1995 Supreme(Kar) 186
Karnataka High Court
K.R.Lakshman - Appellant
Versus
State of Karnataka - Respondent
Decided On : 04-04-95
W.P. : 25740 of 1994
D.V.PADMANABAIAH, K.R.MINA KUMARI, T.SESHAGIRI RAO
The main legal point established in the judgment is that the Tahsildar has inherent powers under S. 25 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, including the power to review, and that an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is null and void.
Headnote:
Review - Jurisdiction of Revenue Court - S. 25 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act - S. 24 - The court held that the Tahsildar has inherent powers under S. 25 of the Act, including the power to review. The order impugned was passed in excess of jurisdiction as it was not covered within the scope of review and was passed without notice or opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The court quashed the order and directed the Tahsildar to take a fresh decision after issuing notice to the parties.
Fact of the Case:
The petitioner sought the quashing of an order passed by the Tahsildar, which reviewed and recalled an earlier order maintaining the Khata of a disputed property in the name of the petitioner and his brothers. The petitioner contended that the Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to review the earlier order and that the review order was illegal as it was passed without notice or opportunity of hearing.
Finding of the Court:
The court found that the order impugned was passed in excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the principles of natural justice. It held that the order, passed without notice or opportunity of hearing, was null and void.
Issues: The issues raised included the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to review the earlier order and the violation of principles of natural justice in passing the review order without notice or opportunity of hearing.
Ratio Decidendi: The court held that the Tahsildar has inherent powers under S. 25 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, including the power to review. It also emphasized that an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is null and void.
Final Decision: The court allowed the petition, quashed the order of the Tahsildar, and directed the Tahsildar to take a fresh decision after issuing notice to the parties.
( 1 ) BY this petition, petitioner has prayed for grant and issuance of writ of certiorari or any other writ or order or direction in the nature of writ of certiorari for quashing order Annexure-F dated 14-7-1994, passed by Tahsildar-2nd respondent in Case No. RRT (1) CR 171/94-95,whereby the Tahsildar has reviewed and recalled his earlier order dated 23-6-1994, copy of which is Annexure-E to the writ petition. That by order dated 23-6-1994, Annexure-E to the petition, passed in Case No. RRT (1) CR 171 of 1994-95, the respondent No. 2 i. e. , Tahsildar, ordered in maintaining of Khata of property in dispute in the name of the petitioner and his brothers. It is petitioner's case that the Tahsildar, by order dated 14-7-1994, reviewed and recalled the order dated 23-6-1994, taking the view that petitioners are not in possession. The petitioner's case is that Tahsildar had no jurisdiction to review his order dated 23-6-1994 firstly and secondly the order dated 14-7-1994 is illegal and has been reviewed without any notice or opportunity of hearing being given to the petitioner.
( 2 ) I have heard Sri T. Seshagiri Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri D. V. Padmanabhaiah, learned counsel for respondents 3 and 4 and Smt. Meenakumari, learned High Court Government Pleader who had been put her appearance on behalf of respondents 1 and 2. On behalf of the petitioner, Sri Seshagiri Rao made two submissions, he firstly submitted before me that Tahsildar had no power to review his earlier order dated 23-06-1994, as there is no power under the provisions of the Act conferred for review. Sri Rao further submitted that even if for a moment this Court holds that there exist power to review in the revenue Court viz. , Tahsildar while exercising review power viz. , order Annexure-F has been passed in violation of principles of natural justice in fair play, as no notice had been given to the petitioner and no opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioner, by the Tahsildar while allowing the review application or reviewing or recalling his earlier order.
( 3 ) ON behalf of the respondents, Sri Padmanabhaiah learned counsel for the respondents 3 and 4 as well as Smt. Meenakumari, Government Counsel urged that the petitioner had alternative remedy by filing a suit. It has been further urged on behalf of the respondents 1 to 4 that in view of the provisions of S. 25 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act 1964 r/w S. 24 thereof there is inherent power vested in the revenue Courts and that Tahsildar or any revenue officer not below the rank of Tahsildar which are designated to the Revenue Court and S. 25 provides that inherent power of the Revenue Court shall not be deemed to be curtailed by any provisions of the Act. So learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that it has been within the jurisdiction of the Tahsildar to review and recall his earlier order. As regards notice to the other side is concerned that Sri Padmanabhaiah had not been able to show that any notice has been issued nor in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, there is any such averment that any notice had been issued by the Tahsildar before passing the impugned order dated 14-7-1994.
( 4 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions of learned counsel for the parties. As regards alternative remedy available in a routine course, it has been held by Lordships of the Supreme Court that alternative remedy if it is available no doubt, party should be required to avail the alternative remedy. The existence of alternative remedy is firstly no bar to the exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 226 in appropriate cases. Such cases may be whether the order firstly appears to be without jurisdiction or order appears to have been passed under the provisions which appear to be ultra vires of the Constitution or they may also be cases in which the jurisdiction vested under Art. 226 may be exercised, like the cases where the order had be