This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the court of the City Civil Judge, Bangalore in O.S. No. 7136/2009 insofar as it relates to ‘A’ schedule property.

2. The facts of the case in brief are that the appellants claim to have purchased the sites from Sued Makthiar Pasha, the general power of attorney holder of one Smt. Vazira Bi and her children. The said Smt. Vazira bi and her daughter, Razia Bi, it is claimed, got the properties in question by virtue of a registered will, dated 29/5/1981 executed by Sri Shaik Kaladar Sab. The appellants claim to have built the houses on their respective sites. They claim to have been paying the property tax to the local bodies.

3. At the other end of the spectrum, the respondent no.1 filed O.S. No.534/2002 seeking the relief of permanent injunction in respect of the lands standing at Sy.Nos.57/2 and 57/4 of Doddabettahalli village measuring 1 acre 2 guntas and measuring 16 guntas respectively. The suit was dismissed by the Trial Court by its judgment dated 17/1/2008. Thereafter, the respondent no.1 filed O.s.No.7136/2009 for partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties. The suit culminated in the compromise under the aegis of the Mediation Centre.

4. Apprehending that the respondent no.1 may alienate the properties based on the compromise decree and the consequent change of khatah, this appeal is filed.

5. This appeal is posted for orders on the office note regarding the maintainability of the appeal.

6. Sir S.P. Shankar, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri Ranga Ramu for the appellants requests that the notice be ordered to the respondents keeping open the issue of maintainability of the appeal. He submits that the appellants are not parties to the suit and hence obviously not parties to the compromise arrangement also. As the appellants have purchased the sites carved out of suit schedule ‘A’ property, their interests are required to be protected. He brings to my notice, the provisions contained in Section 96(3) of the CPC and submits that there is no legal impediment in filing the appeal to challenge the compromise decree, as the appellants have not given their consent to the same.

7. The learned Senior Counsel brings to my notice the Apex Court judgment in the case of State of Punjab & others versus Amar Singh & another, reported in AIR 1974 SC 994. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment is extracted herein below:

“84. Firstly, there is a catena of authorities which, following the doctrine of Lindley, L.J., in re securities Insurance Co., (1894) 2 Ch 410 have laid down the rule that a person who is not a party to a decree or order may with the leave of the court, prefer an appeal from such decree or order if he is either bound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially affected by it. As a rule, leave to appeal will not be refused to a person who might have been made ex nominee a party –see province of Bombay versus W.I. Automobile Association, AIR 1949 Bom 141; Heera Singh versus Verka, AIR 1958 Raj 181 and Shivaraya versus Siddamma, AIR 1963 Mys 127; Executive Officer versus Raghavan Pillai, AIR 1961 Ker 114. In re B, an infant (1958) 1 QB 12; Govinda Menon versus Madhavan Nair, AIR 1964 Ker 235”.

8. Nextly, Sri Shankar sought to draw support from the decision of this court in the case of S.G. Thimmappa versus T. Anantha & others, reported in AIR 1986 KAR 1, wherein it is held that the compromise decree can be challenged on the ground of fraud, undue influence or coercion. He also takes me through the Apex Court judgment in the case of Ruby Sales & Services (p) Ltd & another versus State of Maharashtra & others reported in (1994) 1 SCC 531, wherein it is held that a consent decree can be set aside on any of the grounds on which the agreement itself can be set aside. He submits that the compromise decree does not stand on a footing higher than the agreement which preceded it; a consent decree is a mere