The main legal point established in the judgment is the applicability of the principles of natural justice and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in cases involving demolition orders under the Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act.

( 1 ) THESE Miscellaneous First Appeals are instituted by the original defendant, namely, the Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Bangalore, against the orders passed on I. As. I and III in the two suits, namely, O. S. 1575/80-9663/1980 and O. S. 1579/1980-10419/1980, dated 9-12-1980 by the III Addl. City Civil judge, Bangalore.

( 2 ) THE facts germane for the decision of the question at issue in these two appeals are these : in respect of premises bearing Nos. 771 to 774, O. T. C. Road, Chickpet Bangalore, notices under S. 322 (1) of the karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 (hereinafter teferred to as the Act), were issued by the Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Bangalore, to owners and occupiers requiring them to demolish the buildings and to keep the premises clean. In premises Nos. 772 and 773, the occupiers Kapoorchand Brothers (P) Ltd. who are the tenants in the building, filed o. S. 1575/1980 for permanent injunction against the defendant-Corporation from demolishing the premises as per the aforesaid notice. Similar suit was institutec by Shashikanth S. Javeri, tenant in respect of premises bearing No. 774. These two premises form part of the same building located in O. T. C. Road, Chickpet, bangalore. On instituting the suits on 2-8-1980, applications were filed in both suits for temporary injunction under Or. 39, Rr. 1, 2 and 7 read with S. 151,. CPC. , for grant of ex-parte temporary injunction in terms of the plaint prayer. Emergent notices were ordered on 4-8-1980 by the trial Court The defendant entered appearance. After hearing the counsel, the learned Munsift before whom the original suits were pending, granted temporary injunction restraining the defendant- corporation from demolishing or damaging the building until further orders and adjourned the suits to enable the defendant to file written statements and objections to I. A. I in each suit. Thereafter the defendant filed applications I. A. III in each suit, under Or. 39, R. 4 read with S. 151, CPC. , for vacating the temporary injunction order. The learned City Civil judge clubbed these two matters together and heard the counsel and by a common order dated 9-12-1980 confirmed the temporary injunction order already issued in each suit on 4-8-1980. Aggrieved by the said order, the above two appeals are instituted before this Court.

( 3 ) THE learned Advocate General, appearing for the appellant-Corporation in the two cases, vehemently contended that the trial Court was not justified in not vacating the injunction order already issued. According to him the suits themselves were not prima facie maintainable under law. Moreover, a writ petition of the building owner in WP. 13509/1980 was rejected by the single Judge and the appeal instituted was subsequently withdrawn. Therefore, he submitted that prima facie the suits were barred by general principles of res-judicata. Hence, he submitted that the appeals were entitled to succeed. He further submitted that the learned City Civil Judge failed to appreciate that the decision of the appropriate and competent authority in regard to the condition of the building was not a justiciable issue before the Civil Court.

( 4 ) AS against that the learned counsel appearing for respondents-plaintiffs argued supporting the common order passed by the learned City Civil Judge.

( 5 ) THE points, therefore, that arise for my consideration in these appeals are : 1) Whether the two suits are not prima facie tenable in law ? 2) Whether the two suits are barred by general principles of res-judicata ? 3) Whether there are grounds to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court ?

( 6 ) THE learned Advocate general invited my attention to the fact that if the plaintiffs were aggrieved by the order passed by the Commissioner, Corporation of the City of Bangalore, they had a right of appeal to the standing committee and to the Corporation and the decision of the standing committee and t