P. K. Shyamasundar, J.

( 1 ) THESE are 5 Original Suits transferred to this Court for disposal by an order of the Supreme court of India made on the 9th February, 1988 on an application made by one Adityan against whom there were a spate of suits virtually all over the Country. In the context of application made by Adityan, the Order referred to above came to be passed by the Supreme Court transferring all the cases to this Court for disposal. Supreme Court while passing the aforesaid order had also directed the suits to be disposed off within three months from the date of Order if that was possible but regrettably it has not been possible to comply with that direction since the order along with the records in several cases was received by this Court after more than two months had elapsed from the date of Supreme Court's Order made on 9th February, 1988 (Ex. D-41 ). Thereafter it was noticed that in most of the cases service of summons had not been completed and pleadings were also not complete. With all this preliminary work having taken some time it was only possible thereafter to proceed with the task of hearing them which task was to some extent facilitated by the stipulation made on behalf of the plaintiffs -M/s. V. C. Shukla, erstwhile President of Indian Olympic Association in O. S. 2/88 and the other plaintiff, the Madhya Pradesh Olympic Associating agreeing to have these suits disposed off only on one issue which arises in common in all these Suits viz. whether the General Assembly of Indian olympic Association (hereinafter referred to as 'the. O. A. ') had the power to remove the president in office by passing a vote of no confidence. The other questions raised including what transpired at the meeting of the. O. A at which the disputed vote of no confidence is said to have been passed, were given up by a memo filed before this Court on 15-7-1988. The said memo reads: "in order not to disturb the continuance in the management of the affairs of the IOA the plaintiff will not question the validity or propriety of any acts done by the IOA under the purported presidentship of Mr. Adityan". The plaintiffs further submitted that they would not lead oral evidence and just confine themselves to making submissions on the basis of documents tendered in evidence which were got marked by consent after dispensing with proof. This procedure resulted in the marking of exs. P-1 to P-5 and Exs. D-1 to D-50, by consent with the result the Court was enabled to try the crucial issue arising for consideration, as aforesaid, straightaway without being put to the necessity of recording evidence in that behalf. I must add, as the plaintiffs opted not to lead any oral evidence defendants likewise desisted from leading any oral evidence. The statements made to this effect at the Bar have been duly recorded and find reference in the minutes maintained of these proceedings.

( 2 ) ALTHOUGH this Court is rarely called upon to decide legal matters in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, a discipline to which it is almost a stranger, the proceedings in these cases being original Suits have nonetheless become amenable for disposal as if they were either appeals or other miscellaneous proceedings arising under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. The fact that both sides agreed to short-circuit what otherwise promised to be a marathon trial, regard being had to the keenness with which the cases had been contested in this Court, it has now been possible to compress the controversy and to confine it to a single point lying within a narrow compass. This, as I have said, has been possible by the very reasonable attitude adopted by Counsel appearing on either side with Mr. Nariman, Senior Advocate-Supreme Court, leading or the plaintiffs along with the then Advocate General of Karnataka - Sr. Santhosh Hegde and sr. Udaya Holla and the defendants represented by Mr. Sundaraswamy, another Senior advocate of this Court, assisted by Junior

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