2005 Supreme(Kar) 438

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
N. KUMAR, J.
THE MANAGEMENT OF HUKKERI TALUKA CO-OPERATIVE RURAL ELECTRICITY SOCIETY LIMITED, HUKKERI - Appellant
Versus
S.R. VASTRAD AND ANOTHER - Respondent
Writ Petition No. 6717 of 1997 (L) connected with Writ Petition Nos. 32623 of 1997; 3371, 20189, 22897 to 22899 and 36040 of 1998; 22925, 24945, 37914, 39020, 45731 and 44802 of 1999; 13826, 21040, 28946, 31466 and 33528 of 2000; 18025 and 25812 of 1997; 18191, 29650, 30229 and 30562 of 1998; 2542, 7112, 13813, 16780, 22928, 29657,32148,35275,36461 and 38729 of 1999; 113 and 6304 of 2000 and 47510 of 2001.
Decided on : 18th July, 2005

Headnote:WORDS AND PHRASES - Stare decisis - Black s new Dictionary defines stare decisis to mean "to avoid by", or adhere to decided cases.

       Blackstone s Commentaries - Duty of Courts as per - Duty of Courts as per - Is not to pronounce a new law while interpreting a statutory provision. [N. Kumar, J]: Blackstone in his Commentaries, 69 (15th Edition 1809) stated the common law rule that the duty of the Court was "not to pronounce a new rule but to maintain and expound the old one". It means the Judge does not make law but only discovers or finds the true law. The law has always been the same. If a subsequent decision changes the earlier one, the latter decision does not make law but only discovers the correct principle of law. The result of this view is that it is necessarily retrospective in operation.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136 ; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255. Followed: 1991(1) SCC 588.

       Jurisdiction of Labour Courts

       INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947

       Section 10 - Jurisdiction of Labour Courts - Disputes under Section 70(1) and 21(d) of Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 - (As amended by Act 2/2000) - Awards passed by Labour Courts - Whether saved - Awards passed by Labour Courts after decision in ILR 1985 Kar 501 (DB) where jurisdiction of Labour Court is ousted till the decision in ILR 2000 Kar 3743 (DB) which was affirmed in ILR 2003 Kar 2531 (FB) where it is declared that, Labour Courts have no jurisdiction after the amendment - Cannot be saved either on the principle or stare decisis or on the principle of prospective overruling.

       [N. Kumar, J]: When the Court interprets a provision of law it does not lay down any new law, but the Court interpret the existing law which was in force. It is settled principle that the interpretation of a provision of law relates back to the date of the law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the judgment because concededly the Court does not legislate but only give an interpretation to an existing law. Therefore, any award passed during this period is one without jurisdiction and it cannot be sustained/saved either on the principle of stare decisis nor on the principle of prospective overruling.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234 ; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255.

       Followed: 1991(1) SCC 588.

       Interpretation of statutory provision

       INTERPRETATION OF STATUES

       Interpretation of statutory provision - It relates back to the date of the statute itself and not prospective from the date of decision.

       [N. Kumar, J]: When the Court interprets a provision of law it does not lay down any new law, but the Court interpret the existing law which was in force. It is settled principle that the interpretation of a provision of law relates back to the date of the law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the judgment because concededly the Court does not legislate but only give an interpretation to an existing law. Therefore, any award passed during this period is one without jurisdiction and it cannot be sustained/saved either on the principle of stare decisis nor on the principle of prospective overruling.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366:77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255.

       Followed:1991(1) SCC 588 (Foll);

       Object of the Act

       KARNATAKA CO-OP SOCIETIES ACT, 1959

       Object of the Act - What is - Stated.

       [N. Kumar, J]: The State legislature enacted the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 with an object to consolidate and amend the laws relating to co-operative societies in the State and it generally provides for the establishment of societies, their registration, membership, rights and liabilities of members, powers of the general body, management of societies and their properties and funds, audit, winding up and dissolution and execution of awards, decrees and other matters.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970 SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119 ; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255.

       Followed:1991(1) SCC 588.

       Awards passed by Labour Courts

       KARNATAKA CO-OP SOCIETIES ACT, 1959

       Sections 70(1) & (2)(d) (As amended by Act 2/2000) - Awards passed by Labour Courts - Whether saved - Awards passed by Labour Courts after decision in ILR 1985 Kar 501 (DB) where jurisdiction of Labour Court is ousted till the decision in ILR 2000 Kar 3743 (DB) which was affirmed in ILR 2003 Kar 2531 (FB) where it is declared that, Labour Courts have no jurisdiction after the amendment - Cannot be saved either on the principle or stare decisis or on the principle of prospective overruling.

       [N. Kumar, J]: When the Court interprets a provision of law it does not lay down any new law, but the Court interpret the existing law which was in force. It is settled principle that the interpretation of a provision of law relates back to the date of the law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the judgment because concededly the Court does not legislate but only give an interpretation to an existing law. Therefore, any award passed during this period is one without jurisdiction and it cannot be sustained/saved either on the principle of stare decisis nor on the principle of prospective overruling.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970 SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255. 1991(1) SCC 588.

       Followed:AIR 1967 SC 1643.

       Prospective overruling

       AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE - Prospective overruling - Doctrine of - Borrowed from American Law.

       [N. Kumar, J]: This doctrine of prospective overruling is borrowed from American Law. There are two doctrines familiar to American Jurisprudence, one is described as Blackstonian theory and the other as "prospective overruling". Doctrine of prospective overruling as expounded by other Jurists suggest that it as "a useful judicial tool". In the words of Canfield the said expression means, "... a Court should recognize a duty to announce a new and better rule for future transactions whenever the court has reached the conviction that an old rule (as established by the precedents) is unsound even though feeling compelled by stare decisis to apply the old and condemned rule to the instance case and to transaction which had already taken place."

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136 ; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255.

       Followed: 1991(1) SCC 588.

       Duty of Courts as per

       BLACKSTONE S COMMENTARIES - Duty of Courts as per - Is not to pronounce a new law while interpreting a statutory provision.

       [N. Kumar, J]: Blackstone in his Commentaries, 69 (15th Edition 1809) stated the common law rule that the duty of the Court was "not to pronounce a new rule but to maintain and expound the old one". It means the Judge does not make law but only discovers or finds the true law. The law has always been the same. If a subsequent decision changes the earlier one, the latter decision does not make law but only discovers the correct principle of law. The result of this view is that it is necessarily retrospective in operation.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924; (1932) 287 US 358, 366: 77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727 ; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255.

       Followed:1991(1) SCC 588.

       Constitution Of India - Reconsideration of previous decisions - Article 141 - Reconsideration of previous decisions - Powers, restrictions and limitations. [N. Kumar, J]: Our Constitution which has made detailed provision about various matters relating to the Supreme Court including a matter relating to its practice, such as, whether there can be a dissenting judgment [Art. 145(5)] has not, in terms made any provision in this behalf. Article 141, no doubt, provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The phrase "all Courts" refers to Courts other than the Supreme Court. In the absence, therefore, of any clear provision in the Constitution and in view of the fact that the Supreme Court of India has historically succeeded to the pre-existing Federal Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, it would not deny itself the competence to reconsider its prior decisions. But, it does not follow that such power would be exercised without restriction or limitation or that a prior decision can be reversed on the ground that, on later consideration, the Court disagreed with the prior decision and thinks it erroneous.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727 (Ref); 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255.

       Followed:1991(1) SCC 588.

       Reconsideration of previous decisions

       CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - Article 141 - Reconsideration of previous decisions - Powers, restrictions and limitations.

       [N. Kumar, J]: Our Constitution which has made detailed provision about various matters relating to the Supreme Court including a matter relating to its practice, such as, whether there can be a dissenting judgment [Art. 145(5)] has not, in terms made any provision in this behalf. Article 141, no doubt, provides that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all Courts within the territory of India. The phrase "all Courts" refers to Courts other than the Supreme Court. In the absence, therefore, of any clear provision in the Constitution and in view of the fact that the Supreme Court of India has historically succeeded to the pre-existing Federal Court and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, it would not deny itself the competence to reconsider its prior decisions. But, it does not follow that such power would be exercised without restriction or limitation or that a prior decision can be reversed on the ground that, on later consideration, the Court disagreed with the prior decision and thinks it erroneous.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727 (Ref); 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255.

       Followed:1991(1) SCC 588.

       Precedents - Prospective overruling - Prospective overruling - Invocation of - Limitation. [N. Kumar, J]: Prospective overruling, therefore, limits to future situations and excludes application to situations which have arisen before the decision was evolved. Supreme Court of United States of America in interpretation of the Constitution, statutes or any common law rights, consistently held that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. It is, therefore, the Court to decide, on a balance of all relevant considerations, whether a decision overruling a previous principle should be applied retrospectively or not. The doctrine of prospective overruling is a doctrine which could be invoked only by the Supreme Court of India. As held in the Golak Nath s case the said principle could be applied only by the highest Court of a country, i.e., the Supreme Court and it has the constitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the Courts in India. Such a power in view of the aforesaid judgment is not conferred on the High Court. No such power could be located in the constitutional provisions.

       Precedents - Stare decisis - Stare decisis -Stare decisis - Doctrine of - Definition. [N. Kumar, J]: The legal effect of the previous decisions is governed by a complex set of conventions for which the Latin phrase "STARE DECISIS is often used. Black s new Dictionary defines stare decisis mean "to avoid by", or adhere to decided cases.

       Stare Decisis - Application of the doctrine - Application - Necessity to follow - Held, is not inflexible. [N. Kumar, J]:Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But, it is not a universal, inexorable command. The doctrine of stare decisis has hardly any application to an isolated and stray decision of the Court very recently made and not followed by a series of decisions based thereon. The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the Court, which again is called upon to consider a question once decided.

       Stare Decisis - Definition of stare decisis - Doctrine of - Definition. [N. Kumar, J]: The legal effect of the previous decisions is governed by a complex set of conventions for which the Latin phrase "STARE DECISIS is often used. Black s new Dictionary defines stare decisis mean "to avoid by", or adhere to decided cases.

       Stare Decisis - Origin and meaning of stare decisis - Stare decisis -Origin and meaning of. [N. Kumar, J]: The doctrine of stare decisis is the basis of common law. It originated in England and was used in the colonies as the basis of their judicial decisions. The genesis of the rule may be sought in factors peculiar to English legal history, amongst which may be singled out the absence of a Code. The older the decision, the greater its authority and the more truly was it accepted as stating the correct law.

       Stare Decisis - Reconsideration of earlier decisions - Reconsideration of earlier decisions - Held, should be confined to questions of great public importance. [N. Kumar, J]: Reconsideration of the earlier decisions should be confined to questions of great public importance. Legal problems should not be treated as mere subjects for mental exercise. An earlier decision may therefore be overruled only if the Court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong, not upon a mere suggestion that if the matter were res integra, the members of the later Court may arrive at a different conclusion. It is impossible to maintain as an abstract proposition that the Court is either legally or technically bound by previous decisions. Indeed, it may in a proper case be its duty to disregard them. But the rule should be applied with great caution, and only when the provision is manifestly wrong. Otherwise there would be grave danger of a want of continuity in the interpretation of the law. It is not possible to say that it is not open to the Court to review its previsions decisions on good cause. The question is not, whether the Court can do so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need for continuity and consistency in judicial decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule of law and cannot be permitted to perpetuate errors to the detriment to the general welfare of the public or a considerable section thereof.

       words and phrases - "All Courts" as found in Article 141 of Constitution - "All Courts" as found in Article 141 of constitution - Refers to Courts other than Supreme Court.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136 ; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255. Followed: 1991(1) SCC 588.

       WORDS AND PHRASES - Stare decisis - Stare decisis - Black s new Dictionary defines stare decisis to mean "to avoid by", or adhere to decided cases

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136 ; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255. Followed: 1991(1) SCC 588.

       WORDS AND PHRASES - Stare decisis - Stare decisis - Black s new Dictionary defines stare decisis to mean "to avoid by", or adhere to decided cases

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136 ; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255. Followed: 1991(1) SCC 588.

       INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 - Jurisdiction of Labour Courts - Section 10 - Jurisdiction of Labour Courts - Disputes under Section 70(1) and 21(d) of Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 - (As amended by Act 2/2000) - Awards passed by Labour Courts - Whether saved - Awards passed by Labour Courts after decision in ILR 1985 Kar 501 (DB) where jurisdiction of Labour Court is ousted till the decision in ILR 2000 Kar 3743 (DB) which was affirmed in ILR 2003 Kar 2531 (FB) where it is declared that, Labour Courts have no jurisdiction after the amendment - Cannot be saved either on the principle or stare decisis or on the principle of prospective overruling. [N. Kumar, J]: When the Court interprets a provision of law it does not lay down any new law, but the Court interpret the existing law which was in force. It is settled principle that the interpretation of a provision of law relates back to the date of the law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the judgment because concededly the Court does not legislate but only give an interpretation to an existing law. Therefore, any award passed during this period is one without jurisdiction and it cannot be sustained/saved either on the principle of stare decisis nor on the principle of prospective overruling.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136 ; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255. Followed: 1991(1) SCC 588.

       INTERPRETATION OF STATUES - Interpretation of statutory provision - Interpretation of statutory provision - It relates back to the date of the statute itself and not prospective from the date of decision. [N. Kumar, J]: When the Court interprets a provision of law it does not lay down any new law, but the Court interpret the existing law which was in force. It is settled principle that the interpretation of a provision of law relates back to the date of the law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the judgment because concededly the Court does not legislate but only give an interpretation to an existing law. Therefore, any award passed during this period is one without jurisdiction and it cannot be sustained/saved either on the principle of stare decisis nor on the principle of prospective overruling.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136 ; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255. Followed: 1991(1) SCC 588.

       KARNATAKA CO-OP SOCIETIES ACT, 1959 - Awards passed by Labour Courts - Sections 70(1) & (2)(d) (As amended by Act 2/2000) - Awards passed by Labour Courts - Whether saved - Awards passed by Labour Courts after decision in ILR 1985 Kar 501 (DB) where jurisdiction of Labour Court is ousted till the decision in ILR 2000 Kar 3743 (DB) which was affirmed in ILR 2003 Kar 2531 (FB) where it is declared that, Labour Courts have no jurisdiction after the amendment - Cannot be saved either on the principle or stare decisis or on the principle of prospective overruling. [N. Kumar, J]: When the Court interprets a provision of law it does not lay down any new law, but the Court interpret the existing law which was in force. It is settled principle that the interpretation of a provision of law relates back to the date of the law itself and cannot be prospective from the date of the judgment because concededly the Court does not legislate but only give an interpretation to an existing law. Therefore, any award passed during this period is one without jurisdiction and it cannot be sustained/saved either on the principle of stare decisis nor on the principle of prospective overruling.

       KARNATAKA CO-OP SOCIETIES ACT, 1959 - Preamble - Object of the Act - Object of the Act - What is - Stated. [N. Kumar, J]: The State legislature enacted the Karnataka Cooperative Societies Act, 1959 with an object to consolidate and amend the laws relating to co-operative societies in the State and it generally provides for the establishment of societies, their registration, membership, rights and liabilities of members, powers of the general body, management of societies and their properties and funds, audit, winding up and dissolution and execution of awards, decrees and other matters.

       Cases Referred: AIR 1970SC 245; 1976 (1) KLJ 102; 1972 (2) M.L.J. 327; ILR 1985 KAR 50; 1981 (1) KLJ 136 ; ILR 2000 KAR 3743; AIR 1997 SC 2652; 1997 (9) SCC 354; AIR 1987 SC 1960; 2002(1) LLJ 684; ILR 2001 KAR 4839; ILR 2003 KAR 2531; ILR 1997 KAR 509; AIR 1953 SC 252; AIR 1954 SC 119; AIR 1955 SC 661; AIR 1981 SC 271; 348 US 236 (1958); 362 US 572 (1946); 264 US 219 (1924); (1932) 287 US 358, 366=77 Law Ed 360; (1940) 308 US 371; (1956) 351 US 12, 20; (1966)1 WLR 1234; AIR 1967 SC 1643; 1993(4) SCC 727; 2000(6) SCC 224; (2003) SAR (Civil) 226; 1990(1) SCC 193; ILR 1997 Kar 3255. Followed: 1991(1) SCC 588.

       Prospective overruling - Invocation of - Limitation.

       PRECEDENTS - [N. Kumar, J]: Prospective overruling, therefore, limits to future situations and excludes application to situations which have arisen before the decision was evolved. Supreme Court of United States of America in interpretation of the Constitution, statutes or any common law rights, consistently held that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect. It is, therefore, the court to decide, on a balance of all relevant considerations, whether a decision overruling a previous principle should be applied retrospectively or not. The doctrine of prospective overruling is a doctrine which could be invoked only by the Supreme Court of India. As held in the Golak Nath s case the said principle could be applied only by the highest court of a country, i.e., the Supreme Court and it has the constitutional jurisdiction to declare law binding on all the Courts in India. Such a power in view of the aforesaid judgment is not conferred on the High Court. No such power could be located in the constitutional provisions.

       Stare decisis

       PRECEDENTS - Stare decisis -Stare decisis - Doctrine of - Definition.

       [N. Kumar, J]: The legal effect of the previous decisions is governed by a complex set of conventions for which the Latin phrase "STARE DECISIS is often used. Black s new Dictionary defines stare decisis mean "to avoid by", or adhere to decided cases.

       Application of the doctrine

       STARE DECISIS - Application - Necessity to follow - Held, is not inflexible.

       [N. Kumar, J]:Stare decisis is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But, it is not a universal, inexorable command. The doctrine of stare decisis has hardly any application to an isolated and stray decision of the Court very recently made and not followed by a series of decisions based thereon. The rule of stare decisis, though one tending to consistency and uniformity of decision, is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from is a question entirely within the discretion of the court, which again is called upon to consider a question once decided.c

       Definition of stare decisis

       STARE DECISIS - Doctrine of - Definition.

       [N. Kumar, J]: The legal effect of the previous decisions is governed by a complex set of conventions for which the Latin phrase "STARE DECISIS is often used. Black s new Dictionary defines stare decisis mean "to avoid by", or adhere to decided cases.

       Origin and meaning of stare decisis

       STARE DECISIS - Stare decisis -Origin and meaning of.

       [N. Kumar, J]: The doctrine of stare decisis is the basis of common law. It originated in England and was used in the colonies as the basis of their judicial decisions. The genesis of the rule may be sought in factors peculiar to English legal history, amongst which may be singled out the absence of a Code. The older the decision, the greater its authority and the more truly was it accepted as stating the correct law.

       Reconsideration of earlier decisions

       STARE DECISIS - Reconsideration of earlier decisions - Held, should be confined to questions of great public importance.

       [N. Kumar, J]: Reconsideration of the earlier decisions should be confined to questions of great public importance. Legal problems should not be treated as mere subjects for mental exercise. An earlier decision may therefore be overruled only if the Court comes to the conclusion that it is manifestly wrong, not upon a mere suggestion that if the matter were res integra, the members of the later court may arrive at a different conclusion. It is impossible to maintain as an abstract proposition that the Court is either legally or technically bound by previous decisions. Indeed, it may in a proper case be its duty to disregard them. But the rule should be applied with great caution, and only when the provision is manifestly wrong. Otherwise there would be grave danger of a want of continuity in the interpretation of the law. It is not possible to say that it is not open to the Court to review its previsions decisions on good cause. The question is not, whether the Court can do so, but whether it will, having due regard to the need for continuity and consistency in judicial decisions. The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule of law and cannot be permitted to perpetuate errors to the detriment to the general welfare of the public or a considerable section thereof.

       "All Courts" as found in Article 141 of Constitution

       WORDS AND PHRASES - "All Courts" as found in Article 141 of constitution - Refers to courts other than Supreme Court.