Ajit J. Gunjal, J.

Even though the matter is listed for preliminary hearing, with the consent of both the Counsel, it is taken up for final disposal.

2. The backdrop of the case can be summarised as follows:

During the course of this order, the parties would be referred to as per the ranking in the executing Court.

Way back in the year 1994, the first decree holder initiated eviction proceedings against the judgment debtors under Section 21(1)(h) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act’). It is not necessary for us to look into the averments made in the rent control proceedings except noticing that the petition was for bonafide requirement. The Court of the first instance allowed the eviction petition, as against which a revision was preferred. The said revision was dismissed as against which the judgment debtors preferred HRRP No. 1870/1996 before this Court. This Court confirmed the findings recorded by the Court below. While disposing of the revision petition, this Court observed thus:

“After arguing the matter for some time, Smt. Rajarajeswari, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners, submitted that if petitioners are given three years’ time from today to hand-over vacant possession of the premises in question, the petitioners will not press this revision petition.”

The first decree holder, on the fond hope that the longdrawn litigation would be put to an end, conceded for granting of three years’ time. Hence the aid revision petition was disposed of directing the judgment debtors to quit and deliver vacant possession within three years.

An undertaking was also directed to be filed to that effect. One of the conditions was that the petitioners shall voluntarily hand-over vacant possession of the premises in question to the respondents on or before 31.12.1999 To that effect, an affidavit was also filed. But however the fond hopes were belied. As like any other abrasive tenants, the judgment debtors did not choose to vacate the premises, pursuant to the affidavit and the solemn undertaking given to this Court. This compelled the first decree holder to initiate contempt proceedings in CCC (Civil) 2030/2000. This Court, having regard to the undertaking given by the judgment debtors, found that it is not open for the judgment debtors to contend that they have not committed any contempt of the Court. This Court, while accepting the contempt petition, has quoted with approval, the principle laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of D.M. SAMYULLA Vs. COMMISSIONER, CORPORATION OF CITY OF BANGALORE reported in 1990(1) KLJ 352:

“The principle laid down in the said decision is that a party who knows an order, whether it is null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it and it would be dangerous to allow the party to decide as to whether an order was null or void and whether it was regular of irregular. In our opinion, such a principle would be attracted in cases where there has been an order of the Court against any particular person or authority and that person are authority takes the stand that the order of the Court is illegal or it is bad for not following any mandatory procedure or takes upon himself or itself to disobey the order of the Court.”

This passage is quoted by the Division Bench approving the decision rendered by the Court of appeal in HADKINSON Vs. HADKINSON reported in 1952(2) ALL E.R. 567. Consequently, the said contempt petition was allowed in part holding that the first judgment debtor was guilty of Civil Contempt and was convicted and sentenoed for such civil contempt to pay a fine of Rs.2000/-. It was also further directed that the said fine shall be paid within a period of one month from the date of order and in default, he shall be detained in civil prison for a period of 15 days. Insofar as the second judgment debtor was concerned, she was discharged on the ground that she was a widow and was aged 80 years. The contempt Court also obser