Respondents filed O.S.No.544 of 1975 against the petitioners in the Court of II Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, for the relief of specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 28-01-1974. The trial Court dismissed the suit on 26-12-1978. Thereupon, the respondents filed CCCA No.49 of 1979 before this Court. The appeal was allowed through judgment dated 09-09-1986 and the suit was decreed. Respondents were directed to deposit the balance of consideration of Rs.57,300/-, with interest at 6% per annum from 28- 08-1974, within two months from the date of decree. A default clause was also incorporated. The said decree became final.

2. The respondents filed E.P.No.81 of 1999 on 24-09-1999. Apart from raising several objections to the E.P., petitioners filed I.A.No.1182 of 2001, with a prayer to rescind the agreement of sale under Section 28 (1) of the Specific Relief Act (for short 'the Act'). The trial Court allowed the I.A., through its order dated 27-08-2002. The respondents filed C.R.P.No.4276 of 2002 before this Court. The C.R.P. was allowed vide order dated 08-09-2004. In view of this, it became necessary for the Executing Court to proceed with the E.P.

3. The Executing Court allowed the E.P. through its order dated 03-02-2006, and directed the petitioners to execute the sale deed. Alleging that certain important contentions advanced by them, such as limitation and non-compliance with the conditions in the decree, were not taken into account by the Executing Court, the petitioners filed E.A.No.88 of 2006, under Section 114, read with Order XLVII C.P.C., with a prayer to review the order dated 03-02-2006. The review petition was dismissed on 04-06-2007. Hence, this C.R.P., against the order in E.P.No.81 of 1999.

4. Sri Ch.Raghuveer Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the E.P. was filed after a lapse of 12 years, and it was barred by limitation. He contends that the respondents failed to comply with the condition imposed by this Court, as to making of deposit of the balance of consideration, and on account of the same, the suit came to be dismissed, by operation of the default clause. He further contends that the Executing Court did not discuss any of these aspects in its order dated 03-02-2006, and the review petition was dismissed on technical grounds. Learned counsel submits that neither the order dated 03-02-2006 passed in E.P.No.81 of 1999, nor the one, dated 04-06-2007, rejecting the application for review, can be sustained in law, or on facts.

5. Sri P. Shiv Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the order dated 03-02-2006 passed in E.P.No.81 of 1999 has merged in the order dated 04-06-2007, passed in E.A.No.88 of 2006, and the present C.R.P, which is filed against E.P.No.81 of 1999, is not maintainable in law. He contends that the Executing Court discussed all the points urged on behalf of the parties, in its order dated 03-02-2006, and no case was made out for reviewing the same. According to the learned counsel, the E.P. is within the period of limitation, if the period during which an order of temporary injunction was obtained in O.S.No.1466 of 1977 is taken into account. Learned counsel further contends that deposit of the balance of consideration was made within the stipulated time, and certain omissions, on the part of the office of the trial Court, in bringing the deposits to the register, cannot be a ground to deny the execution of the decree.

6. Both the counsel have relied upon the precedents, in support of their contentions.

7. This Court can not act as an Appellate Authority over an order passed by an Executing Court. Strong grounds must exist to interfere with such orders, particularly when the decree is very old. From the various contentions urged on behalf of the parties, the following questions arise for consideration:

a) Whether the C.R.P. i