C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy, J.

1. This Writ Appeal is filed by the respondent in W.P.No.19721 of 2015 questioning order dated 18-1-2017 passed by the learned single Judge.

2. The facts relevant for the disposal of the Writ Appeal have already been set out in the order under appeal and therefore, they need not be repeated here. The only point argued by Sri K. Raghavacharyulu, learned Standing Counsel for the appellants is that the learned single Judge has committed an error in holding that the termination of the respondent is punitive in nature and that as no enquiry was held before such termination, the same was illegal. He has taken us through the termination order and submitted that no where in the order any allegation of misconduct was made against the respondent nor a stigma was attached to him and that therefore the order was in the nature of termination simpliciter and was not punitive.

3. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the termination order referred to Clause Nos.1 to 9 of the appointment order dated 27-8-2014 and that the latter deals with the situation where the appointment of the respondent will be terminated if any declaration given or information furnished by him is proved to be false, or if he was found to have wilfully suppressed any material information. He has further submitted that before the impugned order of removal was passed, a vigilance enquiry was conducted by the Vigilance Department of the appellants on 30-3-2015 during which the respondent was interrogated and coerced to give the statement that he worked in L & T Limited on adhoc basis in order to make him concede that he did not have the required experience of two years and that he has deliberately made a false representation regarding experience. He has submitted that in the context of the allegation of suppression/furnishing of false information or declaration regarding the respondent’s experience, the appellants have quoted para-9 of the appointment order and that therefore the alleged misconduct is the foundation for termination of the services of the respondent and the appellants were bound to hold an enquiry before such termination. The learned Senior Counsel accordingly submitted that the learned single Judge has rightly set-aside the termination order as the same was not preceded by an enquiry.

4. As regards the question whether an order of termination of an employee must be preceded by an enquiry or not, the same is no longer res integra. In Parshottam Lal Dhingra Vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 38, the Supreme Court held as under :

“In short, if the termination of service is founded on the right flowing from contract or the service rules then, prima facie, the termination is not a punishment and carries with it no evil consequences and so Article 311 is not attracted. But even if the Government has, by contract or under the rules, the right to terminate the employment without going through the procedure prescribed for inflicting the punishment of dismissal or removal or reduction in rank, the Government may, nevertheless, choose to punish the servant and if the termination of service is sought to be founded on misconduct, negligence, inefficiency or other disqualification, then it is a punishment and the requirements of Article 311 must be complied with.”

5. In State of Punjab Vs. Sukh Raj Bahadur, AIR 1968 SC 1089 the Supreme Court held that if the order visits the public servant with any evil consequences or casts an aspersion against his character or integrity, it must be considered to be one by way of punishment, no matter whether he was a mere probationer or a temporary servant.

6. In Shamsher Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1974 SC 2192, a seven-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the legality of the discharge of two Judicial Officers of the Punjab Judicial Service who were serving as probationers, and held:

“No abstract proposition can be laid down that where the services of a probationer are terminat