A classification made by a statute will not be set aside as a denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.

( 1 ) THE question which must essentially he answered in this enquiry is whether Section 32 (b) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 15 of 1960 thereinafter called the Act) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

( 2 ) THE material facts are that the petitioner instituted a suit, O. S. 19/63 in the Court of the Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabed, for a declaration that he is the tenant within the meaning of Section 2 (ii) of the Act and therefore is entitled to the protection afforded there under. The respondent who is the landlord instituted O. S. No. 20/0. 3 against the petitioner before the same Court for possession of the suit property contending that us the suit building was constructed in 1960 it is exempted from the operation of the Act. The Chief Judge framed the following common issue in both the suits:"whether Section 32 (b) of the Act is unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative in view of the provisions of Article 14 and Article 19 of the Constitution of India?"the petitioner submitted an application, I. A. No. 91/64 under Section 113 read with Order 46 Rule 1 C. P. C. to refer the question involved in the said issue for determination to the High Court. The learned Chief Judge through his order dated 8-1-1961 rejected the petition. Against the said order C. R. P. No. 1679/64 is filed. C. M. P. No. 4906/64 is filed by the petitioner under Article 228 of the Constitution requesting this Court to withdraw the two suits in order to determine the issue mentioned above. It was conceded that in order to resolve the constitutionality of Section 32 (b) it is necessary to assume that the building in question was constructed after 26-8-1957 and it is on that basis that the learned Advocate for the petitioner argued before us. Section 32 (b) is in the following terms:"32. The provisions of this Act shall not apply; (a ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (b) to any building constructed on or after the 26/08/1957".

( 3 ) NOW Article 14 has been construed in several cases by the Supreme Court and various High Courts. The difficulty therefore is not about the ascertainment of the principles enunciated in those cases. The real difficulty arises in applying those principles to the, cases arising now and then. In substance the principle underlying Article 14 is that it does not prohibit the Legislature from classifying persons or things, or from setting up different classes to some of which the law may apply, while to others it may not. But in order that such a classification may be constitutionally valid, it must be based on some, rational basis. It must be intelligible classification. It is also necessary that the basis of such a classification must have some rational nexus with the object which the legislation is intended to achieve.

( 4 ) BEFORE we test Section 32 (b) in the light of the above said twin principles underlying Article 14 of the Constitution, it is better to keep in view some of the presumptions which arise in such cases.

( 5 ) IT need hardly be asserted that every presumption favours the validity of an Act of the Legislature and the doubts, if any, must be resolved in support of the Act. Similarly it must be presumed that the Legislature acted with an honest purpose to keep the enactment within constitutional limits. This presumption arises from the fact that the Legislature is pledged to support and uphold the Constitution. It is also presumed that the Legislature intended that the whole of the Act and every part of it should be significant and effective. It is obvious that these presumptions are not conclusive. Never the less they throw burden upon the person who attacks the validity to show clearly and convincingly how and in what respect the impugned provision or the Act is violative of any constitutional principle.

( 6 ) MR. T. Lakshmiah, the learned counsel for the petitioner, challenged the validity of Section 32 (b) of the Act on the ground that i