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Karnataka High Court
D.M.VENKATARAMANAPPA - Appellant
Versus
CHIKKADADDAPPA - Respondent
Decided On : 01-25-06
Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 4591 of 2004 (CPC) connected with Miscellaneous First Appeal No. 5540 of 2004 (CPC).
Cases Referred; 1991 (1) KCCR SN 34; AIR 1978 SC 1051; AIR 1994 SC 1202; AIR 1987 SC 353; AIR 1996 SC 1697; (1977) 3 SCR 261: AIR 1977 SC 1944; (1995) 6 SCC 88; (1969) 2 SCC 586.
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 -Scope -Section 14 -Scope -And interpretation. Settled Principles: Whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable, and whichever be the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14, the object of the Legislature being to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Sastric law, to abridge the stringent provisions against property rights which were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual tutelage and to recognize her status as an independent and absolute owner of property. Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property [AIR 1977 SC 1944]. "Maintenance, as we see it, necessarily must encompas a provision for residence. Maintenance is given so that the lady can live in the manner, more or less, to which she was accustomed. The concept of maintenance must, therefore, include provision for food and clothing and like and take into account the basic need of a roof over the head. Provision for residence may be made either by giving a lump sum in money, or property in lieu thereof. It may also be made by providing, for the course of the lady s life, a residence and money for other necessary expenditure. Where provision is made in this manner, by giving a life interest in the property for the purposes, of residence, that provision is made in lieu of a preexisting right to maintenance and the Hindu lady acquires far more than the vestige of title which is deemed sufficient to attract Section 14(1) [(1995) 6SCC 88]. If the acquisition is for the first time, without any vestige of pre-existing right under the instrument, document or device etc. then Sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted. Sub-section (2) being in the nature of an exception, it does not engulf and wipe out the operation of Sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) of Section 14 independently operates in its own sphere. The right to disposition of property by a Hindu under Section 30 is required to be understood in this perspective and if any attempt is made to put restriction upon the property possessed by a Hindu female under an instrument, document or device, though executed after the Act has come into force, it must be interpreted in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case and to construe whether Hindu female acquired or possessed the property in recognition of her pre-existing right or she gets the rights for the first time under the instrument without any vestige of pre-existing right. If the answer is in the positive, Sub-section (1) of Section 14 gets attracted. Thus construed, both sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 will be given their full play without rendering either as otiose or aids as means of avoidance [(1969) 2 SCC 586].
Cases Referred; 1991 (1) KCCR SN 34; AIR 1978 SC 1051; AIR 1994 SC 1202; AIR 1987 SC 353; AIR 1996 SC 1697; (1977) 3 SCR 261: AIR 1977 SC 1944; (1995) 6 SCC 88; (1969) 2 SCC 586.
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 -Scope -Section 14 -Scope -And interpretation. Dilatory Settled Principles: Whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable, and whichever be the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by sub-section (1) of Section 14, the object of the Legislature being to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Sastric law, to abridge the stringent provisions against property rights which were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual tutelage and to recognize her status as an independent and absolute owner of property. Sub-section (2) must, therefore, be read in the context of sub-section (1) so as to leave as large a scope for operation as possible to sub-section (1) and so read, it must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre-existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a restricted estate in the property [AIR 1977 SC 1944]. "Maintenance, as we see it, necessarily must encompas a provision for residence. Maintenance is given so that the lady can live in the manner, more or less, to which she was accustomed, The concept of maintenance must, therefore, include provision for food and clothing and like and take into account the basic need of a roof over the head. Provision for residence may be made either by giving a lump sum in money, or property in lieu thereof. It may also be made by providing, for the course of the lady s life, a residence and money for other necessary expenditure. Where provision is made in this manner, by giving a life interest in the property for the purposes, of residence, that provision is made in lieu of a preexisting right to maintenance and the Hindu lady acquires far more than the vestige of title which is deemed sufficient to attract Section 14(1) [(1995) 6SCC 88]. If the acquisition is for the first time, without any vestige of pre-existing right under the instrument, document or device etc. then sub-section (2) of Section 14 gets attracted. Sub.-section (2) being in the nature of an exception, it does not engulf and wipe out the operation of sub-section (1). Sub-section (2) of Section 14 independently operates in its own sphere. The right to disposition of property by a Hindu under Section 30 is required to be understood in this perspective and if any attempt is made to put restriction upon the property possessed by a Hindu female under an instrument, document or device, though executed after the Act has come into force, it must be interpreted in the light of the facts and circumstances in each case and to construe whether Hindu female acquired or possessed the property in recognition of her pre-existing right or she gets the rights for the first time under the instrument without any vestige of pre-existing right. If the answer is in the positive, sub-section (1) of Section 14 gets attracted. Thus construed, both sub sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 will be given their full play without rendering either as otiose or aids as means of avoidance [(1969) 2 SCC 586].
Cases Referred; 1991 (1) KCCR SN 34; AIR 1978 SC 1051; AIR 1994 SC 1202; AIR 1987 SC 353; AIR 1996 SC 1697; (1977) 3 SCR 261: AIR 1977 SC 1944; (1995) 6 SCC 88; (1969) 2 SCC 586.
These two appeals by the same appellants are filed against a common order on I.A. Nos. II and III filed by them before the Trial Court.
2. The facts of the case are as follows.-
The appellants claim that they, along with the respondents, except respondent 4, constituted a Hindu Joint Family. It is stated that the father of appellant 1 had three wives. Appellant 1 and father of appellant 3 are children of Bhagyamma, the third wife. Respondents 1 to 3 are born to Chikka Akkayamma, the second wife. Dodda Akkayamma, the third wife of Munishamappa, did not have any children. During the lifetime of late Munishamappa, appellant 1 and one Muniyappa had filed O.S. No. 185 of 1975. The said Muniyappa, the plaintiff therein, and Munishamappa, defendant, had entered into a compromise and the suit was accordingly decreed in terms of the compromise. At para 15 of the compromise petition, it was' recorded as follows.-
"It is agreed that the eastern portion of Survey No. 88 measuring 2 acres 4 guntas is left for the maintenance of Chikka Akkayamma, the mother of defendants 1 to 3 and Dodda Akkayamma and they shall hold the said land for the their lifetime".
Dodda Akkayamma having died intestate as on 17-11-1991, it is the claim of the appellants that the property which was provided for the maintenance of Dodda Akkayamma and Chikka Akkayamma reverted to the family and is in the joint possession of the parties. The respondents, seeking to alienate the said property to the exclusion ofthe appellants, the suit was brought along with applications under LA. Nos. II and III seeking to restrain the respondents from alienating the property and from changing the nature of the property, respectively.
The defendants contended that the properties having been conferred on Dodda Akkayamma, she became an absolute owner of the property by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity) and since she lived, during her lifetime, with defendant 1, of her volition, has bequeathed her interest in the subject property to defendants 5 to 7 under a registered Will dated 13-3-1991. It is defendant 1 and his children who have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property. Therefore, the appellants are not entitled to any order of injunction.
The Trial Court, on consideration of the applications and objections thereto, held that in terms of the Will executed by Dodda Akkayamma, mutation entries have been effected in favour of defendants 5 to 7 and it is also noticed that appellants 1 to 3 had themselves filed a statement before the Revenue Authorities on 2-11-2002 admitting the Will. Though the Counsel for the appellants had taken a stand that the same was a got up document, the Court was not convinced with the explanation and also noticed that for over a period of ten years the appellants had not taken any steps to claim the said disputed property and having regard to the admitted legal position, the Trial Court found that there was no case made out by the appellants for injunction.
3. Smt. T.N. Manjula Devi, Senior Advocate appearing for Manjula Devi Associates for the appellants, contends that the grant of the subject property in favour of late Dodda Akkayamma for her maintenance during her lifetime, to be a restricted estate in the property and since the intention under the said compromise can be gleaned from the circumstances that insofar as the allotment of shares in respect of other members of the family is concerned, it is expressly conferred absolutely. This would presuppose that the property allotted to the share of Dodda Akkayamma for her maintenance was a restricted estate and the property would revert to the family on her demise. Therefore, it is not open for respondents 5 to 7 to claim any exclusive right in respect of the said property.
4. It is contended that the Trial Court, while considering the case for injunction by the other members of the family, has misguided itself in e
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