The cause of action for specific performance arises when the remedy is available to the party.

( 1 ) THIS L. P. A. arises out if a purchasers suit for specific performance of agreement of sale (Ex. A-2) dated 1-2-1961 by which the defendants father Sriramulu, who died on 3-4-1961, having received Rs. 200. 00 agreed to sell the house No. 3/10 0f Thallarevu village in East Godavari district, and received Rs. 100. 00 on 15-3. 1961 out of the total consideration of Rs. 400. 00. In Ex. A-2 the parties fixed the dated for performance fixed the date for performance as on 1-6-1961 or earlier. The suit, however, was field on 12-11-1968.

( 2 ) THE suit house was the subject- matter of dispute in O. S. No. 30/60 on the file of the District Munsifs court at Kakinada, in which Maneoalli, Veerraju claimed possession. Sriramulu, the defendant in the suit, was defending his tittle to the house. The suit was dismissed on 20-1-1961, twelve days earlier to the execution of the agreement of sale, Ex. A-2. The suit ultimately dismissed the suit. The plaintiff at first, on 18-5-1961 issued notice and demanded performance and again on 4-9-1986, after the suit is finally decided, issued, for the second time, noticed for performance of the agreement.

( 3 ) THE defendants resisted the specific performance on the ground that it was barred by limitation under Art, 113 of the Limitation Act (Act 9 of 1908), (Act 36 of 19630),

( 4 ) MR. Poorniah , the learned Counsel for the plaintiff- appellant, submits Veerrajus suit was decided finally on 17-7- 1968. Therefore, the purchaser plaintiff could not have instituted the a suit prior to that date. It is urged, in the circumstances of the case, it should be held that the cause of action arose on the day when O. S. No. 30/60 was finally decided in favour of the vendors, as, it is argued, laying a suit for specific performance earlier to the impediment to the title of the defendants was finally removed and immediately the suit is field. The cause of action, it is argued, should be constructed to have arisen also on 12-11-1968. In the alternative it is argued, the cause of action arose on 1- 6- 1961 and institution of the suit under Articles 113 of act 9 of 1908 has to be made within three years from the when the cause of action arose.

( 5 ) IN Muthu Korakki Chetty v. Madar Ammal (1920) ILR 43 Mad 185 (FB) at 211, Seshagiri Aiyyar J. Speaking for the Full Bench Observed: "broadly Speaking, the decisions of the Board fall under two heads. "

( 6 ) THE cases, then, are collected at page 211 of the Report and further the learned Judge held:"it was argued , not without some plausibility, that the first class of cases recognise the doctrine that where a party, in whose favour a cause of action has arisen, cannot usefully pursue a remedy at the time his right of action is postponed to a subsequent date. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the true rule deducible from these various decisions of the Judicial committee is this; that subject to the exemption exclusion, mode of computation and the excusing, of delay etc. Which are provided in the limitation Act, the language of the third column of the first schedule should be so interpreted as to carry out the true intention of the legislature, that is to say, by dating the causing of action from a date when the remedy is available to the party. This is a rule of construction and not a rule of law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . "6-A. The Madras High Court in two subsequent decisions in Sundaramma v. Abdul Khadar (1933) 64 MLJ664) (FB) and in Ramaiya v. Surryanarayan (AIR 1949 Mad 279) doubted the ratio decidendi of the full Bench decision in Muthu Korakki Chetty v. Madar Ammal (1920 ) ILR 43 Mad 185, (FB ).

( 7 ) IN Narayan Patil v. Puttabai (AIR 1945 PC 5), the privy council, considering a suit instituted on 25-11- 1932, where the plaintiff urged to exclude the period, under section 15 of the Limitation Act (ACT 9 of 1908 ) between 25-11-1920 and 4-11-1932, as "continuously the suit was stayed for various order of temporary injunction an