The court emphasized that sufficient cause for delay under the Limitation Act must be established, aligning government entities with private litigants regarding the standards for delay condonation.

ORDER :

Subhendu Samanta, J.

1. The instant Criminal Revision Case is preferred against the order dated 31.05.2024, passed in Crl.M.P.No.182 of 2023, under Rule 127 of the Criminal Rules of Practice and Circular Orders 1990, read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 whereby the learned Sessions Judge has condoned the delay of 1803 days in filing a Criminal Revision petition.

2. The brief facts of the case are that initially, Crime No.2 of 2016 of Dumbriguda Police Station, Visakhapatnam, was registered against the petitioners under Sections 41 , 102 and 120(b)of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [for short 'IPC ’], Section 13 (2) of the (Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 [for short, 'the UAPA Act'] and Sections 4 and 20(A) of the Telegraphic Act 1885 [for short, 'the Telegraphic Act'] After completion of the investigation, the police filed a charge sheet before the Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Araku, who has taken cognizance of the offence and numbered it as C.C.No.30 of 2017. Thereafter, the accused filed a petition Crl.M.P.No.320 of 2017 for discharge. The learned Magistrate, by an order, dated 09.04.2018, has allowed the Crl.M.P. No.320 of 2017 and the accused were discharged. Aggrieved by the order, dated 09.04.2018, the prosecution filed a Criminal Revision Petition before the Sessions Court, Visakhapatnam, along with an application Crl.M.P. No.731 of 2023 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking condonation of a delay of 1803 days. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the application for condonation of delay by passing the order impugned in the instant criminal revision case.

3. Heard the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General.

4. Brief submissions on behalf of the petitioners:

a) It is the contention of the petitioners that the impugned order passed by the learned Sessions Judge is illegal and improper. The learned Sessions Judge allowed the application without following the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The prosecution has not assigned any sufficient reason for condonation of such inordinate delay. The affidavit filed in support of the application does not contain any reason as to why the prosecution failed to challenge the order of discharge within the prescribed time. It is further submitted that the delay is not attributable to administrative reasons. Moreover, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again as well as in the recent time has deprecated the practice of government authorities causing delay.

b) It is further submitted that the expression “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act requires not only an explanation for the delay beyond the prescribed period of limitation, but also requires a satisfactory justification demonstrating the circumstances under which the applicant was prevented from filing the application within the statutory time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has time and again observed that State or its instrumentalities shall stand on the same footing as private litigants and no preferential indulgence in limitation matters should be shown merely due to practical considerations. He further submits that reliance on government lethargy, procedural bottlenecks, or departmental inefficiency cannot constitute sufficient cause.

c) The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the learned Sessions Judge has passed the impugned order following the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inCollector, Land Acquisition, Anantanag and Another v. MST Katiji and Others , AIR 1987 SC 1353 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has condoned a delay of only four days, whereas in the present case, the delay is more than five years. The lear