IMPORTANT POINT
The main legal point established in the judgment is that the period of limitation for filing an application to set aside an ex-parte order before the Tribunal shall be 30 days, and there would be no power with the Tribunal to entertain such an application beyond the 30-day period from the start of the limitation period.

JUDGMENT

RAVI NATH TILHARI, J. - Heard Sri P.Raja Sekhar, learned counsel for the petitioner.

2. This civil revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India has been filed for the following relief:-

"...pleased to set aside the order dtd. 1/8/2023 passed in Diary No 1301 of 2023 (unnumbered MA) in O.A.No.157 of 2009 on me file of Debts Recovery Tribunal, Visaknapatnam and allow the Civil Revision Petition in the interest of justice and pass..."

3. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that, the respondent ICICI Bank Ltd., Visakhapatnam, filed O.A.No.157 of 2009, before the Debts Recovery Tribunal Visakhapatnam (in short the Tribunal) which was allowed against the defendants therein (the present petitioner was defendant No.4) for realization of the amount claimed in O.A., fixing liability of the defendants jointly, severally and personally, and the recovery certificate was issued vide Order of the Tribunal dtd. 22/3/2018.

4. The petitioner herein, filed Petition Diary No.1301/2023/ unnumbered M.A. in the said O.A. to set aside the Order dated, 22/3/2018 on the ground that it was an ex-parte order.

5. The Registry of the Tribunal raised objections to the petition IR (MA) 101 of 2023 that "(1) condone delay petition not filed. (2) This petition is non maintainable without delay petition".

6. The petitioner represented the same with an endorsement which reads as follows:

"It is submitted that this petition is filed under Sec.22(2)(g) of Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act for which no period of limitation is prescribed. Further, provisions of Limitation Act, do not apply to this petition as held by the Madras High Court in the Judgment reported in 2008(2) Law Weekly (Page 103). The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the provisions of Limitation Act will apply only to Application filed under Sec. 19 of the Act to Review Petitions filed under Sec.22(2)(e) of the Act read with Rule 5.A of Debts Recovery (Procedure) Rules, 1993. Hence, this petition is maintainable without a separate petition for condonation of delay. In such cases, the only aspect to be considered is, whether reasonable grounds are set out in the petition to set aside ex-parte order".

7. The petitioner's endorsement was that the application was filed under Sec. 22(2)(g) of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act (for short "the RDB Act") for which no period of limitation is prescribed. The Limitation Act also did not apply in view of the judgments as mentioned in the endorsement (supra). It was submitted that the petition was maintainable without a separate petition for condonation of delay.

8. The matter was placed before the Tribunal which by Order dtd. 1/8/2023 dismissed the Petition Diary No.1301 of 2023/unnumbered M.A., finding no merit.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner while challenging the Order dtd. 1/8/2023 submits that the application to set aside the ex-parte order is maintainable under Sec. 22(2)(g) of the Act. For filing the said application there is no period of limitation prescribed under the Act. The Limitation Act is also not applicable. Consequently there is no requirement to file any application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act or any application under the RDB Act to condone the delay. He has referred to the provisions of Ss. 2, 19, 22(2)(g), and 24 of RDB Act and placed reliance in the Judgment of the Madras High Court in M/s.Tamil Nadu Merchantile Bank Limited represented by its Manager, TTK Road Branch Vs M/s G.Vijaya Lakshmi, 2008-2-L.W.1103. and the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in International Asset Reconstruction Company of India Limited Vs. Official Liquidator, (2017) 16 SCC 137.

10. He further submits that the Tribunal ought to have first decided the objection with respect to the limitation and the necessity of the application for condonation of delay. It was only thereafter it should have proceeded to decide the application on merits. He submits that the opportunity to argue the matter on the merits of the