SANJAY KUMAR, J.

1. By way of this writ petition, the first petitioner firm and its Managing Partner, the second petitioner, assail the possession notice dated 11.09.2017, issued under Rule 8(1) and the sale notice dated 01.03.2018, issued under Rule 8(6), of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for brevity, the Rules of 2002), by the Canara Bank, Madanapalle Branch, Chittoor District, Andhra Pradesh, (hereinafter, the bank). Interim order dated 14.03.2018 was granted by this Court and it reads as under:

“Though Sri Deepak Bhattacharjee, learned senior counsel representing Sri Dishit Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the respondent bank, would argue that this writ petition ought not to be entertained as an efficacious alternative remedy is provided to the petitioners under Section 17(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short, the SARFAESI Act), and place reliance on the recent judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of Travancore vs. Mathew K.C. 2018 SCC Online SC 55 in that regard, as to whether a writ petition should be entertained or not is ultimately a matter of discretion and this Court would exercise the same judiciously, keeping in mind the principles of self-imposed restraint adumbrated in cases where alternative remedies are available.”

2. Be it noted that in United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110, the Supreme Court pointed out that it is ultimately for the High Court to decide in a given case as to whether it should exercise discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution, despite the availability of an alternative remedy. The observations made in this regard were referred to by the Supreme Court in its recent judgment in Agarwal Tracom Pvt. Ltd. vs. Punjab National Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 626.

3. Each case would turn upon its own individual facts.

4. In the case on hand, we find that the impugned sale notice does not satisfy the requirements of the amended provisions of the SARFAESI Act and the Rules made thereunder. A notice under Rule 8(6) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (for short, the Rules of 2002), was issued by the bank on 01.03.2018. A notice under Rule 9 of the Rules of 2002, bearing the same date, was also communicated to the petitioners informing them that the date of auction was fixed as 03.04.2018. We are informed that this notice under Rule 9 of the Rules of 2002 was published in the newspapers on 03.03.2018.

5. In terms of the amended provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the right of redemption given to the borrower would expire upon publication of such a notice. However, Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Mathew Varghese vs. M. Amritha Kumar, (2014) 5 SCC 610, stipulates that the thirty day notice period mentioned therein is for the purpose of enabling the borrower to redeem his property. Significantly, this provision remains unaltered. Therefore, this statutory notice period of thirty days is sacrosanct and deviation therefrom would curtail the statutory right of redemption available to the borrower. However, in terms of the amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, once the notice under Rule 9 of the Rules of 2002 is published, the said right stands extinguished.

6. In effect, in the case on hand, though the notice under Rule 8(6) of the Rules of 2002 was issued on 01.03.2018 stipulating a thirty day notice period, it is of no practical utility to the petitioners as the opportunity to exercise the right of redemption given to them thereunder stood extinguished on 03.03.2018 when the notice under Rule 9 of the Rules of 2002 was published. Hence, a flagrant violation of the statute is, prima-facie, manifest.

7. This aspect of the matter requires further examination given the fact that after amendment of the SARFAESI Act and the Rules of 2002, there seems to be no clarity on the part of banks as to how they should go about