The main legal point established is that the Family Court, exercising jurisdiction under Section 7 (2) (a) of the Family Courts Act, has the inherent jurisdiction to pass ex-parte orders of interim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

( 1 ) IN these two writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioners have sought for quashing the ex-parte orders of interim maintenance passed by the Additional principal Judge, Family Court, Bangalore. The petitioners have not yet filed their objections and sought for re-consideration of the ex-parte orders of interim maintenance granted in the petitions for maintenance filed under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

( 2 ) THE Contention of the petitioners is that neither Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short 'cr. P. C. ') contains any provision enabling the Court to pass an ex-parte order of interim maintenance nor there is any other provision in the Cr. P. C. to re-consider the order of maintenance once passed whether interim or final; that the jurisdiction exercised by the Family court is the one exercisablc by the Court of Judicial magistrate I Class under Section 125 of the cr. P. C. ; therefore, the restrictions and the limitations imposed on the jurisdiction of the Criminal court continue to govern the Family Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 125 Cr. P. C. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned exparte orders of interim maintenance are without jurisdiction.

( 3 ) ON the contrary, it is contended by Sri Subbanna, learned High Court Government Advocate that the court that has exercised the jurisdiction is a Civil Court. The fact that there is no provision contained in Section 125 of the Cr. P. C. enabling a Criminal Court to pass an exparte order of interim maintenance does not take away the jurisdiction vested in a Civil Court to pass ex-parte orders in aid of the main reliefs sought in the petition. It is also further submitted by the learned Government Advocate that the matter is no more res-integra because the supreme Court in the case of Smt. Savitri v govind Singh Rawat, AIR 1986 SC 984 has specifically considered this question and has held that the Magistrate while exercising jurisdiction under Section 125 of the Cr. P. C. has an inherent power to pass an ex-parte order awarding interim maintenance and so also the Family Court which exercises the very same jurisdiction under Section 7 (2) (a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, has jurisdiction to pass on cx-parte order granting interim maintenance.

( 4 ) IN the light of these submissions, the question that arises for consideration is as to whether the Family Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 7 (2) (a) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 has jurisdiction to pass an ex-parte interim order of maintenance.

( 5 ) THE jurisdiction exercised by the Family Court under Section 7 (2) (a) of the Family Courts act is the one exercisable by a Judicial magistrate I Class under the Cr. P. C. Wherever a Family Court is established for any area, the jurisdiction of Judicial Magistrate I Class having territorial jurisdiction over that area, ceases and the Family Court is entitled to exercise the said jurisdiction. No doubt under Section 7 (2) (a) of the Family Courts Act, what is exercised by the family Court is the jurisdiction exercisable by the magistrate under Chapter IX of the Code of criminal Procedure, 1973. Nevertheless it is not a Criminal Court. It is a Civil Court. There is an inherent jurisdiction in a Civil Court to pass ex-parte orders and ex-parte interim orders in aid of the main relief in order to protect the interest of the party who approaches the Court and/or to protect the subject matter of the suit, in order to ensure that the relief, which the party will be granted in the suit or a proceeding is not rendered infructuous. Thus in aid of the final relief, an interim ex-parte order can be granted. That it is so cannot at all be doubted. In the absence of such power the very jurisdiction to pass final order in many cases would be rendered ineffective. When the Court has jurisdiction to pass final order, the power to pass interim order stems from the very power to pa