The Court can exercise inherent power under section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash criminal proceedings in cases where the compromise between the offender and victim makes the possibility of conviction remote and continuation of the criminal case would cause oppression and prejudice to the accused.

ORDER :

I.A. Nos. 1 and 2 of 2021

1. These applications are filed requesting the Court to permit the 2nd respondent/defacto complainant to compound the offences and record the compromise entered into by the parties and quash the proceedings in F.I.R. No. 265 of 2021 on the file of the New Port Police Station, Visakhapatnam District. The offences alleged are under Section 304-B r/w 34 IPC.

2. Today i.e. on 22.03.2022 the parties, together, with their respective counsel, are present in the Court and the identity of the parties has been verified. On being specifically asked, both the parties confirmed the terms of compromise recorded in the joint memorandum of compromise appended to the applications.

3. The terms of the compromise show that at the advice of the elders and well wishers of the petitioner, they have settled the matter amicably in view of leading peaceful life of both the parties separately and keeping in mind the social status and in view of their future, they intended to compromise with each other and the defacto complainant inclined to withdraw the police report.

4. Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/accused as well as learned counsel appearing for the 2nd respondent/defacto complainant and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for respondent No. 1-state.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the parties having arrived at compromise, the defacto complainant not desires to proceed with the complaint and in view of the settlement, a joint memo has been filed, thereby sought for quashing of the proceedings in F.I.R. No. 265 of 2021 on the file of the New Port Police Station, Visakhapatnam District.

6. Learned counsel further relied upon the observations of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303 while adjudicating the inherent power of the High Court under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 [for short Cr.P.C.] in quashing the criminal proceedings against an offender, who has settled his dispute with the victim of the crime, but the crime in which he is allegedly involved is not compoundable under section 320 Cr.P.C. it was observed that:

“In a very recent judgment decided by this Court in the month of July, 2012 in Jayrajsinh Digvijaysinh Rana vs. State of Gujarat, (2012) 12 SCC 401 this Court was again concerned with the question of quashment of an FIR alleging offences punishable under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B IPC. The High Court refused to quash the criminal case under Section 482 of the Code. The question for consideration was that inasmuch as all those offences, except Section 420 IPC, were non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of the Code, whether it would be possible to quash the FIR by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or by this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The Bench elaborately considered the decision of this Court in Shiji V. Radhika, (2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101 and by invoking Article 142 of the Constitution quashed the criminal proceedings. It was held as under: (Jayrajsinh’ Case, SCC Paras-13-15):

“13. In the light of the principles mentioned above, inasmuch as Respondent No. 2 - the Complainant has filed an affidavit highlighting the stand taken by the appellant (Accused No. 3) during the pendency of the appeal before this Court and the terms of settlement as stated in the said affidavit, by applying the same analogy and in order to do complete justice under Article 142 of the Constitution, we accept the terms of settlement in so far as the Appellant herein (Accused No. 3) is concerned.

14. In view of the same, we quash and set aside the impugned FIR No. 45 of 2011 registered with Sanand Police Station, Ahmedabad for offences punishable Under Sections 467, 468, 471, 420 and 120-B of IPC insofar as the Appellant (Accused No. 3) is concerned.

15. The appeal is allowed to the extent mentioned above.”

7. It is further held in the above judgment that:

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