2006 Supreme(Kar) 540

Karnataka High Court
Judges : B.PADMARAJ,S.ABDUL NAZEER
MALLIKARJUN NINGAPPA RAGATI - Appellant
Versus
STATE OF KARNATAKA - Respondent
Cri. Appeal 525 Of 2003
Decided On : 07/13/2006
Advocates Appeared :
AMICUS CURIAE, B.V.Pinto, B.V.PINTORIAE, LATHA SAWANT SINGH, SAWANT SINGH, V.F.Kumbar

Headnote:Criminal Justice -May be and must be -Conviction can only be based on must be. -Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely; may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between may be and must be is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.

       Indian Penal Code -Section 143, 147, 148, 323,504,302 & 307 r/w 149 -Motive -Burden on Prosecution -Whether discharged. Held, the motive attributed by the prosecution could be established. It is generally an impossible task for the prosecution to prove what precisely would have impelled the appellants to kill the deceased. All that the prosecution in many cases could point to is the possible mental element, which could have been the cause of the murder. Even the case suggested by the defence would show that all was not well between the deceased and his brothers viz., the appellants herein. Under the circumstances, therefore, we are of the view that the prosecution has been able to establish that there was a motive for the appellants to commit the crime.

       Criminal Justice -May be and must be -Conviction can only be based on must be. -Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely; may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between may be and must be is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.

       Criminal Appeal No. 525/2003; Decided on 13-7-2006. Cases Referred: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220; 2001 SCC (Cri) 190-B; 2002 SCC (Cri) 1600-D; 1999 SCW 982; 1998 SC 1328; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1447-C and 1697-G; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1840-F and 32-E; 2004 SCC (Cri) 276-D.

       Trial Procedure -May be and must be -Conviction can only be based on must be. -Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely; may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental distance between may be and must be is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.

       Cases Referred: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220; 2001 SCC (Cri) 190-B; 2002 SCC (Cri) 1600-D; 1999 SCW 982; 1998 SC 1328; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1447-C and 1697-G; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1840-F and 32-E; 2004 SCC (Cri) 276-D.

       Legal Maxims -Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus -Reliability -Whether a sound rule of law. [B.Padmaraj and S.Abdul Nazeer, JJ.] : The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness, whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate, exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. In most cases, the witnesses when asked about the details, venture to give some answer not necessarily true or relevant, have fear that their evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main incident which they have witnessed but, that is not to say that their evidence as to the salient features of the case after cautious scrutiny cannot be considered though, where the substratum of the prosecution case is disbelieved, it may not be permissible for the Court to reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" is not to be blindly invoked in appraising evidence adduced in our Courts where witnesses seldom deliver the whole truth, but, often resort to exaggerations, embellishments and padding-up to support a story however true in the main. It is the function of the Court to disengage the truth from falsehood and to accept what it finds to be true and reject the rest. Further, as human testimony resulting from widely different powers of observation and description, is necessarily faulty and even truthful witness not infrequently exaggerate or imagine or deliver half truths, the Courts must try to extract and separate the hard core of truth from the whole evidence. This is what is meant by the proverbial saying that "the Courts must separate chaff from the grain". If, after considering the whole mass of evidence, a residue of acceptable truth is established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt, the Courts are bound to give effect to the result flowing from it and not to throw it over board on purely hypothetical and conjectural grounds. Induced, it is very difficult to find a witness whose evidence is so flawless that it has to be wholly, completely and unqualifiedly accepted. There is no general rule that the evidence of the relations of the deceased must be corroborated for securing the conviction of the accused. Likewise, merely because, the other persons who could have been present at the spot and witnessed the occurrence have not been examined, would not be a sound reason to reject the evidence of the relatives, which is otherwise acceptable and reliable to decline to act upon the testimony of the relations of the deceased merely because of the absence of other witnesses to corroborate them in Court, is to defeat the cause of justice in a given case. The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking under an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be truthful or unreliable in any particular aspect. Witnesses solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during the trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with full sense of responsibility of the consequences of what they state. The close relative of the deceased in a murder case, who is a very natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate the innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person, against whom, a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. In substance, the mere fact that a witness is a relation of the deceased or his partisan is not sufficient to discard his or her testimony.

       Cases Referred: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220; 2001 SCC (Cri) 190-B; 2002 SCC (Cri) 1600-D; 1999 SCW 982; 1998 SC 1328; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1447-C and 1697-G; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1840-F and 32-E; 2004 SCC (Cri) 276-D.

       Medical Jurisprudence -Injuries -Fatality of. Held, from the evidence of the Doctor-PW,19 and the post-mortem report as well as the wound certificate issued by him, it can safely be inferred that the deceased had died of violence and his wife PW.2 had sustained certain injuries on her person which could have been proved fatal but for the timely treatment and they were caused by an external violence. Almost all the injuries sustained by the deceased and the injured-PW.2 could be caused by the weapons like the MOs.1 to 3 that have been produced in the case. Under the circumstances, therefore, it can safely be held that the prosecution has been able to establish that the death of the deceased was homicidal and the injured-PW.2 had sustained certain serious injuries on her person which could have been proved fatal, but for the timely treatment.

       Cases Referred: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220; 2001 SCC (Cri) 190-B; 2002 SCC (Cri) 1600-D; 1999 SCW 982; 1998 SC 1328; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1447-C and 1697-G; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1840-F and 32-E; 2004 SCC (Cri) 276-D.

       Indian Evidence Act -Section 3 -Falsus in uno falsus in omni bus Maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omni bus" is not a sound rule for the reason that hardly one comes across a witness, whose evidence does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate, exaggeration, embroideries or embellishments. Held, in most cases, the witnesses when asked about the details, venture to give some answer not necessarily true or relevant, have fear that their evidence may not be accepted in respect of the main incident which they have witnessed but, that is not to say that their evidence as to the salient features of the case after cautious scrutiny cannot be considered though, where the substratum of the prosecution case is disbelieved, it may not be permissible for the Court to reconstruct a story of its own out of the rest. The maxim "falsus in uno falsus in omnibus" is not to be blindly invoked in appraising evidence adduced in our Courts where witnesses seldom deliver the whole truth, but, often resort to exaggerations, embellishments and padding-up to support a story however true in the main. It is the function of the Court to disengage the truth from falsehood and to accept what it finds to be true and reject the rest. Further, as human testimony resulting from widely different powers of observation and description, is necessarily faulty and even truthful witness not infrequently exaggerate or imagine or deliver half truths, the Courts must try to extract and separate the hard core of truth from the whole evidence. This is what is meant by the proverbial saying that "the Courts must separate chaff from the grain". If, after considering the whole mass of evidence, a residue of acceptable truth is established by the prosecution beyond any reasonable doubt, the Courts are bound to give effect to the result flowing from it and not to throw it over board on purely hypothetical and conjectural grounds. Induced, it is very difficult to find a witness whose evidence is so flawless that it has to be wholly, completely and unqualifiedly accepted. There is no general rule that the evidence of the relations of the deceased must be corroborated for securing the conviction of the accused. Likewise, merely because, the other persons who could have been present at the spot and witnessed the occurrence have not been examined, would not be a sound reason to reject the evidence of the relatives, which is otherwise acceptable and reliable to decline to act upon the testimony of the relations of the deceased merely because of the absence of other witnesses to corroborate them in Court, is to defeat the cause of justice in a given case. The ordinary presumption is that a witness speaking order an oath is truthful unless and until he is shown to be untruthful or unreliable in any particular aspect. Witnesses solemnly deposing on oath in the witness box during the trial upon a grave charge of murder, must be presumed to act with full sense of responsibility of the consequences of what they state. The close relative of the deceased in a murder case, who is a very natural witness cannot be regarded as an interested witness. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate the innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person, against whom, a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but the foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth. The mechanical rejection of such evidence on the sole ground that it is partisan would invariably lead to failure of justice. In substance, the mere fact that a witness is a relation of the deceased or his partisan is not sufficient to discard his or her testimony.

       Indian Evidence Act -Section 3 -There is no rule of law that if Court acquits accused on evidence of a witness finding it to be open to some doubt, any other accused against whom there is absolute certainty about his complicity in the crime based on the remaining credible part of the evidence of that witness, should also be acquitted.

       Cases Referred: 2002 SCC (Cri) 1220; 2001 SCC (Cri) 190-B; 2002 SCC (Cri) 1600-D; 1999 SCW 982; 1998 SC 1328; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1447-C and 1697-G; 2003 SCC (Cri) 1840-F and 32-E; 2004 SCC (Cri) 276-D.