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1993 Supreme(Kar) 117

Karnataka High Court
P.Ramadevi - Appellant
Versus
C.B.Saikrishna - Respondent
Decided On : 04-23-93
M.F.A. : 2361 of 1992

Advocates:
G.V.THIMMAPPIAH, H.G.RAMESH, S.P.SHANKAR

The main legal point established in the judgment is that the interest to be awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act is determined by the provisions of the Act and judicial discretion, and the judgments of the Supreme Court serve as precedents but do not establish a binding law on the interest rate.

Headnote:

Interest - Motor Accident Claims - S. 110-C, S. 110-D, S. 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - The court discussed the provisions of S. 110-C, S. 110-D, and S. 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and their relevance in awarding interest. The court also considered the judgments of the Supreme Court in Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation, Chameliwati v. Delhi Municipal Corporation, and Jasbir Singh v. General Manager, Punjab Roadways, and their applicability as precedents.

Fact of the Case:

The appellant filed an appeal against the judgment and award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, challenging the interest rate awarded to him. The appellant contended that the interest should have been awarded at 12% per annum instead of 6% per annum granted by the Tribunal.

Finding of the Court:

The court found that the interest awarded by the Claims Tribunal at 6% per annum is legal and proper under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The court dismissed the appeal, stating that there are no grounds to interfere with the Tribunal's order.

Issues: The main issue was the determination of the appropriate interest rate to be awarded under the Motor Vehicles Act, specifically in relation to the judgments of the Supreme Court and the provisions of S. 110-C, S. 110-D, and S. 110-CC.

Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the interest to be awarded is prescribed under S. 110-CC of the Motor Vehicles Act and could only be at 6% per annum. The court emphasized that the Motor Vehicles Act is a self-contained Act, and the awarding of interest depends on judicial discretion.

Final Decision: The appeal was dismissed, and the court upheld the interest awarded by the Claims Tribunal at 6% per annum as legal and proper.

( 1 ) THIS miscellaneous first appeal is filed by the appellant against the judgment and award dated 14-2-1992 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bangalore Rural District, Bangalore, in M. V. C. No. 208 of 1987.

( 2 ) WE have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondents fully and perused the records of the case.

( 3 ) THOUGH the appellant has preferred an appeal against the quantum of compensation awarded to him by the Tribunal, he has confined himself in this appeal only regarding the award of interest. The Tribunal has awarded interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum whereas the contention of the appellant is that the Tribunal ought to have awarded interest at 12 per cent per annum from the date of the petition till the date of realisation.

( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the provisions of S. 34, C. P. C. and the rate of interest granted in the Land Acquisition Cases, the Tribunal ought to have granted interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum. The learned counsel for the respondent-Insurance Company has opposed this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground that the Motor Vehicles Act is a self contained Act and S. 110-C of the said Act provides granting of interest. Therefore, S. 34, C. P. C. or the provisions of the Act or the rate of interest awarded in L. A. C. Cases are not relevant.

( 5 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant relied on Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation, AIR 1992 SC 1261: (1992 AIR SCW 1213), wherein the Supreme Court awarded the appellants interest at 12 per cent per annum instead of 6 per cent per annum awarded by the Tribunal. In the said ruling, in para 12 the Supreme Court has referred to the case of Chameliwati v. Delhi Municipal Corporation, 1985 Acc CJ 645 : (AIR 1986 SC 1191), wherein interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum was awarded. Similarly, the Supreme Court has referred to the case of Jasbir Singh v. General Manager, Punjab Roadways, 1987 Acc CJ 15 : AIR 1987 SC 70, wherein the interest awarded by the Tribunal at 6 per cent per annum was enhanced to 12 per cent per annum.

( 6 ) NOW the question before the Court is whether the observation of the Supreme Court in Hardeo Kaur v. Rajasthan State Transport Corporation, AIR 1992 SC 1261 : (1992 AIR SCW 1213) and in Chameliwati v. Delhi Municipal Corporation, 1985 Acc CJ 645 : AIR 1986 SC 1191 and also in Jagbir Singh v. General Manager, Punjab Roadways, 1987 Acc CJ 15 : AIR 1987 SC 70, can be said to be the law declared by the Supreme Court.

( 7 ) IN State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, AIR 1992 SC 1593 : (1992 AIR SCW 1728), the Supreme Court has laid down as to how the judgment of the Supreme Court can be held to be a precedent in the following words:-"a decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. Thus the temporary lecturer in a writ petition before High Court, would not be entitled to rely upon an order of the Supreme Court which directs a temporary employee to be regularised in his service without assigning reasons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Constitution has, by Art. 142 empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary "for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. "

( 8 ) THE Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur, AIR 1989 SC 38, has laid down that quotability as 'law' applies to the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi, that in a Judge's decision what is binding as an authority upon the subsequent Judge is binding as an authority upon the subsequent Judge is the principle upon which the case was decided; that the statements which are part of ratio decidendi are distinguished as other dicta and are not aut





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