The court emphasized the statutory obligation of the land acquisition officer to make a reference under Section 18(1) and the court's power to condone the delay in filing the application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act.

( 1 ) CERTAIN extent of land comprised in various survey numbers situated in biranal and byakud villages of raibag taluk were acquired for the construction of an irrigation tank under preliminary notification published on 11-10-1973.

( 2 ) AS against the land acquisition officer's award dated 31-3-1977 at the rate of Rs. 840/- per acre, the reference court has fixed the market value of the land at Rs. 4,000/- per acre, in addition to awarding statutory benefits. The state being aggrieved by the enhancement has preferred this appeal.

( 3 ) A preliminary objection regarding the question of limitation arises in this case. It is not disputed that an application under Section 18 for referring the award to the court for adjudication of the market value was filed before the land acquisition officer within a period of 3 months i. e. , on 18-5-1977. Admittedly, no reference having been made, the claimant made an application on 28-6-1986 under Section 18 (3) (b) of the Land Acquisition Act seeking direction for a reference to be made. The question for consideration is whether this application made after the expiry of 3 years and 90 days from the date of the application under Section 18 to the land acquisition officer seeking reference, is barred by time. In assista it Commissioner v Lakshmi Bai, while considering the statutor obligation on the land acquisition officer to make reference under Section 18 (1), m. n. venkatachaliah, j. (as he then was), has observed thus:"the statutory obligation on the part of the l. a. o. to make a reference on the application filed under Section 18 (1) does not come to an end with the expiry of ninety days contemplated under Section 18 (3) (a ). The obligation subsists till the court is moved in the matter under Section 18 (3) (b ). If the time-limit under Section 18 (3) (a) is built in for the benefit of the person-interested, no construction can be placed on it which would defeat its very purpose by the delay on the part of the person charged with the duty to act promptly. The l. a. o. cannot benefit by his own wrong. Section 18 (3) (2) is a procedural provision. It is a sound Rule of construction that procedural enactments should be construed liberally and in such manner as to render the enforcement of substantive rights effective (see: N. T. Veluswami Thevar v G. Raja Nainar and others ). The procedure is after all the handmaid and not the mistress of justice. To construe a provision which was intended to give speedy relief to the persons-interested and in aid of their substantive rights should not be construed in a manner which would defeat the very rights of those persons. Any construction which would lead to serious injustice should be avoided. There is a fundamental distinction between the nature and quality of the prescription of time in the second proviso to Section 18 (2) on the one hand and in Section 18 (3) (a) on the other. The first is a case of limitation for the enforcement of a right and seeking a remedy; the other is a case of prescription of time for the performance of a statutory duty. In the very nature of things, these two prescriptions cannot be put on the same footing, for purposes of construction. . . Xxx xxx xxx what emerges from these pronouncements is that, the time-limit prescribed for performance of a duty is rarely mandatory. In the present case, as long as the right on the part of the person interested to compel a reference subsists that right must be held to subsist till the right to move the court under Section 18 (3) (b) is not lost - a reference made by the l. a. o. even if it be after the period of ninety days prescribed in Section 18 (3) (a), would require to be sustained. Section 18 (3) (a) directs the l. a. o. to act promptly and the period of ninety days referred to therein is the legislature's standard of promptitude. It does not mean that if the l. a. o. is not prompt in performing the duty, the right, to aid which the duty exists as correlative, is itself lost

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