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2015 Supreme(Kar) 103

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
ANAND BYRAREDDY, J.
Smt. Sharadamma & Ors., - APPELLANTS
Versus
Sri. R. Vishwanath & Ors., - RESPONDENTS
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL No.248 OF 2012
Decided On : 17-3-2015

Advocates:
Advocate Appeared:
Shri. A.S.Mahesha, Advocate
Shri. K.B.S.Manian, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 1 to 8 Shri K.N. Puttegowda, Advocate for Respondent Nos. 9 to 10

Headnote:TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 - Section 43: [Anand Byrareddy, J] Doctrine of feeding the estoppel - Scope and Application - Held, (1) The doctrine of feeding the estoppels envisages that, ’where a grantor has purported to grant an interest in land which he did not at the time possess, but subsequently acquires, the benefit of his subsequent acquisition, goes automatically to the earlier grantee, or as it is usually expressed, feeds the estoppels. (2) In order to get the benefit of the said provision, the conditions which must be satisfied are - (i) The contract of transfer was made by a person who was competent to contract; and (ii) The contract would be subsisting at the time when a claim for recovery of the property is made.

        However, the provisions would have no application if the transfer was invalid as being forbidden by law or contrary to public policy, as envisaged under Section 23 of the Contract Act. Thus, no estoppel can be pleaded contrary to the provisions of a statute. The ’rule of feeding the estoppel’ shall apply in absence thereof.

        For the application of Section 43 of the TP Act, two conditions must be satisfied. Firstly, that there is a fraudulent or erroneous representation made by the transferor to the transferee that he is authorized to transfer certain immovable property and in the purported exercise of authority, professed to transfer such property for consideration. Subsequently, when it is discovered that the transferor acquired an interest in the transferred property, at the option of the transferee, he is entitled to get the restitution of interest in property got by the transferor, provided the transferor acquires such interest in the property during which contract of transfer must subsist.

       TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 - Section 43: [Anand Byrareddy, J] Doctrine of feeding the estoppel - Suit for declaration that subject sale deed executed in favour of D-2 is null and void, for possession and consequential injunction etc. - Death of Plaintiff pending suit - House allotted by Karnataka Housing Board - Non-alienation period of 10 years - Plaintiff’s husband had mortgaged a portion in favour of D-1 - Cancellation of lease by Karnataka Housing Board - Held, Plaintiff’s husband was not the absolute owner at the time of execution of sale deed in favour of D-1. Contents of sale deed showing that D-1 was fully aware of the fact. Defendant cannot invoke Section 43 of T.P. Act.

JUDGMENT :


This is an appeal by the plaintiff. The parties are referred to by their rank before the trial court for the sake of convenience. The suit of the plaintiff was filed for the following declaratory reliefs, for possession and consequential injunction:

a. That a sale deed dated 29.3.1985, executed by her husband, S. Ranoji Rao in favour of the first defendant as being null and void

b. That a gift deed dated 26.06.2003 vide document No.1463/2003-04 recorded in C.D.No.18, registered before the Sub-Registrar, Srirampuram, Bangalore, executed by the first defendant in favour of the second defendant as being null and void.

c. That a bifurcation order dated 3.9.2003 passed by the third and fourth defendants as being null and void.

d. To declare the plaintiff as the owner of the suit property as per sale deed dated 3.6.2003, executed by the Karnataka Housing Board in favour of the plaintiff.

e. For possession of the suit property and

f. For injunction restraining the defendants 1 & 2 from alienating the suit property.

2. The facts as stated by the plaintiff are as follows:

The plaintiff having died during the pendency of the suit, the same has been prosecuted by the widow and children of S. Ranoji Rao, the original plaintiff. He is said to have been allotted a residential house by the Karnataka Housing Board (KHB ) under a Scheme, known as Industrial Housing Scheme of the KHB. Under the Scheme the KHB is said to have constructed houses and had allotted the houses on a lease–cum-sale basis. The plaintiff’s husband was said to have been allotted a house bearing no. 52/B , Manuvanahosahalli, II Phase, Bangalore, measuring East to West 52 + 49½ feet and North to South 25 feet, as per Order dated 24.9.1979. A lease-cum-sale deed was said to have been executed on 21.9.1981, which was also said to have been duly registered. There was a condition that the said property could not be alienated for a period of 10 years. And subject to the allottee conforming to other terms and conditions, KHB was to execute an absolute sale deed at the end of 10 years from the date of the lease-cum-sale deed. In the event of a breach of the conditions, by the lessee, the KHB was empowered to recover possession of the property and any amounts paid by the lessee would stand forfeited. The price was said to have been fixed at Rs.11,827/-. The lessee was obliged to meet all outgoing expenses and charges such as property tax, water and electricity charges, etc.

3. It is stated that the plaintiff’s husband, notwithstanding the bar on alienation during the lease period, had mortgaged a portion of the property measuring 28.6 feet by 25.6 feet, which was more fully described in the Schedule to the plaint, to the first defendant. It is stated that in the year 1985, the first defendant is said to have filed a suit in OS 2167/1985, for permanent injunction claiming to be the owner of the said extent of the property, against the plaintiff. It is further claimed that Rao had become aware only thereafter, that the first defendant had in fact obtained a sale deed instead of a mortgage deed. In any event, that suit had been decreed in part and the first defendant was permitted to use the door on the northern side of the suit property, purportedly to provide access to the suit property. The court however, had not entered upon the question of title to the property.

On the strength of the sale deed said to have been executed by the plaintiff, the first defendant is said to have sought for and obtained a khatha certificate from defendants 3 & 4 after having obtained an order for bifurcation of the suit property from the main building.

However, on the expiry of the ten year period under the lease deed, at the instance of the husband of the plaintiff, the KHB is said to have executed an absolute sale deed in respect of the entire extent of the property, in consonance with the lease deed, including the extent held by the first defendant. As the KHB had proceeded on the footing








































































































































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