2015 Supreme(Kar) 136

HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
N. KUMAR & RATHNAKALA, JJ.
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA – COMPLAINANT
Vs.
JAI CHAITANYA DASA @ JAYANARAYANA K. – ACCUSED
C.C.C. (CRIMINAL) NO. 20 of 2009
Decided On : 16.4.2015

Headnote:CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 - Sections 2(c) & 15: [N. Kumar & Mrs. Rathnakala, JJ] Suo motu proceedings - Filing of an application by a party to the proceedings requesting a Judge to recuse himself from hearing the case on the ground that he is biased - Held, Mere filing a recusal application does not constitute contempt. There was no intention on the part of the first respondent to insult the learned Judge. They have not made any allegations against his integrity. They have not accused him of any dishonesty. The words chosen in the affidavit are mild, courteous and respectful. The said allegations are neither serious nor scurrilous in nature scandalizing the Court and imputing improper motives to the learned Judge trying the case. He was only expressing the apprehension in his mind which is induced because of the utterances of the learned Judge in the open Court as well as its wide publicity given in the news papers. He bonafidely believed that the learned Judge is prejudiced against them. It was a reasonable doubt which he entertained in his mind. There was no intention to interfere with the due course of justice or proper administration of law by the Court. On the contrary, for proper administration of law, he wanted the learned Judge to recuse himself. Therefore, it cannot be held that in the facts of this case, the filing of the recusal application and the allegations made therein are scurrilous in nature scandalizing the Court and imputing improper motives to the learned Judge hearing the appeal and that it amounts to contempt of the Court. The letters written by two Advocate was held to be unwarranted.

       CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 - Section 2(c): [N. Kumar & Mrs. Rathnakala, JJ] Contempt - Credibility in the functioning of the justice delivery system and the reasonable perception of the affected parties are relevant considerations to ensure the continuance of public confidence in the credibility and impartiality of the judiciary. This is necessary not only for doing justice but also for ensuring that justice is seen to be done. The initiation of contempt action should be only when there is substantial and mala fide interference with fearless judicial action, but not on fair comment or trivial reflections on the judicial process and personnel. The respect for judiciary must rest on a more surer foundation than recourse to contempt jurisdiction.

       CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 - Section 2(c): [N. Kumar & Mrs. Rathnakala, JJ] Contempt of Court - The power of the Court to initiate a proceeding for criminal contempt is a plenary one with grave consequences but the same ought to be sparingly exercised. The Contempt of Courts Act is a penal statute. In the matter of interpreting a penal provision, it is well known that it must be strictly construed so far as the penal consequences are concerned. Contempt proceedings should not be initiated at every irritant or pin-prick. Normally, the Courts should not be oversensitive and should not take very serious note of any loose expressions in the application. Deference to judiciary cannot be secured by the scepter of contempt but is to be attained by the sublime-quality of the conduct of the Judges and their judgments. Contempt jurisdiction is to be sparingly exercised and in very exceptional cases. If a Judge is defamed in such a way as not to affect the administration of justice, he has the ordinary remedies for defamation, if he should feel impelled to use them.

       CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 - Section 15: [N. Kumar & Mrs. Rathnakala, JJ] Where in a matter, an application is made requesting a learned Judge to recuse himself from hearing the matter, when the application is dismissed and matter was ordered to be posted before another Bench, virtually the application is allowed and there is no scope to initiate contempt proceedings - More so, when the SLP filed against dismissal of application was dismissed by Apex Court holding that the Division Bench before whom the matter is listed shall consider the matter afresh untrammeled by the observations made in the impugned order.

       CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 - Section 15(2): [N. Kumar & Mrs. Rathnakala, JJ] Writing letters to Judges attributing improper motives - Held, it not only transgresses the limits of fair and bonafide criticism, but has a clear tendency to affect the dignity and prestige of this Court and also interferes with the administration of justice. The reflection on the conduct or character of a Judge in reference to the discharge of his judicial duties would not be contempt, if such reflection is made in the exercise of the right of fair and reasonable criticism which every citizen possesses in respect of public acts done in the seat of justice. When attacks or comments are made on a Judge or Judges disparaging in character and derogatory to their dignity, care should be taken to distinguish between what is a libel on a Judge and what really amounts to contempt of Court. Freedom is what Freedom does and Justice fails when Judges quail and for sure his plea is not for judicial pachydermy, but for dignified detachment which ignores ill-informed criticism in its tolerant stride, but strikes when offensive excesses are established.

       CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971 - Section 15(2): [N. Kumar & Mrs. Rathnakala, JJ] Writing letters to Judges, hearing the case attributing improper motives - Judge has to answer his conscience. If there is any iota of truth in the allegation made in the said letter against him, the choice is his. He can ignore the same and discharge his duties without any fear or favour and without any ill will or affection. However, if for any reason, he lacks courage or feels embarrassed to take up the mater and decide the case, he can recuse himself from hearing the matter. It should end there. The question of initiating contempt proceedings on the basis of such letter or if the author of the letter is not known, to hold an enquiry to trace who the author is, would, be a waste of precious judicial and public time which we cannot afford in the circumstances we are placed.

       CONSTITUTION OF INDIA - Articles 129 & 215: [N. Kumar & Mrs. Rathnakala, JJ] Powers under - The power conferred upon the Supreme Court and the High Court, being the Courts of Record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution respectively, is an inherent power and that the jurisdiction vested is a special power not derived from any other statute but derived only from Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the Constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged by any legislation or abrogated or cut down nor can they be controlled or limited by any statute or by any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure or any Rules. Inherent power of a Superior Court of Record remains unaffected even after the codification of the law of contempt of Courts. Though Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act of 1971 prescribes the procedure, the inherent power under Article 215 cannot be curtailed by anything contained in the said Act. The provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 are in addition to and not in derogation of the Article and it cannot be used for limiting or regulating the exercise of the Jurisdiction contemplated by the Article. The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the Courts of record and described as a necessary incident to every Court of Justice. This power, though inherent to the High Court, is given a Constitutional status by Article 215 of the Constitution for securing public respect and confidence in the judicial process.

       PRACTICE & PROCEDURE - Private communication: : [N. Kumar & Mrs. Rathnakala, JJ] Private communications of an Advocate with a Judge relating to a pending case is forbidden under Bar Council of India Rules.