( 1 ) IN these appeals, a short but an important point namely, "whether the period of limitation provided under Section 10 (4-A) of the Act, is directory or mandatory?" arises for consideration.

( 2 ) FACTS, which give rise to present appeals are: the respondents, claiming as workmen under the appellant 2 filed applications under Section 10 (4-A) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as 'act'), before the Labour Court, stating that though they were working under the second appellant from 18-2-1993, March 1992, 14-7-1992, 22-1-1992, 1-6-1991 and 1-6-1991, without any reason, notice or enquiry, they were refused employment from 1-6-1994, 24-12-1993, 1-5-1993, 1-3- 1993, 12-12-1993 and 1-3-1993 respectively in violation of the principles of natural justice, Government Order and Section 25-F of the Act and hence, entitled to the reliefs claimed therein. The appellants opposed the same stating that they (applicants) were appointed as daily wagers for a particular scheme of work and after completion of that scheme, as their services were not required, they were not called for work and hence, no direction can be given to appoint by creating posts, and they (applicants) have wrongly interpreted Government order and sought relief even though not raised any industrial ispute and not working under any industry and consequently, challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and, even otherwise, the applications were barred by time and thus, requested to dismiss the applications. However, after enquiry, the Labour Court allowed the applications and directed for the reinstatement of the respondents with continuity of service, but without back wages. Aggrieved by it, the appellants filed writ petitions in this Court. The learned Single Judge dismissed the same. Hence, these intra-Court appeals.

( 3 ) WITH consent of both sides, taken for final hearing and heard. It is submitted for the appellants that the Tribunal as well as the learned single Judge have wrongly interpreted Section 10 (4-A) of the Act even though the applications filed were patently barred by time since filed after 6 years and as such, the impugned award and order are not sustainable. On the other hand, it is submitted for the workmen/respondents that the view taken by the Labour Court and affirmed by the learned Single Judge by detail order show that there is nothing wrong in the interpretation of Section 10 (4-A) of the Act done following the dictum of an earlier division Bench decision besides the decisions of the supreme Court and hence, interference is not required. Perused the records carefully.

( 4 ) AT the outset, it may be noted that the point in issue is no more res integra. In the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, central Office and Another v Govinda Setty and Another, a learned single Judge of this Court has specifically held that the period of limitation provided under Section 10 (4-A) of the Act is directory and not mandatory. So also in the case of north-West Karnataka Road Transport Corporation, Central Office, Hubli v Santmallayya and Another. However, in the case of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v khaleel Ahmed and Another, a Division Bench of this Court has specifically held as under. "for these reasons, we hold that the two judgments of this court rendered by the learned Single Judges in Govinda Setty and santmallayya's cases, supra, do not lay down the correct law and are also per incuriam for having not followed the law laid down by this Court in M/s. Indian Express (Madhurai) Private Limited v g. Krishna Murthy. Accordingly, the same are OVERRULED". (emphasis supplied)NOT only that, in the same decision, the Division Bench further observed as under. "27. In view of the above discussions, we hold that if an aggrieved individual workman do not file application within the period prescribed under section 10 (4-A) of the Act then, it will be impermissible for the Labour Court to entertain the same and the same

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