The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, being procedural law, are retrospective in operation, and they apply to cases where the right to sue under the provisions of the repealed Act has not been barred by the date of the new Act coming into force.

( 1 ) THE petitioner, who obtained a decree for the recovery of certain sum of money against the respondent on October 24,1962 in s. C. No. 736 of 1962 on the file of the Court of District Munsif, Eluru, filed E. P. No. 108 of 1963 on January 28, 1963, It was dismissed on June 11, 1963. The next E. P. No. 359 of 1969 preferred by the petitioner on August, 21, 1969 was dismissed by the lower Court on november, 25, 1969 on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Hence this revision petition.

( 2 ) THE contention of Sri Narasimhacharya for the petitioner that it is the provisions of Article 136 of the Limitation Act, Act 36 of l963 but not the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 908, that are applicable to the instant case and hence, the E P No, 359 of 1969 was well in time, is resisted by Sri Nagaraja Rao appearing for the respondent Judgment debtor.

( 3 ) THE question, therefore, that arises for decision is whether it is the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 or the Limitation act, 1963 that are applicable for the presentation of the execution petition on August, 21, 1969 in respect of a decree passed prior to the coming into force of the new Act.

( 4 ) THE Indian Limitation Act, 1908 was repealed by the Limitation Act, 1963 which came into force on January, 1, 1964. It has therefore to be seen whether the provisions of Article 136 of the limitation Act, 1963 are attracted in the instant case although the decree sought to be executed was passed in the year 1962 and the earlier execution petition was dismissed in June, 1963. We have, therefore, to examine whether the provisions of Article 136 of the limitation Act, 1963 are prospective or retrospective. Whether the provisions of an Act are prospective or retrospective depends upon the fact whether they are precedural or substantive law. It is wellsettled that the law of limitation applicable to a suit or proceeding is a procedural law and the provisions existing on the date of the suit or application or appeal, as the case may be, are applicable to it unless there is a distinct provision to the contrary. See C. Beepathama and others v. Velasari Shankaranarayana Kadamoblithaya and ramanathan v. Kandappa. When once the provisions of the Limitation Act 1963 are held to be procedural law, it has to be considered what follows therefrom.

( 5 ) THE proposition that statutory provisions creating substantive rights are ordinarily prospective unless either expressly or by necessary intendment the legislature has made them retrospective, is a well-established one. See Which deotal v. Administrator General of West Bengal. Equally settled is the principle that where the provisions of a repealing Act relate to procedural law, the aforesaid normal rule of presumption of prospective operation is not applicable to such a case. The provisions of the statute which prescribe procedure are ordinarily presumed to be retrospective as no one has a right to a particular procedure being adopted in any proceeding. See Anant Gopal Sheorey v. State of Bombay, Colonial Sugar refining Co , Ltd v Irving Mukerjee v. Mr Ratnaralan and. Shyabuddingsab v. Municipality of Gadag-Betgeri. Suffice it to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Nani Gopal Mitra v. State of bihar wherein it was observed that as a general rule the amended rule relating to procedure operates retrospectively. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, I have no hesitation to hold that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 being procedural law, are retrospective in operation.

( 6 ) THOUGH the provisions of the repealing Act are retrospective, they cannot be made applicable to a case where the right to a party to sue had become barred by the provisions of the repealed Limitation Act, which was then in force on the date of the coming into force of the later enactment as the right which was already extinguished cannot be revived by the application of the repealing Act. In fact, the afo