VENKATACIIALA, J, J.

( 1 ) IN this revision petition, which is before us, being referred for hearing and disposal by a Division Bench, we are concerned and have to deal with the scope and operation of sub-rule (1)of R. 3a of O. 41 of the C. P. C 1908 (for short 'the Act' ).

( 2 ) THE material facts, which have given rise to the filing of this revision petition, lie in a narrow compass. The State of Karnataka (for short 'the State') presented in the Court of District Judge, Gulbarga (for short 'the appellate Court') a time barred appeal. But, that appeal, when presented, was not accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. However, such an application came to be filed subsequently. The appellate Court, which registered the said time barred appeal as R. A. No. 55/83, numbered the said application as I. A. I in that appeal. Later, when the appellate Court took up the time barred appeal together with the application for condonation of delay for hearing, a preliminary objection, to wit, that time barred appeal having been presented without being accompanied by an application for condonation of delay as required under sub-rule (11 of R. 3a of O. 41 of the Code was liable to be dismissed in limine, appears to have been raised relying upon a decision of a learned single Judge of this Court, in Madhukar Daso Deshpande v Anant Nilkandha Deshpande, (1983) 2 Kant LJ 15 (AIR 1984 Kar 40 ). That preliminary objection having been upheld by the appellate Court, by its order dt. 24th July 1984, the appeal itself has come to be dismissed. The validity of that order has been assailed by the State in the present revision petition. This is how, we are concerned and have to deal with the scope and operation of sub-rule (1) of R. 3a of O. 41 of the Code, in the light of the arguments addressed from the Bar.

( 3 ) SUB-RULE (1) of R. 3a of O. 41 of the Code reads :"3a. Application for condonation of delay :- (1) When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. "

( 4 ) FOR a proper understanding of the exact scope and real operation of the sub-rule, it would be advantageous to refer at the outset as to why the need for filing an application for condonation of delay arises when a time barred appeal is preferred (presented) in a Court

( 5 ) AN appeal preferred after the prescribed period shall be dismissed because of the bar of limitation imposed by S. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short 'the Limitation Act' ). As the operation of that Section, as seen therefrom, is made subject to S. 5 of the Limitation Act, an appeal may be admitted by a Court after the prescribed period, if the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. The fact that the appellant was misled by an order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period, may be sufficient cause within the meaning of that S. 5, becomes clear from the explanation found thereto. As to how the benefit of S. 5 of the Limitation Act could be availed of by an appellant preferring a time barred appeal, is not specified m the Limitation Act. Even before R. 3a was inserted in the Code, as a matter of practice, applications for condonation of delay were being filed into the Courts whenever time barred appeals were being presented. Filing of such an application was, in fact, regarded as a procedural step required to be complied with before a time barred appeal was decided by a Court.

( 6 ) WE shall now refer to the Legislative history of R. 3a wherein sub-rule (1) finds a place, as it will give the background as to why sub-rule (1) as also sub-rule (2) thereof, which requires the Court to decide finally the application for condonation of

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