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Karnataka High Court
BPL Ltd. - Appellant
Versus
R.Sudhakar - Respondent
Decided On : 07-30-01
W.P. : 28377 of 2001
INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947
Section 33 - Object of - Stated.[Shivaraj V. Patil And D. M. Dharmadhikari, JJ]: The object of Section 33 of the Act is to protect the workman concerned during pendency of the proceedings in a dispute against victimisation by the employer for having raised industrial dispute or his continuing the pending proceedings. Further it is to ensure that the proceedings in connection with the industrial disputes already pending should be concluded in a peaceful atmosphere and to say that no employer should, during pendency of the proceedings, take action of any kind mentioned in the said Section, giving rise to fresh disputes leading to straining the relations between the employer and the workman. But, then, the requirements of the said section are to be satisfied in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the said Provision.
Cases Referred: AIR 1972 SC 2466: 1973 Cri. L.J 19 (SC): (1973)2 SCR 495.
Distinguished: AIR 1992 SC 1439: (1992)3 SCC 1: (1992)2 SCR 999; (1997)5 SCC 722; AIR 1968 SC 1050: 1968 Cri.L.J 1234 (SC); AIR 1999 SC 3678: (1999)7 SCC 89.
Followed: AIR 1994 SC 1558: 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641.
Interim order and final order
CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, 1908 - Section 94(c) - Interim order and final order - Difference between - Stated.
[Shivaraj V. Patil and D. M. Dharmadhikari, JJ]: Even if an application was to be made under proviso to Section 33(2)(b), the Tribunal could not have proceeded to pass any order because of the interim order passed by the High Court staying the operation of the order of reference. If the Tribunal were to proceed to pass any order there would have been a possibility of it committing contempt of the order passed by the High Court. The Tribunal, if was to proceed with an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act, it would have been direct disobedience of the interim order of stay passed by the High Court.
Cases Referred: AIR 1972 SC 2466: 1973 Cri. L.J 19 (SC): (1973)2 SCR 495 .
Followed: AIR 1994 SC 1558: 1994 Supp (2) SCC 641.
Distinguished: AIR 1992 SC 1439: (1992)3 SCC 1: (1992)2 SCR 999; (1997)5 SCC 722; AIR 1968 SC 1050: 1968 Cri.L.J 1234 (SC); AIR 1999 SC 3678: (1999)7 SCC 89.
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - Constitution of India - Effect of interim order - Article 226 & 227 - Effect of interim order - Reference of industrial dispute stayed in Writ Petition - Hence, Tribunal cannot commence proceedings nor any proceedings are pending before it - In turn stay order acts as a bar on the workmen to complain and tribunal to proceed with. [Shivaraj V. Patil and D. M. Dharmadhikari, JJ]: In the very nature of things interim order and final order are, distinct and they serve different purposes. Interim order operates during the pendency of the proceedings and final order results in adjudication of a dispute finally. May be in some cases final order may be passed in terms of the interim order, but then interim order merges in final order and it gets elevated to the status of final order. One more factor to be kept in mind is that it is not that the workmen do not have remedy to challenge the order of dismissal.
Cases Referred:
Distinguished:AIR 1992 SC 1439: (1992)3 SCC 1: (1992)2 SCR 999; (1997)5 SCC 722; AIR 1968 SC 1050: 1968 Cri.L.J 1234 (SC); AIR 1994 SC 1558; (1999)7 SCC 89.
Followed:1994 Supp (2) SCC 641; AIR 1999 SC 3678: AIR 1972 SC 2466: 1973 Cri. L.J 19 (SC):
Relied:(1973)2 SCR 495.
( 1 ) PETITIONERS, in all the petitions have challenged the validity of Section 33-A of the industrial Disputes Act. But at the time of argument the petitioners have given up their challenge to the validity of Section 33-A of the industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as Act ). Hence, the validity of Section 33-A has not been considered in these petitions.
( 2 ) IN all these Writ Petitions the petitioner-Management contended that the application filed under Section 33-A of the Act before the Tribunal is not maintainable.
( 3 ) THE facts in these cases are that respondents-workmen made applications under section 33-A of the Act alleging contravention of Section 33 of the Act. The petitioner-Management filed objections to the said complaint contending that the order of dismissal passed by the Management not during the pendency of any dispute pending before the industrial Tribunal and therefore the application filed by the workmen under Section 33-A is not maintainable in law.
( 4 ) SRI Kasturi, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that when once an order of reference, referring the dispute in I. D. No. 19/1999 has been stayed by the Court, no proceedings could be said to be open before the Industrial Tribunal and therefore, the action taken by the Management in dismissing its employees cannot be said to be in contravention of Section 33 of the Act in order to invoke Section 33-A of the Act.
( 5 ) IN order to consider the rival contentions, it is just and necessary to consider whether the order of stay of reference in I. D. No. 19/1999 by the High Court which was in force as on the date of the dismissal of the workmen be considered as one of wiping out the proceedings on the file of the Industrial Tribunal.
( 6 ) IT is an admitted fact that on the charter of demands made by the workmen, the State government referred the dispute to the industrial Tribunal in I. D. No. 19/1999. This order of reference by the State Government has been stayed by this Court in the Writ Petition filed by the Management. It is an admitted fact that as on the date the employees were dismissed, the order of stay, staying the reference was in force. Mere stay, staying the order of reference by this Court does not amount to taking away the effect of the reference and at best it can be construed as stay of further proceedings pursuant to the order of reference by the Industrial Tribunal. Supreme court in the case of Shree Chamundi Mopeds limited v. Church of South India Trust association, Madras, AIR 1992 SC 1439 : 1992 (3) SCC 1 has held as follows:"in the instant case the proceedings before the Board under Sections 15 and 16 of the Act had been terminated by order of the board dated April 26, 1990 whereby the board, upon consideration of the facts and material before it, found that the appellant company had become economically and commercially non-viable due to its huge accumulated losses and liabilities and should be wound up. The appeal filed by the appellant-company under Section 25 of the act against the said order of the Board was dismissed by the Appellate Authority by order dated January 7, 1991. As a result of these orders, no proceedings under the Act was pending either before the Board or before the Appellate Authority on February 21, 1991 when the Delhi High Court passed the interim order staying the operation of the appellate Authority dated January 7,1991. The said stay order of the High Court cannot have the effect of reviving the proceedings which had been disposed of by the Appellate authority by its order dated January 7,1991. While considering the effect of an interim order staying the operation of the order under challenge, a distinction has to be made between quashing of an order and stay of operation of an order. Quashing of an order results in the restoration of the position as it stood on the date of the passing of the order which has been quashed. The stay of operation of an o
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