The High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 of the CrPC are not barred by Section 397(3) of the CrPC, which prohibits a second revision by the same person before the High Court or the Sessions Court.

A. SAMBASIVA RAO, C. J.

( 1 ) WHILE referring these matters to Bench or three Judges the Division Bench consisting of Obul Reddi, C. J. and Gangadhara Rao. J. posed the two following questions; (I) Whether it would be open to party to invoke the provisions of S. 482, Cr. P C. 1973, When he seeks to file a second revision in the High Court under S. 397 (3) ? (2) Whether sub-section (3) of S. 397 takes away the jurisdiction of this Court (High Court) to suo motu exercise its revisional jurisdiction in case where the Sessions Judge had already exercised his revisional jurisdiction under sub-sec. (3) on an application made to him under that sub-section?"

( 2 ) EARLIER Muktadar. J. referred these cases to a Division Bench in view of the conflicting decisions on these aspects f this Court and other High Courts. The Division Bench thought that the two question are very important and should be decided by a Full Bench.

( 3 ) APART from the different view points expressed on these questions by learned single Judges of this Court and of other High Courts, the Supreme Court itself in a Bench of two learned Judges held the view m Amarnath v. State of Haryana. AIR 1977 SC 2185 (at p. 2187): "section 482 contains the inherent powers of the Court and does not confer any new powers but preserves the powers which the High Court already possessed. A harmonious construction of Ss. 397 and 482 would lead to the irresistible conclusion that where a particular order is expressly barred under S. 397 (2) and cannot be the subject of revision by the High Court, then to such a case the provisions of S. 482 would not apply. It is well settled that the inherent powers of the Court can ordinarily be exercised when there is no express provision on the subject matter. Where there is an express provision barring a particular remedy the Court cannot resort to the exercise of inherent powers". However, in a later decision in Madhulimaye v. State of Maharashtra. AIR 1978 SC 47, a Bench of three Honble Judges of the Supreme Court was of the opinion that the aforesaid statement of the law was not quite accurate and needs some modulation. It is significant to note that Untwalia, J. who was a member of the earlier Bench, spoke for the later Bench of three Judges.

( 4 ) THE question before the Supreme Court in the later Bench was whether the High Court can exercise its inherent Power to quash an interlocutory order. The learned Judges had to consider the meaning and nature of an interlocutory Order within the meaning of S. 397 (2) Cr. P. C. and whether the bar contained in that provision would preclude the High Court to exercise its inherent Power under S. 482 Cr. P. C- in relation to an interlocutory order. In this Particular matter we are not concerned with the meaning of words interlocutory order occurring in S. 397 (2 ). The aforesaid Supreme Courts decision is relevant and material only on the other fact- of the problem viz. , exercise of inherent power by the High Court under S. 482 Cr. P. C. It was pointed out by Untwalia J. giving the judgment of the Court, that on a plain reading of S. 482, it would follow that nothing in the Code which would include sub-section of S. 397 also shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court. The bar provided in sub-sec. (2] of S. 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order Then in accordance with one or the other principles stated earlier the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provisions in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. Three principles had been earlier stated by the learned judge which are pertinent to the exercise of the inherent power of the High Court. They are. (1) That the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party: (2

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