act was passed and indicates the objects which it seeks to achieve. A perusal of the statement of objects and reasons shows that in the very first sentence it is stated that the Supreme Court in Shah Bano case has held that although the Muslim law limits the husband s liability to provide for maintenance of the divorced wife to the period of Iddat, it does not contemplate or countenance the situation envisaged by Section 125 of the Code. The Court held that it would be incorrect and unjust to extend the above principle of Muslim law to cases in which divorced wife is unable to maintain herself. The Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that if the divorced wife is able to maintain herself, the husband s liability ceases with the expiration of the period of Iddat, but if she is unable to maintain herself after the period of Iddat, she is entitled to have recourse to Section 125 of the Code. The above statement is almost taken verbatim from the statement of objects and reasons and it clearly highlights two points which must be kept in mind for the purpose of a decision in the instant case. The first principle which has been recognised in the statement of objects and reasons of the Act of 1986 is that the Muslim law limits the husband s liability to prov

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