Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, is retrospective to the extent that it disregards any term of a decree or agreement that the amount of maintenance fixed shall in no case be increased, but it does not apply to cases where the right to maintenance itself was relinquished prior to the Act.

( 1 ) THERE were two brothers G. Chenchu Naidu and Narappa Naidu. They constituted a Hindu Joint Family. They owned A schedule immovable properties at Kesavaram village. Chenchu Naidu died undivided some 37 years before without leaving no issue. The plaintiff is the widow of Chenchu Naidu. She claimed maintenance from Narappa Naidu who was the sole surviving coparcener. As a result of some mediation, the plaintiff and Narappa Naidu came to an agreement. Narappa Naidu paid Rs. 400. 00- in full quit of maintenance keeping in view the property of the family. She executed a registered relinquishment deed on 14-9-1936 whereby she gave up all her rights in the family immovable property and also gave up her rights of maintenance against the family. She agreed not to raise any dispute about her maintenance thereafter.

( 2 ) WHILE so, she instituted a suit for recovery of past and future maintenance. She claimed 1/2 putties of paddy, Rs. 300. 00- per annum towards clothing and utensils, and Rs. 3,000. 00- towards provision for residence. She also claimed Rs. 4,950. 00- arrears of maintenance of six years. She contended that the amount paid under Exhibit B-1, the relinquishment deed was temporary and as the cost of living had increased, the amount was insufficient. It was also stated that the defendant, who is the widow of Narappa Naidu, is receiving a large income from the family properties. Therefore she is entitled to the enhanced maintenance.

( 3 ) THE suit was resisted by the defendant mainly on the ground that under Exhibit B-1, the plaintiff had relinquished her right of maintenance. Therefore she cannot claim any maintenance, leave aside the enhanced maintenance.

( 4 ) THE trial Court framed appropriate issues and after recording the evidence produced by the parties dismissed the suit by its judgment dated 1-6-1966. It was found that the plaintiffs maintenance claim was permanently settled under Exhibit -1.

( 5 ) ON appeal, our learned brother M. Krishna Rao, J. , decreed the plaintiffs suit. He held that " in more than one case it was held by this Court that the maintenance-holder was not debarred from ignoring the agreement or decree in seeking further relief. " He relied on S. Kameswaramma v. Subramanyan, AIR 1959 Andh Pra 269 and C. Ambayamma v. C. Ganapathi, AIR 1969 Andh Pra 213. He observed that " in Muthyalamma v. China Appanna, 1968-1 Andh WR 429, it was held by a learned single Judge of this Court that the expression agreement used in Section 25 of the Act does not cover a case where a claim for maintenance was once for all fixed at a lump sum in full settlement of the claim. The said decision has been recently overruled by a Division Bench of this Court in a Judgment dated 31-3-70 in Second Appeal No. 432 of 1968 ( Andh Pra ) ( Seetharamaiah v. Padmavathi ) wherein it was held that the agreement contemplated in Section 25 includes also an agreement as in the present case where the claim for maintenance was permanently settled by praying a lump sum amount. "

( 6 ) FOLLOWING the said decision of the Division Bench, the learned Judge decreed the plaintiffs suit as mentioned in his Judgment.

( 7 ) WHEN the L. P. A. against the judgment of the learned Judge came before a Bench of this Court on 16-11-1972, the Bench directed the case to be referred to a Full Bench in view of the importance of the question involved. That is how the case has come before us.

( 8 ) THE question thus arises on Section 25 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act ( hereinafter called the Act ) which was passed for protecting the rights of maintenance of those who are entitled to such maintenance adequately. While we construe the section so as to produce the effect intended by the Legislature, we ought not, in construing it, to give more retrospective effect to it than what was plainly intended by the legislature, because if we do so, we shall run the risk of interfering with honest transactions which have entered into and were close