The time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree under Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act means the time reasonably required for obtaining a copy.

ALLADI KUPPUSWAMI, J.

( 1 ) THIS writ appeal is sought to be preferred against the judgment of Jeevan Reddy, J. , dated 31-12-1980. An objection was taken by the office that the appeal is barred by limitation, as there has been a delay of 12 days in filing the writ appeal. Sri V. B. Sahgal, learned counsel for the appellant, however, contends that there has been no delay in preferring the appeal.

( 2 ) THE judgment was delivered on 31-12-1980, the last day before the Sankranti vacation, which commenced on 1-1-1981 and lasted till 16-1-1981. The appellant filed a copy application on 17-1-1981 and filed the appeal on 26-2-1981. It is contended on behalf of the appellant that the period from 1-1-1981 to 16-1-1981 when the High Court was closed for Sankranti vacation has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation, in which case the appeal will be in time. It is conceded that the appeal would be in time if the above period is excluded. But the objection raised by the office is that this period cannot be excluded under Section 12 of the Limitation Act.

( 3 ) WE requested Mr. S. R. Ashok to act as amicus curiae in this case and after hearing the submissions made by Mr. Sahgal, Advocate for the appellant, and Mr. Ashok, we are satisfied that the objection raised by the office that the appeal is barred by time is justified,

( 4 ) UNDER Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act, in computing the period of limitation for an appeal, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded. It has been held by the Privy Council in Jijibhoy N. Surty v. T. S. Chettyar, (AIR 1928 PC 103) that the expression "time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree" means time reasonably required for obtaining a copy of the decree. The contention on behalf of the appellant is that, as, under Section 12 (2) the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced has also to be excluded, it was open to the appellant to file a copy application on the next day and as the next day and the succeeding days happened to be holidays, the earliest point of time at which he could make a copy application was on 17-1-1981 and, hence, the entire period between 1-1-1981 and 16-1-1981 must be excluded. We are of the view that this contention proceeds upon a misconception of the true meaning of Section 12 (2) of the Limitation Act. All that Section 12 (2) says is that the time requisite for chaining a copy of the decree shall be excluded, and in the words of the Privy Council, this means that the time reasonably required for obtaining a copy should be excluded. In this case, the judgment was rendered on 31-12-1980 and there was nothing preventing the appellant from applying for a copy on the very same day. If he had applied for a copy on that day, whatever time was taken for obtaining the copy of the decree would have been excluded. But the appellant did not do so. He waited until 17-1-1981 to make a copy application. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the whole period from 1-1-1981 to 16-1-1981 was also a period requisite for obtaining the copy of the decree.

( 5 ) RELIANCE was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the decision in Saminatha Ayyar v. Venkata-subba Ayyar, ( (1904) ILR 27 Mad 21 ). In that case, the judgment was delivered at 4. 00 P. M. on the last working day before the commencement of the Christmas vacation when it was too late to apply for a copy of the judgment. The application for a copy was made on the day when the Court reopened. It was held that the appellant was entitled to deduct the period during which the Court was closed and such period, in the circumstances of the case, must be taken to be part of the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment. But the case which is practically on all fours with the present case is that reported in Jaimullabdin, In re (AIR

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